考慮到中國國家主席習近平在11月15日舊金山習拜登峰會上的講話，以及中美在恢復軍事高層對話的共識，這次峰會將對未來幾年台灣的政治前途有直接影響。
首先，習近平主席詳細闡述了中方在台灣問題上的原則立場。他說，台灣問題始終是中美關係中最重要、最敏感的問題。中方高度重視2022年11月習近平主席和拜登總統在峇里島會晤期間，美方積極表達的涉台立場；美方重申「一個中國」政策沒有改變，維護台海和平穩定符合世界利益。
最重要的是，習近平主席11月15日表示，「美方應該將不支持台獨的表態體現在具體行動上」。此外，美國應該「停止武裝台灣，支持中國和平統一」。習近平又說，「中國終將統一，也必然統一」。
習近平暗示統一時間表？
中國國家主席在美國總統面前，首次以前所未有的方式發表此類言論。其意義是顯而易見的：中國非常渴望和平解決台灣問題，而北京認為美國武裝台灣是和平解決台灣問題的障礙──中國大陸一貫堅持這一立場。
習近平的講話暗示，中方或許希望在他有生之年解決台灣問題。
針對習近平對台灣的立場，拜登在峇里島重申了美方的5點承諾：（一）美國不尋求新冷戰；（二）美國無意改變中國的體制；（三）美國不尋求透過強化同盟關係反對中國； （四）美方不支持台灣獨立；（五）美國無意與中國發生衝突。此外，美國支持「一個中國」政策，歡迎各級部門真誠、開放地進行對話，增進了解，避免誤解，管控分歧。
據傳媒報道，習近平在與拜登的會晤中，否認中方有在2027年或2035年「收復」台灣的計劃，儘管一些美國軍方將領曾提出過這樣的說法。
11月15日雙方達成的重要共識，是同意恢復軍事高層對話。顯然，雙方都希望避免在台灣問題上發生軍事意外事件、衝突和對抗，特別是美國軍機經常飛近中國軍機，反之亦然。雙方海軍也必須避免在台灣海峽發生不必要的事故或衝突。
儘管如此，中美兩國如何管理從指揮到作戰層級的各個層面的軍事交流，仍有待觀察。如果危機發生在作戰層面，就必須立即上升到指揮層面解決危機──這是一個需要各層級迅速決策和立即反應的過程，以化解任何軍事事故或衝突。因此，對任何危機的管控將取決於中美雙方從作戰到指揮各層級的縱向溝通，進而取決於雙方指揮梯隊之間的橫向溝通。
美國在這次三藩市APEC領導人非正式會議的策略是奏效的：首先關注那些更容易達成共識的問題，特別是禁毒問題──這是中方必須同意的問題。其他比較容易的問題包括更多美國學生到中國進行教育交流，這也重視了人文交流。
政治解決方案 缺乏吸引選擇
然而，APEC會議並未討論雙方將如何利用人文交流，來探討台灣政治前途的解決方案。
中央政府2022年8月發布的《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》白皮書，一再重申「和平統一、一國兩制」是解決台灣問題的基本方針。白皮書提到採取分階段解決台灣問題的可能性。到目前為止，美國智庫似乎還沒有注意到這項採取分階段談判進程的建議。
因此，可以說，美方應該利用其財力雄厚的政治智庫，來討論分階段進程如何有助於化解台灣危機，以及這一進程如何促進雙方討價還價、互惠互利的談判。
習主席關於美方須停止武裝台灣的言論措辭強硬，暗示美國對台灣軍事的支持，無論現在和將來都是和平解決台灣問題的最大障礙。因此，美方必須深入思考如何促進海峽兩岸探討各種政治解決方案。
客觀而言，不少台灣民眾對一國兩制模式持排拒態度，儘管中方一再重申這是一國兩制的台灣模式，意味着台灣將擁有參與國際事務的空間，在國際組織使用「中國台北」這一名稱。此外，2022年8月的白皮書明確表示，將允許外國在台灣設立領事館或其他官方或半官方機構，這種狀態將持續下去。
中美關係在台灣問題上的癥結在於缺乏對大多數台灣民眾有吸引力的選擇。以國民黨為首的台灣藍營，確實贊成並支持與中國大陸統一──這一立場遭到了更為本土主義和激進的民進黨批評和拒絕。
更糟的是，藍營和白營之間缺乏共識。在撰寫本文時，以朱立倫和馬英九為首的國民黨或藍營致力與柯文哲領導的民眾黨結盟，但台灣最新的報道指出，民眾黨領導層不願接受國民黨提出對侯友宜和柯文哲的民調結果進行統計的提議。民眾黨領導層爭論，如果計算3%而不是6%的標準差，那麼，柯侯配與侯柯配的票數相差無幾。誰是正誰是副總統候選人成為爭論的焦點，表明台灣政治基本上是利己主義、利益本位和黨派鬥爭的。
台灣大選影響解決方案
2024年1月台灣總統選舉將有兩種情況：（1）國民黨和民眾黨未能組成聯合政府，賴清德領導的民進黨獲勝，或（2）國民黨、民眾黨結盟在台灣的總統選舉中首次獲勝。
如果無法組成「藍白合」競選總統，可能會出現第三種情況：即總統大位被民進黨奪去，但立法院卻會出現國民黨、民眾黨聯手阻止法案和政策的情況。
這種情況將導致立法院陷入僵局，將不利於台灣政治前途的任何解決方案。
因此，台灣島內政治的發展，將影響台灣政治前途任何擬議解決方案的結果，儘管中國和美國可能會達成一致的解決方案。
目前，美國政府對防衛台灣採取強硬態度，不像馬歇爾將軍在1946年和1947年未能在國共兩黨之間達成和解方案，後來受到麥克阿瑟將軍批評，指他放棄補給國民黨軍隊，讓大量美製軍需品落入共軍手中。馬歇爾確實嘗試在國民黨和中共之間進行斡旋，但失敗了。美國軍方放棄軍事支持蔣介石，注定了國民黨從1947年到1949年在大陸節節敗退。
美國很難辦到 停止武裝台灣
今天，我們目睹了一個正在崛起的中國，其國內政治是家長式的。諷刺的是，其外交政策卻更加自由，並具有實現「人類命運共同體」的社會主義願景。然而，美國內部多元主義、外在自我保護主義/霸權主義的意識形態，以及舊有的「神授天命」主義，宣揚西方「民主」的普世價值，與中方大肆宣傳「中國式現代化和民主」的意識形態存在直接衝突。因此，武裝台灣是不可避免的，而要求美國停止武裝台灣似乎很難辦到。
因此，有利於台海和平的中間方案是美國智庫需要考慮的問題，包括如何讓一國兩制的台灣模式對大多數台灣民眾更具吸引力。
大陸對台白皮書首次提出的分階段進程，可以進一步劃分。例如，在第一階段，台灣方面必須接受「九二共識」，以換取大陸採取行動，例如允許比以往更多的大陸民眾到台灣旅遊。其他事項還可以進一步交換，例如正式承認大陸擁有台灣領土，以換取大陸方面放棄使用武力解決台灣問題。
無論談判過程中交換什麼內容，美國都可能成為台灣政權諮詢的角色，尤其是在民進黨政府執政的情況下。
另一個問題是，無論大陸方面提出什麼方案，台灣都會提交立法院表決。如果立法院由民進黨主導，這樣的方案就會被拒絕。如果是藍白執政聯盟主導的話，和平解決方案的通過就會遭到民進黨的拒絕。在所有這些情況之下，美國合適的角色是什麼？保持中立？在台灣政治前途談判的過程中，中國將如何回應美國的立場。大陸與台灣之間是否應該以諒解備忘錄的形式，而不是將任何擬議的解決方案提交台灣立法院投票？然而，這樣的諒解備忘錄可能會被批評缺乏民意授權。
短期解決之道 加強人文交流
儘管前路艱難，短期解決之道是加強中國大陸與台灣、中美之間的人文交流。這種交流，特別是在涉及更多學者的智庫層面，有望帶來解決台灣政治所需前途的集體智慧。
總之，美方是時候思考一下其財力雄厚的智庫如何將如何考慮中方「一國兩制」台灣模式的各種修改版本。要求美國停止武裝台灣似乎是一個難以達成的目標，但這確實意味着美國學者和官員將不得不思考有利於和平解決台灣政治前途的解決方案。馬歇爾的時代已經一去不復返了，他在1946年和1947年初未能促成國共雙方達成協議，至今仍產生深遠的影響。目前美國對台政策已完全逆轉，國民黨亦不是台灣的執政黨。意味着民進黨政權將不斷獲得美國武器──這一立場必然會引起北京的憤怒。因此，按照一國兩制的台灣模式，探索中間解決方案，最重要的是，分階段進行談判，如果談判能夠進行，將是未來數年可行的步驟──這一目標相信應該引起美國智庫的認真思考。
The Xi-Biden Summit and Its Implications for Taiwan’s Political Future
Considering the remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Xi-Biden Summit in San Francisco on November 15, and given the Sino-US consensus on the resumption military-to-military communication, the Summit has immediate implications for Taiwan’s political future in the coming years.
First, Chinese President Xi Jinping went into details about China’s principles and position on the question of Taiwan. He says that the Taiwan question is ultimately the most important and the most sensitive one in Sino-US relations.
China attaches great importance to the US active expression of its position on Taiwan during the Bali meeting between President Xi and President Biden in November 2022, during which the US side reiterated that its one-China policy did not change, and that the world has an interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Most significantly, President Xi on November 15 said that “the US should in concrete action demonstrate its expression of not supporting Taiwan independence.” Moreover, the US “should stop arming Taiwan and should support China’s peaceful reunification.” President Xi added that “China will be reunified, and such reunification will be inevitable.”
It was the first time that a top Chinese President made such remarks in an unprecedented way in front of his US counterpart.
The implications are obvious: China is very eager to settle the question of Taiwan peacefully and Beijing sees the US armament of Taiwan is an obstacle to the peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s political future – a position held by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) consistently.
Xi’s remarks implied that China would perhaps like to settle the question of Taiwan in his lifetime.
In response to Xi’s Taiwan position, President Joe Biden reiterated the American five-point stance in Bali: (1) the US does not seek a new Cold War; (2) the US does not seek to change the Chinese system; (3) the US does not seek to oppose China through the consolidation of its allies; (4) the US does not support Taiwan independence; and (5) the US has no intention of having conflicts with China.
Furthermore, the US supports the one-China policy and welcome departments at all levels to start dialogue sincerely and openly to enhance understanding,avoid misunderstanding, and control diverging views.
The media reported that President Xi in the meeting with Biden denied that China had a plan to “take back” Taiwan in the year 2027 or 2035, although some US military officers had made such claims.
An important consensus reached by both sides on November 15 was the agreement to resume military-to-military communications. Clearly, both sides are keen to avoid sudden military accidents, conflicts and confrontations over the issue of Taiwan, especially as the US military airplanes often flied near the Chinese counterpart, or vice versa. The navies of both sides must also avoid unnecessary accidents or conflicts in the Taiwan Strait.
Still, it remains to be seen how both China and the US manage their military-to-military communication at all levels, ranging from the commanding to the operational levels. If crisis takes place at the operational level, it must go up to the commanding level for crisis resolution immediately – a hierarchical process that will demand prompt decision and immediate response to defuse any military accident or conflict.
As such, the control over any crisis will depend on the hierarchical communications from the operational to the commanding level of both the Chinese and American sides, and then on the horizontal communications between the commanding echelon of both sides.
The US strategy in this San Francisco Summit was effective: focusing on matters that could reach easier consensus first, notably the control over narcotics – an issue to which the Chinese side must agree. Other easier issues include educational exchange of more US students to visit China, which also attaches importance to people-to-people exchange.
Yet, the Summit stopped short of how both sides will make use of people-to-people exchange to explore the solutions to Taiwan’s political future.
The PRC’s White Paper on Taiwan, a document released in August 2022, harped on the theme of utilizing the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” to deal with the island’s political future. The document mentioned the possibility of adopting a stage-by-stage process of resolving the Taiwan issue. So far, none of the American think tanks has appeared to notice this proposal of adopting a stage-by-stage process of negotiations.
As such, the ball is arguably on the US court to make use of its rich political think tanks to discuss how a stage-by-stage process will help defuse the Taiwan crisis and how such process will facilitate a give-and-take bargaining in which one issue will be exchanged for a concession from the other side.
President Xi’s remark on the need for the US side to stop rearming Taiwan was a strong one, implying that the US military support of Taiwan is and will be an ultimate obstacle to the peaceful resolution of the island’s political future. Therefore, the US side must ponder deeply how to facilitate the mainland side and the Taiwan counterpart to explore a variety of political solutions.
Objectively speaking, many Taiwan people have rejected the “one country, two systems” model, even though the PRC side has reiterated that it is the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems,” meaning that Taiwan will have international space of participating in international organizations by using the name “Chinese Taipei.” Moreover, the White Paper in August 2022 explicitly said that foreign countries will be allowed to set up their consulates or official or quasi-official institutions in Taiwan – a kind of status quo that will persist in the future.
The crux of the problem in Sino-US relations over Taiwan is that there is a lack of options attractive to most Taiwan people. The blue camp in Taiwan led by the Kuomintang (KMT) does favor and support reunification with mainland China – a position that has been criticized and rejected by the more localist and radical Democratic Progressive Party.
Even worse, there is a lack of consensus between the blue camp and the white camp. At the time of writing, the KMT led by Eric Chu and Ma Ying-jeou is keen to form an alliance with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) led by Ko Wen-je. The most recent reports in Taiwan have pointed to the reluctance of the People’s Party leaders to accept how the KMT proposes to statistically calculate the results of the polls conducted on the Hou You-yi ticket with Ko Wen-je.
The TPP leaders have argued that if a standard deviation of 3 percent rather than 6 percent is calculated, the Ko-Hou ticket is as strong as with the Hou-Ko ticket. Who is the presidential candidate coming first becomes a bone of contention, showing that Taiwan politics is basically egoistic, interest-based and partisan-struggling.
There are two scenarios in Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2024: (1) the DPP led by William Lai would win because of the failure of the KMT and the TPP to form a coalition, or (2) the KMT-TPP coalition would capture the presidential seat for the first time in Taiwan’s presidential election.
A third scenario may be emerging if the KMT-TPP coalition cannot be formed at the presidential election level: namely the presidency would be captured by the DPP, but the Legislative Assembly would see an alliance between the KMT and TPP to block the bills and policies initiated by the DPP.
This scenario would bring about deadlock in the Legislative Assembly, leading to immobilism that would not be conducive to any proposed solution for Taiwan’s political future.
Hence, Taiwan’s domestic political development will shape the outcome of any proposed solution for the island’s political future, even though China and the US may produce an agreed resolution.
At present, the US government is adopting a hardline attitude toward the defense of Taiwan, unlike General George Marshall who in 1946 and 1947 failed to reach a solution between the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC), and who were later criticized by General Douglas MacArthur for abandoning the armament of the KMT forces in favor of the CPC military. George Marshall did try to mediate between the KMT and CPC, but he failed. The withdrawal of the US military support of Chiang Kai-shek doomed the KMT failure in defending the entire mainland from 1947 to 1949.
Today, we witness a rising China where its internal politics are paternalistic and whose foreign policy is ironically more liberal with the socialist vision of achieving “a common destiny for the mankind.” Yet, the US ideology of internal pluralism and external self-protectionism/hegemonism with the old doctrine of “manifest destiny” in promoting the universal values of Western “democracy” is in direct conflicts with the PRC ideology of harping on the “Chinese-style modernization and democracy.”As such, arming Taiwan is inevitable and demanding the US to stop rearming the island seems to be a bridge too far.
Therefore, an intermediary solution conducive to peace in the Taiwan Strait is a matter for the US think tanks to consider, including the likelihood of how to make the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” far more attractive to most people of Taiwan.
The stage-by-stage process proposed for the first time in China’s White Paper on Taiwan can be delineated further. In the first stage, for instance, the Taiwan side will have to accept the 1992 consensus in exchange for the mainland action of, say, allowing far more mainland Chinese to visit the island as tourists than ever before. Other items can be exchanged further, like the formal recognition of the mainland’s possession of Taiwan territory in exchange for the mainland side’s abandonment of the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue.
Whatever the items of exchange in the process of negotiations, the US would likely be an actor that would be consulted by the Taiwan regime, especially if the DPP government is in power.
Another problem is that whatever solution proposed by the mainland Chinese side would be put in the Legislative Assembly for a vote. If the legislature is dominated by the DPP, such a solution will be rejected. If it is dominated by the KMT-PP coalition, the passage of a peaceful solution would be rejected by the DPP.
In all these scenarios, what would be the proper role of the US? Maintaining neutrality? How would China react to the US position in the process of negotiating Taiwan’s political future. Should a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) be used between the mainland and Taiwan instead of putting any proposed solution to the Taiwan Legislative Assembly for a vote? Yet, such a MoU would likely be criticized as lacking the people’s mandate.
Despite the difficult paths ahead, the short-term solution is to enhance the people-to-people exchange between mainland China and Taiwan, and between China and the US. Such exchanges, especially at the level of think tanks that would involve more academics, would hopefully bring about the necessary collective wisdom to resolve Taiwan’s political future.
In conclusion, it is time for the US side to ponder how its rich think tanks can and will consider various modified versions of the PRC’s Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.” Asking the US to stop rearming Taiwan seems to be a bridge too far, butit does imply that the American academics and officials will have to ponder solutions conducive to the peaceful resolutions of Taiwan’s political future.
Gone were the years of George Marshall whose failure to broker a deal between the KMT and CPC in 1946 and early 1947 had far-reaching repercussions until today. The current complete reversal of George Marshall’s policy toward the KMT, which is no longer a ruling party in Taiwan, means the continuous rearmament of the DPP regime – a position that must incur the anger of the PRC.
As such, exploring intermediary solutions along the line of the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” and, most importantly, the stage-by-stage process of negotiation, if such negotiation comes, will be the feasible steps forward in the coming years – a task that arguably should provoke US think tanks to ponder seriously.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-the-xi-biden-summit-and-its-implications-for-taiwans-political-future/
