9 月 25 日參加國民黨主席選舉的深藍候選人張亞中敗選，對兩岸關係產生了深遠的影響，尤其是對於中國大陸的台灣專家，未來幾年如何能夠探索並提出「一國兩制」的台灣方案極具意義。
張亞中在國民黨支持者尤其是網民中脫穎而出，獲得60631票（32.59%），而勝出的朱立倫則獲得85163票（45.78），至於現任黨主席江啟臣則只獲得35093票（18.87%）。
深藍陣營在台灣仍有市場
選舉結果顯示，國民黨內部權力鬥爭的三個主要特徵：首先，地方黨內精英傾向支持朱立倫，一些黨員更願意投票給朱立倫，而放棄了深耕基層但政綱平平的江啟臣，因此未能吸引更多選票讓他保任黨主席一職。
其次，張亞中主張大陸與台灣簽署兩岸和平備忘錄的深藍立場，對一些選民來說是極具挑釁性的。他強調國民黨需要處理其政治思想和論述，引起了許多選民的共鳴。張亞中的迅速崛起和民調表現證明，深藍陣營在台灣仍有政治市場；儘管如此，這樣的市場在整個台灣人口中仍然相對較小。選民投票率只有 50.71%──考慮到競選中備受矚目且兩極分化的辯論，這一結果並不令人滿意。
第三，朱立倫在選舉中表現不佳，提出了相對保守的政綱，留在一個防守的位置。朱立倫的勝利，部分歸功於在國民黨的機器中佔主導地位的保守派精英，部分是由於一些國民黨員擔心如果張亞中贏得選舉，黨內會出現嚴重分裂。
大陸一些台灣問題專家的反應很有意思。10月1日，廈門大學台灣研究院院長李鵬教授表示，國民黨應為兩岸同胞共同利益和中華民族根本利益繼續努力，發揮建設性作用；上海國際問題研究院副院長嚴安林和他的同事季伊昕在10月2日寫道，他們希望國民黨在黨主席選舉中給兩岸關係發展注入正能量，重振國民黨。
習近平電賀朱立倫是重大舉措
最重要的是，9月26日上午，中共總書記習近平發賀電給朱立倫，祝賀他當選國民黨主席，並補充說中國共產黨和國民黨在堅持「九二共識」、反對台獨的共同政治基礎上良性互動，加強合作，順應兩岸同胞共同願望，推動兩岸關係和平發展，造福兩岸同胞，成效有目共睹，期望兩黨登高望遠，堅持共同政治基礎，堅守民族大義，戮力合作，為同胞謀福祉，為台海謀和平，為國家謀統一，為民族謀復興。
中共總書記習近平9月26日給新當選的國民黨主席朱立倫發賀電，這是繼2015年1月17日朱立倫當選國民黨主席之後的慣例。2016年3月26日洪秀柱當選國民黨主席、2017年5月20日吳敦義當選國民黨主席時，習近平也給他們發賀電。有趣的是，2020年3月7日，江啟臣當選國民黨主席時，並沒有收到來自中共方面的賀電，這反映了國共關係的惡化。
2021年9月26日，中共總書記恢復向朱立倫發賀電，是一個重大舉措，表明中方期待海峽兩岸兩黨短期內應該並將會加強合作。
2019年1月2日，習近平呼籲台灣同胞，兩岸要探索「一國兩制」的台灣方案。
然而，由於台灣執政當局的負面回應， 探索「一國兩制」的台灣方案並沒有取得重大突破，直至張亞中在激烈的國民黨主席選舉中提出兩岸簽署和平備忘錄的想法後，張亞中被一些國民黨黨員質疑是「紅統派」，他否認了這一指控。
如果張亞中勝出國民黨主席選舉，他的想法可能會為兩岸關係帶來突破，不過，在實際操作上，還是會遇到一些困難。中廣董事長趙少康問張亞中，如果國民黨員拒絕他提出的兩岸和平備忘錄怎辦？張亞中回答他會辭去國民黨主席一職，趙少康認為這樣的回答不能令人滿意。
國民黨也不是鐵板一塊
從程序上講，任何提出兩岸和平備忘錄想法的國民黨主席，都會面臨兩個障礙：第一，這個想法是否會被執政民進黨破壞，動員輿論反對？第二，這個想法會不會被國民黨精英和黨員拒絕？也許，更有效的做法是探討如何設計「一國兩制」的台灣方案，讓大多數國民黨員和台灣人覺得它更吸引和容易接受。
國民黨主席的選舉結果，顯示黨內有三個主要派系：張亞中領導的深藍陣營、朱立倫領導的較溫和或淺藍的派系，以及江啟臣領導的淺藍或略呈淺綠的派系。
雖然少數大陸的台灣問題專家對國民黨的反應非常積極，希望國民黨對兩岸關係起到建設性作用，但問題的關鍵在於，很多台灣人並沒有明確發現有吸引力的「一國兩制」的台灣方案。
大陸的台灣專家如何提出「一國兩制」的清晰「台灣方案」還有待觀察，但大陸教授及其台灣同行的想法值得我們關注。
兩岸學者獻策創意紛呈
2020年12月，上海台灣研究所常務副所長倪永傑表示，大陸統一台灣有3種策略：上策是「智統」；中策是「和統」，時間長但「皆大歡喜」；而下策是「武統」。
倪永傑詳細闡述了「智統」的三部分，即（1）首先是以和平、民主協商的方式實現統一，制定一部新憲法，按「一國兩制」台灣方案完成統一。（2）採取軍事、外交和法律等手段，定向、定點、定時打擊清剿台獨。（3）主張中國統一的「正能量」一旦足以阻擋反華勢力的「負能量」時，「統一就會水到渠成」。倪永傑的想法發人深省，說明了大陸可能採取和平與強硬手段雙管齊下的辦法。
台灣國際戰略學會教授兼理事長王崑義近日提出了一個更有趣的「一國兩制」台灣方案。王崑義提出「武統」與「和平統一」之外的第三種選擇，即「合作性統一」。 他借用了加拿大前外長克拉克（Joe Clark）1990年9月在聯合國大會中提出了「合作性安全」說法，並於7月下旬以視像方式在廣西南寧舉行的一個研討會上，將之套用於兩岸關係。
王崑義不同意倪永傑的看法，指「智統」讓台灣只能處於被動的「被統一」。王崑義又批評倪永傑兩岸共同「制定新憲法」的想法，認為會在台灣引起無休止的爭論，「光吵架就吵不完」，顯然不切實際。王崑義從三個方面闡述了他的「合作性統一」理念：（1）兩岸應在救災等「非傳統安全」領域尋求合作，更符合人道主義； （2）兩岸應在鐵路等基礎建設項目進行合作； (3) 兩岸應在構建大中華地區半導體晶片供應鏈方面進行合作。
嚴格來說，王崑義倡議大陸和台灣在基建項目進行合作的想法是可行的，但需要台灣民眾，尤其是政界人士達成一定的共識。半導體晶片行業合作的想法在技術上會引起爭議，因為任何一方的技術轉移似乎都具有政治敏感性。最重要的是，台灣對大陸的技術轉移可能會引起美國的反應，從而使王崑義改善兩岸關係的方案複雜化。
「葉九條」可揉合「習五點」
一個比較現實可行的方案，是將1981年9月葉劍英對台灣問題發表了九點聲明（「葉九條」）的內容與習近平2019年1月對台政策講話提出的五點（「習五點」）結合起來，使之對台灣更具吸引力。「葉九條」最重要的內容，是維持台灣的社會經濟體系和現有的軍事力量，並鼓勵台灣同胞在大陸的投資；「習五點」最重要的兩點，是加快兩岸融合，特別是通過福建與金門、馬祖更密切的互動，探索「一國兩制」的台灣方案。
具體來說，一旦新冠病毒逐漸消失，金門和馬祖可能會成為大陸更密切的合作目標，例如，探索連接福建與金門和馬祖的跨海大橋或海底隧道。如果雙方像王崑義說的那樣，把基建設施合作視為優先事項，兩岸關係就有可能取得突破。
其次，如果兩岸深入探討達成和平備忘錄的所有先決條件，張亞中關於兩岸簽署和平備忘錄的想法是可以實現的。例如北京方面堅持要求台方接受「九二共識」，這是一個前提條件，台灣可以用雙方都接受的名稱參與國際組織，例如「中華台北」。兩岸關係的任何突破，都需要雙方交換所有先決條件。
第三，由於統一的過程可能漫長而艱辛，兩岸可以同意分階段進行，其中兩岸的社會經濟合作（人員、經濟和基礎設施合作）將是第一階段，然後是達成以和平發展為主要目標的諒解備忘錄，然後是建立信任的過程，探索統一的長期前景。
第四，是加強人文交流和學術交流，增進互信。由於新冠疫情的爆發和持續，兩岸建立信任受到阻礙。因此，一旦新冠病毒消失，出行、訪問和旅遊的放寬將是必須的。否則，沒有深入的人際交往和思想交流，建立信任是非常困難的，正如張亞中提出加强兩岸關係的想法，很容易被批評者也許不公平地貼上「紅統」的標籤。
綜上所述，張亞中在國民黨領導人選舉中落敗，意味着拉近兩岸關係在台灣的政治市場仍然相對薄弱。因此，大陸方面及其台灣專家必須更加努力探索「一國兩制」台灣方案的具體內容。葉劍英的九條和習近平的五點可以進一步研究，以建構「一國兩制」的台灣方案。
倪永傑的「智統」理念雖好，但兩岸統一之路任重而道遠。王崑義加強兩岸「合作性安全」的構想是建設性的，短期內有可能以金門、馬祖為第一地點，與大陸加強接觸和合作建設基建設施。
從中長期看，雙方需要一一交換所有前提條件，以加強人際交往，建立信任，並在政治成熟的時候達成和平備忘錄。
張亞中、倪永傑和王崑義的一些創新理念可以選擇性地和建設性地結合一些修改來改善兩岸關係，這很可能是未來十年塑造大中華地區的最重要事件。
KMT Leadership Election: Implications for a Taiwan Model of “One Country, Two Systems”
The defeat of Chang Ya-chung, a dark blue candidate running for the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership election on September 25, had profound implications for cross-strait relations, especially on how the Taiwan experts of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can explore and come up with a Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” in the coming years.
Chang Ya-chung stood out as a popular candidate among the KMT supporters, especially netizens, and he garnered 60,631 votes (32.59 percent), while the victorious Eric Chu acquired 85,163 votes (45.78) and the incumbent Johnny Chiang got only 35,093 votes (18.87 percent).
The results showed three main features in the KMT’s internal power struggle. First, the local party elites tended to support Chu and some members preferred to vote for Chu while abandoning Johnny Chiang, who worked hard at the grassroots level but whose weak political platform failed to attract more votes for him to retain the party chairmanship position. Second, Chang Ya-chung’s dark blue position advocating a memorandum of understanding and peace agreement between the mainland side and Taiwan proved to be a very provocative one to some voters. His emphasis on the need for the KMT to rebuild its spirit and style struck a responsive chord with many voters. Chang’s rapid rise and impressive performance demonstrated that the dark blue camp still has a political market in Taiwan; nevertheless, such a market remains relatively small in the whole population of Taiwan. The voter turnout was only 50.71 percent – a result that was not very satisfactory given the high-profile and polarized debates in the campaign. Third, Eric Chu did not really perform well in the election, putting forward a relatively weak platform and remaining in a defensive position. Chu’s victory was attributable partly to the conservative elites who were dominant in the party machinery and partly to the fear of some KMT members that the party would be deeply divided if Chang Ya-chung would win the election.
The responses from some mainland experts on Taiwan are interesting. On October 1, Professor Li Peng, the Dean of the Taiwan Study Center at Xiamen University, said that the KMT should develop its functions and promote peaceful development across the two straits, and that it can work constructively for the common interests of the comrades from both sides (see http://www.CRNTT.com, October 1, 2021). Yan Anlin, the Deputy Dean of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, and his colleague Ji Yixin, wrote on October 2 that they hoped the KMT would inject a new element of “positive energy” to revive the KMT in the forthcoming elections (also see http://www.CRNTT.com, October 2, 2021).
Most importantly, on the morning of September 26, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping, responded to the victory of Eric Chu by congratulating his victory, and by adding that the CCP and KMT, on the political basis of opposing “Taiwan independence,” would strengthen cooperation, develop the peaceful development of both sides of the two straits, and seek to achieve national reunification and national renaissance (United Daily News, September 26, 2021).
The dispatch of a congratulatory message from CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping on September 26 to the newly elected KMT Chairman Eric Chu followed a convention of having the same move by Xi on January 17, 2015, when Chu had also been elected as the KMT Chairman. When Hung Hsiu-chu was elected as the KMT chairlady on March 26, 2016, and when Wu Den-yih was elected as KMT chairman on May 20, 2017, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping also sent congratulatory messages to them. Interestingly, when Johnny Chiang was elected as KMT chairman on March 7, 2020, he did not receive any congratulatory message from the CPC side – a reflection of the worsening relations between the KMT and CPC.
The resumption of the CPC General Secretary’s congratulatory message to Eric Chu on September 26, 2021, was a significant move pointing to the PRC side’s expectation that both parties across the two straits should and would strengthen cooperation in the short run.
On January 2, 2019, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping appealed to the Taiwan comrades that both sides of the two straits should “explore” a Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.”
However, because of the negative response from the ruling authorities of the Taiwan side, this Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” has not achieved any significant breakthrough until Chang Ya-chung refloated his idea of both sides reaching a memorandum of understanding and even peace agreement during his fiery election campaign for the KMT leadership. Chang was criticized by some KMT members for being “red,” an accusation that he denied. His idea could be a potential breakthrough in cross-strait relations if Chang were elected as a KMT chairman. Nevertheless, in terms of practical operation, there would be some difficulties. When asked by KMT member Jaw Shau Shaw-kong what would happen if Chang’s idea of a memorandum of understanding and peace agreement between the two sides would be rejected by KMT members, Chang replied that he would resign from the party leadership position – a response that Jaw said would be unsatisfactory.
Procedurally speaking, any KMT chair who floats an idea of reaching a memorandum of understanding between the two straits would face two hurdles: first whether the idea would be sabotaged by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that would mobilize public opinion to oppose it, and second whether it would be rejected by the KMT elites and members themselves.
Perhaps a more fruitful approach is to consider how a Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” can be designed so that most members of the KMT and also most Taiwan people would find it more acceptable and attractive.
The election result of the KMT party chairperson showed three main factions: the dark blue camp led by Chang Ya-chung, the more moderate or light blue faction led by Eric Chu, and a lighter blue or slightly light green faction led by Johnny Chiang.
Although the responses from a few mainland experts on Taiwan are very positive toward the KMT, which they hoped would play a constructive role in cross-strait relations, the crux of the problem is that many Taiwan people do not find the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” clear or attractive.
While it remains to be seen how the mainland’s Taiwan experts are coming up with a clear “Taiwan model” of “one country, two systems,” the ideas of a mainland professor and that of a Taiwan counterpart deserve our attention.
In December 2020, Ni Yongjie, a Deputy Director of the Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies, said that China’s reunification of the Taiwan district would have three routes: the best and most ideal strategy is to adopt “wise reunification;” the middle-range strategy is to adopt “peaceful reunification” that would be much longer in terms of the timeline; and the worst strategy would be the adoption of “forceful reunification” (BBC Chinese News, January 18, 2021). Ni elaborated on the three components of “wise reunification,” namely (1) the formulation of a new constitution along the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems;” (2) the adoption of military, diplomatic and legal means to curb and eliminate the hostile forces on Taiwan, and (3) the persistent struggle between China and the anti-China forces so that reunification between the mainland and Taiwan would be reached one day. Ni’s ideas were thought-provocative and illustrated the mixture of peaceful and forceful means that might be adopted.
A more interesting idea of the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” has recently been floated by Wang Kun-yi, a professor and Director General of the Taiwan International Strategic Study (see www.voacantones.com, September 5, 2021). Wang proposed a third alternative apart from the options of “forceful reunification” and “peaceful reunification,” namely “cooperative reunification.” Wang borrowed the term “cooperative” from the former Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark’s concept of “cooperative security” in September 1990 at the United Nations, and he applied it to cross-strait relations in a seminar held in Guangxi in late July.
Wang disagreed with Ni’s idea, saying that the latter adopted an approach that would make Taiwan “passively reunified.” Wang criticized Ni’s idea of formulating firstly a constitution, which to Wang would bring about endless debates within Taiwan. Wang elaborated his idea of “cooperative reunification” in three aspects: (1) both sides of the two straits should be cooperative in unconventional security matters, such as disaster relief and humanitarian aid; (2) collaboration in infrastructure projects like railway linking the mainland with Taiwan; and (3) cooperation in the development of the semi-conductor industry in the Greater China region.
Strictly speaking, Wang’s idea of developing infrastructure projects linking the PRC with the Taiwan side would be feasible, but it would need some degree of consensus among the Taiwan people, especially the politicians. The idea of cooperation in semi-conductor industry would be technologically controversial, for technology transfer from either side appears to be politically sensitive. Most importantly, technology transfer from Taiwan to the mainland may trigger the response from the US side, thereby complicating Wang’s solution of improving cross-strait relations.
A more realistic and feasible solution is to combine the elements of Ye Jianying’s nine-points in September 1981 with President Xi Jinping’s five-points formula in January 2019, making them more attractive to the Taiwan side. The most important elements in Ye’s nine points are to preserve Taiwan’s socio-economic system and existing military and to embrace Taiwan comrades’ investment in the mainland. The two most important points in President Xi’s speech in January 2019 are to speed up integration between the two sides, especially through the closer interactions between Kinmen and Mazu on the one hand and Fujian on the other hand, and to explore the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.”
Specifically, once Covid-19 tapers off later, Kinmen and Mazu would likely be a target of closer cooperation, say, by exploring a bridge or an underground tunnel linking Kinmen and Mazu with the Fujian province. If both sides, as Wang said, put infrastructure development as a priority, a potential breakthrough in bilateral relations could be made.
Secondly, Chang Ya-chung’s idea of a memorandum of understanding between the two sides would be pursuable if both sides would explore deeper all the preconditions of reaching such memorandum. For instance, if the PRC side insists on the Taiwan side to accept the 1992 consensus, this would be a precondition in exchange for, say, Taiwan’s participation in international organizations by a name acceptable to both sides, like Chinese Taipei as proposed by the PRC side. The exchange of all the preconditions from both sides would be essential in any breakthrough in cross-strait relations.
Thirdly, since the process of reunification may be a long and difficult one, both sides can agree to a stage-by-stage process in which cooperative socio-economic interactions (human, economic and infrastructure cooperation) between the two sides would be the first stage, followed by a memorandum of understanding to be reached with peaceful development as the key objective, and then by a process of trust-building to explore the long-term prospect of reunification.
Fourth, both sides must enhance more intensive human interactions and scholarly exchanges to build up mutual trust. Because of the outbreak and persistence of Covid-19, trust-building between the two sides has been hampered. As such, a relaxation in travels, visits and tourism will be a must once Covid-19 fades away. Otherwise, without intensive human interactions and exchange of ideas, trust-building is very difficult to be achieved, as Chang Ya-chung’s idea of enhancing relations between the two sides was easily but perhaps unfairly labelled by his critics as being “red.”
In conclusion, Chang Ya-chung’s defeat in the KMT leadership election means that the political market for a closer cross-strait relations remains relatively weak in Taiwan. As such, the mainland side and its Taiwan experts must work harder to explore the concrete content of the “Taiwan model” of “one country, two systems.” Ye Jianying’s nine points and President Xi’s five points can be built up further to constitute the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.” While Ni Yongjie’s idea of “wise reunification” is a good one, the path of reunification between the two sides remains far away and difficult. Wang Kun-yi’s idea of enhancing “cooperative security” between the two sides is a constructive one, with the possibility of using Kinmen and Mazu as the first point of enhancing more contacts and infrastructure development in the short run. In the medium and long term, there will be a need for both sides to exchange all their preconditions one by one to enhance human interactions, to build up trust, and to reach a memorandum of understanding at a politically ripe time. Some of the innovative ideas of Chang Ya-chung, Ni Yongjie and Wang Kun-yi can be selectively and constructively combined with some modifications to improve cross-strait relations, which will likely be the most important event shaping the Greater China region in the coming decade.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
