台灣目前親美、反中、反在野黨政策正在使兩岸關係陷入一場新的危機，除非特朗普的交易外交政策，使美中就台灣的未來進行直接對話，否則這場危機將持續發展。
近期台灣社會出現嚴重分裂，一方是執政的民進黨及其支持者，另一方是在野黨即國民黨和民眾黨，兩者發生激烈的權鬥，最近一批反國民黨立委、市議員和市長的公民所組成的利益團體，發起了一場台灣選舉法下的大罷免潮，正好反映這種現象。
國民黨主席朱立倫表示，由於民進黨領導人賴清德將中國大陸視為「敵對境外勢力」，台灣現在正進入關鍵時刻。朱稱賴反中政策將兩岸關係推向「準戰爭」的邊緣。
3月12日賴清德發表講話，闡述民進黨對中國大陸的17項新政策（簡稱「17條」）。賴斷言，鑑於許多現任和退役軍官已經背叛台灣，而且許多演藝人士只保護自己的利益，而不是台灣的利益，中國大陸的統戰工作正在「透過顛覆、滲透、收購媒體、發動媒體戰、心理戰、法律戰來分裂和征服我們。」
賴清德發布「17條」 應對中國滲透
為此，賴宣布了17條措施，以應對中國大陸的「滲透」，其中較重要的包括抵制中國「吞併」台灣、嚴懲違法軍官、申請在台灣居住的大陸人不被允許擁有雙重國籍、預防中國利用網絡和人工智慧破壞台灣的國家安全、政府部門應在《反滲透法》、《國家安全法》、《兩岸管理協議》、涉港澳立法等方面加強溝通。
17條的目的顯然是限制兩岸互動，阻止大陸統戰工作向台灣滲透，讓部分港澳人士移居台灣變得更加困難，但有批評者指出，賴清德的17條有違反內地《反分裂國家法》之嫌。
《反分裂國家法》第一條旨在遏制台獨、促進國家和平統一。最重要的是，賴清德的17項政策措施似乎違反了《反分裂國家法》第六條，該條規定中國大陸鼓勵兩岸人員往來、兩岸經濟交流與合作、兩岸打擊犯罪、兩岸教育、科學、文化、衛生、體育等方面的交流。
在美國總統特朗普的交易外交和美國優先政策下，台積電已開始在亞利桑那州投資數十億美元。這筆約1650億美元的投資旨在幫助台積電避免與美國的關稅戰。
台積電生產線遷美 掏空台晶片業
然而從戰略上講，台積電這一舉動冒着掏空台灣曾經強大的半導體產業的風險，將其生產線遷往美國，如果台灣與中國就台灣的未來談判或任何對話或，代價是將失去談判的重要籌碼。
不單如此，從台灣向美國轉移技術也可能削弱台灣的技術能力，迫使台灣更依賴美國，但當兩岸發生軍事衝突時，美國並不能保證無條件軍事支持台灣。
在親美的民進黨領導層看來，更加靠攏美國可以保護台灣免受中國的軍事攻擊或侵犯，但在特朗普的交易外交下，台灣可能會為了美國的經濟利益而被犧牲，觀乎烏克蘭當前的險境正好反映這種可能。
當然美國可以繼續向台灣出售更多武器，但從政治上講，這意味在兩岸發生軍事衝突時，美國不太可能部署軍隊保衛台灣。美國對烏克蘭政策的大轉變就是一個很好的例子：特朗普政府可以直接與俄羅斯談判烏克蘭的命運和未來，而犧牲烏克蘭的國家安全利益，同樣也適用於台灣。
17條有違反《反分裂國家法》風險
民進黨親美、反中、反在野黨的政策正使台灣陷入與大陸關係的危機。台灣政局動盪，面臨違反《反分裂國家法》第八條規定的風險，該條規定，以任何名義、任何方式推行台獨，造成台灣從中國分裂出去的事實，或者發生將會導致台灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變。在此情況下，根據法例，中國大陸可以採取非和平等方式，捍衛國家主權和領土完整。
美國政府將如何處理民進黨針對大陸的17條以及兩岸人民交往，還有待觀察。如不遏制，台灣島內亂局升級的趨勢將持續，兩岸政治軍事不確定風險增加。
對於台灣領導人來說，明智的地緣政治戰略應是與中國大陸建立更友好的關係，與大陸接觸，而不是播下政治不信任的種子。審慎的地緣政治和經濟策略，包括向更多大陸遊客和學生稍微打開台灣的大門，讓他們欣賞台灣的文化。一個健全的內部治理策略是避免與國民黨和民眾黨發生政治鬥爭，而是利用這些在野黨和政客作為中間人來發起和維持與大陸當局的對話。
總而言之，台灣當前的內部政治鬥爭、民進黨反中政策和親美傾向，正在將兩岸關係推入一個充滿不確定性和危機的新時代。當然，危機中也能孕育機遇，但前提是美國的交易外交能夠就台灣的政治未來，跟中國大陸展開直接對話和談判。除非台灣保留足夠的籌碼，否則台積電基地搬遷以及對美國的大量投資將削弱台灣的籌碼，使台灣嚴重依賴美國的利益。長此下去，兩岸關係將進入劇烈波動、不確定、難以預測的時期。
The perils of Taiwan’s anti-opposition, anti-mainland and pro-US policies: Toward a showdown?
Taiwan’s currently anti-opposition politics, increasingly anti-Mainland policy, and prominently pro-Washington policies are plunging cross-strait relations into a new crisis, a crisis that will persist and unfold unless Donald Trump’s transactional diplomacy brings about a direct dialogue between the US and Mainland China over the future of Taiwan.
Taiwan is witnessing a fierce power struggle between the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its supporters on the one hand, and the opposition parties, namely the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) and the People’s Party (PP), on the other. A massive campaign launched by interest groups composed of citizens critical of the KMT legislators, municipal councillors, and mayors has been initiated, triggering a recall under Taiwan’s electoral law.
At the same time, some supporters of the political opposition have also launched a recall of some DPP legislators and councillors. In retaliation for the “green” campaign to unseat its elected legislators and councillors, the KMT is calling for two referendums—one against the abolition of the death penalty and the other against the so-called “martial law,” a term referring to DPP leader William Lai’s policy of taking seventeen measures to counter Mainland China’s “infiltration” into Taiwan.
Eric Chu, the KMT chairman, said that Taiwan is now entering a critical moment because of DPP leader William Lai’s “destructive” attempt to treat Mainland China as “a foreign adversary” (Focus Taiwan, 17 March 2025). Chu referred to Lai’s anti-Mainland policy as pushing cross-strait relations to the brink of a “quasi-war” (Focus Taiwan, 17 March 2025).
On 12 March, William Lai delivered a speech that delineated his seventeen items of the DPP’s policy toward Mainland China (Liberty Times, 13 March 2025). He asserted that, given many current and retired military officers had already “betrayed” Taiwan, and given many artists had protected their self-interest rather than Taiwan’s interest, Mainland China’s united front work was “dividing us and conquering us through subversion, infiltration, the buying of media ownership, and the launching of a media war” (Liberty Times, 13 March 2025).
Lai also accused the Mainland side of utilising democratic Taiwan’s “freedom and pluralistic openness” by “absorbing the triads, media, key opinion leaders, political parties, current and retired military officers, and police” (Liberty Times, 13 March 2025). In 2024 alone, sixty-four Taiwanese were arrested for allegedly spying for the Mainland, a threefold increase compared with the 2021 situation. Forty-three military officers, comprising fifteen active and twenty-eight retired and demobilised soldiers, were also indicted.
As such, Lai announced seventeen measures to counter the so-called Mainland Chinese “infiltration”:
- Resistance against the Mainland Chinese “annexation” of Taiwan.
- Publicising the Mainland Chinese intention to other countries through Taiwan’s National Security Council and its Foreign Ministry.
- Punishing military officers who violate the law.
- Checking the passports and citizenship documents of Taiwanese people who apply for Mainland identity cards, Mainland citizenship, and Mainland residency status.
- Checking the background of Mainland Chinese, Hongkongers, and Macau residents who apply for Taiwan residency and citizenship status.
- Mainland Chinese who apply to reside in Taiwan should not be allowed to have dual citizenship.
- People from Hong Kong and Macau who apply to reside in Taiwan should be required to stay on the island for a much longer period.
- Taiwanese people who visit the Mainland should be educated to increase their risk awareness.
- Mainland Chinese who come to Taiwan for exchanges should undergo risk assessment and management.
- Mainland Chinese who apply to visit Taiwan for exchanges and interactions will be subject to security considerations.
- Mainland Chinese who intend to come to Taiwan for united front work should be strictly restricted.
- Religious, cultural, academic, and educational interactions should be depoliticised with proper risk assessment.
- Local cultural, creative, and history-related industries in Taiwan should be fostered and enhanced.
- Taiwanese artists who develop their careers in Mainland China should be under better guidance and management.
- Preventive measures should be implemented to prevent the Mainland from using the Internet and artificial intelligence to undermine Taiwan’s national security.
- Government agencies should enhance their communication in dealing with the anti-infiltration law, national security law, cross-strait management agreement, and legislation related to Hong Kong and Macau.
- Taiwanese businesspeople and youth should be encouraged to contribute to Taiwan’s development rather than being lured by the Mainland’s united front work on “integrated development.”
These seventeen policy measures clearly aim to restrict cross-strait interactions, prevent the Mainland’s united front work from penetrating Taiwan, and make the migration of some Hong Kong and Macau people to Taiwan more difficult than ever before. The underlying factor is a deep sense of political distrust towards not only Taiwanese people interacting with Mainland Chinese, but also Chinese from the Mainland, Hong Kong, and Macau who engage with Taiwanese and/or attempt to stay in Taiwan.
Critics of Lai’s seventeen measures point to their dangers of violating the mainland’s Anti-Secession Law, which was enacted in 2005 and which was celebrated in a seminar held in Beijing on March 14, 2025 (See: 赵乐际在《反分裂国家法》实施20周年座谈会上的讲话（全文）_中共中央台湾工作办公室、国务院台湾事务办公室 (gwytb.gov.cn), 14 March 2025).
Article 1 of the Anti-Secession Law aims at curbing “Taiwan independence” and promoting the nation’s “peaceful reunification.” Most importantly, Lai’s seventeen policy measures appear to violate the content of Article 6 of the Anti-Secession Law, which stipulates that Mainland China seeks to encourage cross-strait interactions of personnel, cross-strait economic exchange and cooperation, cross-strait combat against crime, and cross-strait exchanges in education, science, culture, health, and sports.
Under US President Donald Trump’s transactional diplomacy, in which state-to-state relations are treated in a business manner through the extensive utilisation of reciprocal tariffs, and under his America First policy, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) has started to invest billions in Arizona (South China Morning Post, 8 March 2025). Such investment of about US$165 billion aimed at helping TSMC avoid a tariff war with the US.
However, such a move by TSMC is, strategically speaking, running the risk of hollowing out Taiwan’s once-strong semiconductor industry, relocating its base to the US at the expense of leaving Taiwan without a strong bargaining chip vis-à-vis Mainland China in the event of any dialogue or negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the island’s economic and political future.
Technology transfer from Taiwan to the US will also likely weaken Taiwan’s technological capability, plunging the island into a more dependent relationship with the US, which, however, cannot guarantee unconditional military support for Taiwan in the event of a cross-strait military incident or conflict.
In the minds of the pro-Washington DPP leadership, a more dependent relationship with the US can and will undoubtedly protect Taiwan from any possible Mainland military attack or encroachment. Such calculations mirror Ukraine’s current danger, where, under Trump’s transactional diplomacy, Taiwan could be sacrificed for US economic interests. The US can continue to demand more weapons transactions from Taiwan, whose pro-Washington leadership is, of course, willing to comply—yet politically, this implies that the US is unlikely to deploy its military to defend Taiwan in the event of cross-strait military conflicts. The U-turn in US policy towards Ukraine is a case in point: the national security team under Donald Trump could negotiate directly with Russia over Ukraine’s fate and future at the expense of Ukraine’s national security interests. The same situation could apply to Taiwan.
The DPP’s anti-opposition, anti-Mainland, and overly pro-US policy is plunging Taiwan into a crisis in its relationship with Mainland China. Taiwan’s domestic political turmoil is now running the risk of violating Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law, which states that “Taiwan independence” may be pursued under any name or method to separate Taiwan from China, and that Taiwan may experience “major events” leading to separation from China. Under these circumstances, according to Article 8, Mainland China may adopt non-peaceful and other means to defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It remains to be seen how the US administration will manage the DPP’s comprehensive seventeen policy measures against the Mainland and human interactions between the two sides. If left unchecked, the trend of escalating Taiwan’s domestic chaos will persist, increasing the risks of cross-strait political and military uncertainty.
A wise geopolitical strategy for Taiwan’s leadership would be to foster a more amicable relationship with Mainland China, engaging with the Mainland rather than sowing deep political distrust. A prudent geopolitical and economic approach would involve slightly opening Taiwan’s doors to more Mainland tourists and students, allowing them to appreciate Taiwan’s culture. A sound internal governance strategy would be to avoid political struggles with the KMT and the PP, instead utilising these opposition parties and politicians as intermediaries to initiate and sustain dialogue with Mainland authorities. Opposition politicians in Taiwan could serve as a valuable buffer and intermediary between the DPP and the Mainland.
A strategic external policy for Taiwan would be to reduce its overdependence on the US, avoiding becoming a mere technological appendage of the US by preventing the full and easy relocation of TSMC to Arizona.
If opportunity exists amid crises, Taiwan’s only hope lies in whether Trump’s transactional diplomacy will lead to direct dialogue and negotiations between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan’s political future—a legacy reminiscent of George Marshall’s efforts in 1947, when he strove but ultimately failed to mediate the military conflicts between Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT forces and Mao Zedong’s increasingly dominant military.
In conclusion, Taiwan’s current internal political struggles, the DPP’s anti-Mainland policy, and its pro-US inclinations are pushing cross-strait relations into a new era of uncertainty and crisis. Of course, opportunities can emerge from crises—but only if US transactional diplomacy initiates direct dialogue and negotiations with Mainland China over Taiwan’s political future. Unless Taiwan retains sufficient bargaining chips, the relocation of TSMC’s base and its heavy investment in the US will erode Taiwan’s leverage, leaving the island heavily dependent on US interests. If this continues, cross-strait relations will enter a period of severe volatility, uncertainty, and unpredictability.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。（原文按此）
