民進黨總統候選人賴清德在1月13日台灣總統選舉中獲勝，未來幾年的兩岸關係可能危險與機會並存。
根據台灣中央選舉委員會（中選會）開票的數字，民進黨的賴清德獲得逾558萬票（佔總票數40.06%），擊敗了獲得逾467萬票（佔總票數33.49%）的國民黨侯友宜，台灣民眾黨的柯文哲則獲逾369萬票（佔總票數26.45%）。民進黨在蔡英文總統領導8年後，成功保住總統寶座。
民眾黨成為關鍵少數
民眾黨的柯文哲未能與國民黨的侯友宜達成共識，在2023年11月組成「藍白合」與民進黨競爭，可以說已經決定了這次總統選舉的結果。
儘管柯文哲是一位具有魅力的領袖，贏得許多台灣年輕選民的支持，其中包括一些傾向「淺綠」的選民，但他的民眾黨下屬似乎是國民黨2023年10月和11月提出「藍白合」構想的主要障礙。柯文哲團隊急於證明自己的實力，並成為台灣島內政壇新興的第三勢力。
台灣立法院立法議員共有113個議席。根據1月13日晚間的報道，國民黨奪取了52個議席，民進黨獲得51個議席，無黨派佔2個議席，民眾黨獲得8個議席。
這一來，民進黨無法取得立法院多數，即57個議席，那麼，理論上國民黨和民眾黨實際上能夠形成一個鬆散的聯盟來阻止民進黨通過法案，並可以重新提出與大陸更緊密經濟關係的法案。
民進黨在立法院佔少數的情況或許會讓台灣政壇陷入混亂，因為民眾黨成為關鍵少數，很可能成為立法院的「造王者」。
美國冀對話化解軍事危機
有趣的是，就在台灣大選前一天，美國國務卿布林肯在華盛頓會見了中共中央對外聯絡部部長劉建超。顯然，美國這是表達對台海緊張局勢關切的重要政治舉動，希望透過對話化解大陸與台灣之間的軍事危機與衝突。劉建超也會見了日本外相上川陽子，因為日本是台灣政府最堅定的支持者之一。
布林肯和劉建超討論了一系列問題，包括潛在的合作和分歧領域，例如緝毒合作、軍事交流、在中國、烏克蘭、北韓和中東等地被拘留的美國人，以及台海和平穩定等。議程的項目廣泛，但會議的時機具有政治意義──在台灣大選前一天，顯示美國非常重視台海的和平與穩定。此舉具有政治意義，在台灣選舉史上是史無前例的。
台灣大選前，大陸傳媒嚴厲批評賴清德及民進黨。曾任台灣駐美代表的民進黨副總統候選人蕭美琴，也被大陸傳媒視為具有政治挑釁性且不可接受的人物，尤其是她對兩岸關係的公開言論一向是直言不諱且持批評態度的。
如果兩岸關係要更加和平，賴清德和蕭美琴如何節制他們的言論，以免激怒大陸，仍有待觀察。
國民黨在競選期間認為，選民進黨人當總統，等於危害台灣安全，帶來與大陸的衝突。這個訊息相當強烈，但仍有大部分選民投票支持賴清德。國民黨在競選期間對賴清德領導的民進黨施壓的方式，可能有意無意地在總統選舉後影響民進黨的立場和言論。換句話說，賴清德和蕭美琴在針對中國大陸和兩岸關係的公開言論，即使不是「外交辭令」，也許必須學會更加圓滑。
兩岸關係的中間人
儘管國民黨和民眾黨慘敗，但侯友宜和柯文哲在競選活動的言論，尤其是批評民進黨的言論，都被中國大陸的社群媒體報道。因此，儘管兩人都將處於大陸統戰的保護傘下，他們仍很可能扮演大陸當局可接受的中間人角色。
一般來說，中間人的角色對於維持兩岸關係的和平與穩定至關重要。傳統上，他們包括一些商人、國民黨核心前領導人（像馬英九）和知識分子。有關方面希望這些中間人能繼續成為台灣民眾與大陸、民進黨當局與大陸當局縮小交流隔閡的橋樑。
兩岸關係的癥結在於，大陸方面堅持要求台灣當局必須接受九二共識，作為全面恢復包括旅遊、貿易在內的其他社會經濟交流的條件，但台灣民進黨政府卻拒絕接受九二共識。賴清德可能會延續民進黨的做法，因此兩岸關係的僵局可能會持續下去。
另一個問題是，大多數台灣民眾對一國兩制不感興趣，儘管大陸方面在2022年8月發表的《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》白皮書中，提到一國兩制的台灣模式對台灣未來有具體好處，包括外國可以在台灣設立領事機構或其他官方、半官方機構，國際組織和機構可以在台灣設立辦事機構，有關國際公約可以在台灣適用，有關國際會議可以在台灣舉辦。大陸智庫面臨的挑戰是如何讓一國兩制的台灣模式對台灣人民更具吸引力。已故中國領導人鄧小平用一國兩制的模式，短期內讓港澳回歸，長遠統一台灣，但這種模式在2024年總統大選期間，對包括國民黨侯友宜和民眾黨柯文哲在內許多台灣人來說，已經失去吸引力。
大陸2022年8月發表《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》白皮書的一個被忽略之處是，它是首次提出分階段對話談判可能性的大陸文件，這是前所未有的。結合一些中間人從中斡旋，即使不是談判，分階段對話也可行，應該進一步探討。
中共無法接受民進黨
美方至今尚未就大陸與台灣方面可能進行的對話提出具體方案；無論如何，大陸認為台灣問題是中國內政，不容「外國干涉」。
鑑於美國未能在國民黨和中國共產黨之間斡旋，尤其是像1946年馬歇爾將軍率領代表團來華調停。華盛頓在斡旋台海兩岸執政黨之間的關係方面，確實具有潛在的作用，問題是，馬歇爾使華無功78年後，台灣的國民黨不再是執政黨，很可能成為永遠的在野黨，而民進黨的執政立場在政治上仍然是中共無法接受的。
馬歇爾使華與當前局勢的另一個有趣的區別是，雖然美國在1946年7月至1947年5月間對華實施武器禁運，但當前美台關係的特點是華盛頓需要向台灣提供武器彈藥，台灣是為了遏制大陸的軍事威脅──據報道，習近平主席於2023年11月在舊金山與拜登總統會面時談到了這個問題。
台灣現任民進黨政府可能會繼續對大陸採取敵對態度，這一態度將惡化兩岸關係，但如果未來兩岸進行任何談判，無論有沒有美國的參與，這都將會是一個討價還價的過程。
總之，民進黨在台灣總統大選中獲勝，必然導致兩岸關係持續陷入僵局。如果反對黨國民黨和民眾黨提出加強台海經濟關係的法案和倡議，民進黨立法委員將如何應對仍有待觀察。台灣的行政立法關係可能會出現僵局和激烈爭論，尤其是國民黨和民眾黨很可能聯合起來，成為立法院多數派。這種情況在台灣政壇或許是史無前例的，其政治體制正在走向「總統議會混合制」，即不同政黨分別佔據總統職位和議會多數席位。如果台灣的行政立法關係出現政治僵局，大陸可能會採取觀望態度，從而減少兩岸關係衝突的可能性。
最重要的是，如果美國有潛力、有能力約束民進黨領導層，那麼民進黨新任正副總統可能要學會克制自己對大陸和兩岸關係的公開言論；言語攻擊和對抗不會為兩岸關係帶來舒適的環境。歸根究柢，中間人的角色對於縮小兩岸關係的交流隔閡、減少誤解和誤會仍然極為重要。因此，2024年1月台灣總統選舉和立法院選舉的結果，為我們仔細觀察兩岸關係動態打開了新的大門。
Taiwan’s Election Results: Crises and Opportunities in Cross-Strait Relations
With the victory of William Lai, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential election on January 13, cross-strait relations in the coming years will likely have crises and opportunities.
As of 9 pm on January 13, William Lai of the DPP acquired 5.57 million votes (40.06 percent of the total votes), defeating Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) who captured 4.65 million votes (33.49 percent) and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) (26.45 percent). The DPP succeeds in retaining the position of presidency after eight years of DPP presidency led by Tsai Ing-wen.
This presidential election was arguably decided once Ko’s TPP failed to reach a consensus with the KMT led by Hou to form a coalition team in November 2023 to compete with the DPP in this presidential election.
Although Ko is a charismatic leader capturing a lot of support from the young voters in Taiwan, including some voters who tend to be “light green,” his TPP subordinates appeared to be the major obstacle to the coalition idea floated by the KMT in October and November 2023. The Ko team was eager to evaluate its strength and to become the emerging third party in Taiwan’s domestic politics.
At the time of writing, it is unclear how many seats will be occupied by the three parties in the 113-seat Legislative Yuan. But it is reported at 10:30 pm on January 13 that the KMT can grasp 52 seats, DPP gets 51 seats, independents occupy 2 seats, and the TPP can capture 8 seats.
If so, the DPP cannot capture a majority, namely fifty-seven seats, then the KMT and the TPP may be able to, theoretically and practically, form a loose coalition to block DPP bills and to initiate bills that would perhaps reignite closer economic relations with mainland China.
The scenario of a DPP minority in the Legislative Assembly would perhaps plunge the Taiwan political arena into chaos, because the TPP would likely be a kingmaker in legislative politics.
Interestingly, just one day before the Taiwan elections, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Liu Jianchao, the minister of the International Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Washington. Obviously, the US made an important political move expressing its concern about tensions across the Taiwan Strait, hoping that such dialogue would defuse any military crisis and conflicts between the mainland and Taiwan. Liu also met Yoko Kamikawa, the Japanese Foreign Minister as Japan is one of the strongest supporters of the Taiwan regime.
Blinken and Liu discussed a full range of issues, including areas of potential cooperation and differences, such as anti-narcotics collaboration, military-to-military communication, the Americans who are detained in China, Ukraine, North Korea, the Middle East, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The agenda items were broad, but the timing of the meeting was politically significant – one day prior to the Taiwan elections as a signal that the US attaches immense importance to the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This move was politically significant and unprecedented in Taiwan’s electoral history.
Before the Taiwan elections, the mainland media heavily criticized William Lai and his DPP. DPP’s vice presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim, who was a Taiwan representative to Washington, is also seen as politically provocative and unacceptable by the mainland media, especially as her open remarks on cross-strait relations have been traditionally outspoken and critical.
If cross-strait relations will have to be more peaceful, it remains to be seen how William Lai and Hsiao Bi-khim may moderate their remarks in such a way as to avoid provoking the mainland.
During the election campaign, the KMT argued that electing the DPP to the president position would be tantamount to endangering the security of Taiwan and bringing conflicts with the mainland. This message was quite strong, but still most voters have expressed their support of William Lai. The way in which the KMT pressured the DPP under Lai during the election campaign may have the intended or unintended consequence of reining in the DPP position and rhetoric after the presidential election. In other words, William Lai and Hsiao Bi-khim may have to learn to be more tactful, if not “diplomatic,” in their open remarks on mainland China and cross-strait relations.
Although the KMT and TPP are defeated, both Hou Yu-ih and Ko Wen-je’s remarks in the election campaign were covered in the mainland Chinese social media, especially their comments critical of the DPP. As such, it is likely that while both will be under the united front umbrella of the mainland, they can and will likely play the role of intermediaries acceptable to the mainland authorities.
The role of intermediaries has been traditionally critical to maintaining the peace and stability in cross-strait relations. They have traditionally included some businesspeople, core and former leaders of the KMT (like Ma Ying-jeou), and intellectuals. It is hoped that these intermediaries will continue to be the bridge narrowing the communication gap between the Taiwan people and the mainland on the one hand, and between the DPP authorities and the mainland authorities on the other.
The crux of the problem in cross-strait relations is that while the mainland side insists that the Taiwan authorities must accept the 1992 consensus as a condition for a full-scale resumption of other socio-economic interactions, including tourism and trade, the Taiwan regime has refused to accept this consensus under the DPP administration. William Lai would likely maintain this DPP legacy and therefore an impasse in cross-strait relations will likely continue.
Another problem is that most Taiwan people are uninterested in the “one country, two systems,” although the mainland side in the August 2022 White Paper on Taiwan has mentioned the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” with concrete benefits to Taiwan in the future, including its participation in international organizations, external relations, economic development, and foreign missions stationed in the island. The challenge for the mainland think-tank members is how to make the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” far more attractive to the people of Taiwan. The late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping used the “one country, two systems” model for China to reunify Hong Kong and Macau in the short run and then Taiwan in the long run, but this model has become unattractive to many Taiwan people, including Hou Yu-ih of the KMT and Ko Wen-je of the NPP during this 2024 presidential election.
A neglected element in the August 2022 White Paper published by mainland China on Taiwan is that, for the first time in a mainland document, it mentioned the possibility of a stage-by-stage process of dialogue and negotiation. This was unprecedented. Combining with the role of intermediaries, the stage-by-stage dialogue, if not negotiation, can and should be explored further.
So far, the US side has not produced any concrete proposal to deal with the possible dialogue between the mainland and Taiwan sides; after all, the mainland believes that the Taiwan matter is its domestic affair and there should be no “foreign intervention.”
Given the US failure to mediate between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC), notably the mission led by George Marshall, in 1946, Washington does have a potential role in mediating the relations between the ruling parties across the Taiwan Strait. The problem is, 78 years after the failure of the Marshall mission, the KMT in Taiwan is no longer the ruling party and it is likely to be a permanent opposition, while the ruling DPP position remains politically unacceptable to the CPC.
Another interesting difference between the Marshall mission and the current situation is that, while the US sales of weapons and ammunition were suspended between July 1946 and May 1947, the current US-Taiwan relations is marked by the need for Washington to provide weapons and ammunition to Taiwan for the sake of deterring the mainland military threat – an issue that was reportedly raised by President Xi Jinping during his meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco in November 2023.
The incumbent DPP government in Taiwan is likely to continue its policy of deterrence toward the mainland – an issue that would sour cross-strait relations, but this issue may be a bargaining one in case of any cross-strait negotiations in the future, with or without the US involvement.
In conclusion, the victory of the DPP in the Taiwan presidential election must bring about a persistent deadlock in cross-strait relations. If the opposition KMT and TPP produce proposed bills and initiatives that would enhance the economic relations across the Taiwan Strait, it remains to be seen how the DPP legislators would tackle such a move. Deadlock and fierce arguments in Taiwan’s executive-legislative relations would perhaps be seen, especially as the KMT and TPP are likely combined to capture a majority of seats in the legislature. This scenario in Taiwan politics is perhaps unprecedented and its political system is moving toward a mixed presidential-parliamentary system in which different parties capture the position of the president and the majority of the parliament. If political deadlock occurs in Taiwan’s executive-legislative relations, the mainland may adopt a wait-and-see attitude, with the unintended consequence of minimizing the possibility of conflicts in cross-strait relations.
Most importantly, if the US has the potential and capability to rein in the DPP leadership, the new DPP president and vice-president may have to learn to moderate their open remarks on the mainland and cross-strait relations. Rhetorical attacks and confrontations would not bring about a comfortable environment in cross-strait relations. In the final analysis, the role of intermediaries will remain extremely important in narrowing the communication gap and minimizing misperceptions and misunderstanding in cross-strait relations. As such, the results of the Taiwan presidential and legislative election in January 2024 are opening a new door for us to observe the dynamics of cross-strait relations very carefully.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：http://tinyurl.com/24rczs8a
