台灣領導人賴清德於10月10日發表雙十演講，引發了中國大陸於10月15日舉行的軍事演習，其後中國國家主席習近平赴福建東山視察並發表講話。這一連串事件對未來幾年北京和台北的關係有着重要的政治影響。
10月10日，賴挑釁性地表示，「中國大陸無權代表台灣，因為中華民國已經在台澎金馬落地生根，和中華人民共和國互不隸屬」。此外，賴提醒那些希望祝賀中華人民共和國國慶日的人要謹慎選擇用詞，避免使用「祖國」等字眼。
賴於5月20日發表就職演說，當時引發中國大陸舉行代號為「聯合利劍──2024A」的軍事演習，同樣，他的雙十演說惹來今次代號為「聯合利劍──2024B」的軍演，演習範圍在台灣北部、南部、東部及台海內水域。據媒體報道，中國出動了153架戰鬥機、遼寧號航母和其他艦艇包圍台灣及其離島，創下歷史紀錄。
國台辦批賴言論為台獨分離主義
國台辦發言人陳斌華批評，賴的言論是徹頭徹尾的台獨分離主義的主張，他鼓吹所謂「與國際社會合作」，是要倚外謀獨，在國際上製造一中一台，暴露頑固台獨本性，損害挑戰中國主權，挑戰國際社會堅持一個中國原則的格局。
陳強調，包括《開羅宣言》、《波茨坦公告》在內的一系列國際法文件，確認中國對台灣的主權。台灣屬於中國一部分的地位從未改變，也不可能改變，中華人民共和國理所當然代表台灣地區，也一直代表着台灣地區。
此外，陳重申1971年第26屆聯合國大會通過第2578號決議，將包括台灣在內整個中國的聯大席位歸還給中華人民共和國政府。
在賴發表雙十演說之前，美國似乎已預計到中國可能會舉行軍事演習，美國國務院發言人回應稱：「值得強調的是，北京利用例行年度慶典或公開言論，作為挑釁或脅迫行為的藉口，破壞和平穩定。」美方強調中方沒有理由進行此類軍演，應避免進一步破壞東亞地區和平與穩定。
解放軍演習結束後，東部戰區新聞發言人李熹海軍大校表示評價說，這次演習「充分檢驗了部隊一體化聯合作戰能力」。台灣國防部官員譴責中國解放軍的舉動，同時台灣離島處於高度戒備狀態。
陳斌華則表示，中國正以最大的誠意和努力爭取和平統一，但永遠不會承諾放棄使用武力。
國防部稱軍演目的削弱台軍事力量
針對解放軍演習，台灣國家安全局局長蔡明彥表示，中國軍演引起了國際社會的反應和譴責，他認為國際社會支持台灣的聲音比以往任何時候都多。同時，台灣國防部認為，中國軍演目的是使對台武力「合法化」，削弱和消耗台灣軍事力量。
毫無疑問，台海兩岸的問題能否獲得和平解決是個挑戰，如何處理值得我們繼續密切關注，雖然中方認為國際社會的政治介入是不可接受的，但至少一些主要國際參與者能接受解決方案。
可以預見的是，如果賴清德繼續發表對中國挑釁的言論，中國將不斷以軍演作為回應。問題是這樣的軍演能否在迅雷不及掩耳下，達到解放台灣的目的，或者觸發鼓吹分離主義的台灣領導人下台，然後建立一個支持統一的台灣政權。還有一個可能性是，隨着台灣的本土意識愈來愈強下，任何「解放」台灣的軍事行動都將導致台灣島上的長期游擊戰。
中國反對外國向台供應武器
大陸方面一直呼籲台灣方面考慮探討一國兩制的台灣模式，在這個政治模式下，台灣人民的資本主義生活方式和現有自由將保持不變。然而，2022年《台灣問題白皮書》沒有提到台灣將保留自己的軍隊，一方面暗示中國大陸不會放棄使用武力，另方面，如果中國反對美國向台灣供應武器，台灣從美國和其他國家進口武器很可能成為談判桌上棘手的問題。
簡言之，必須制定特殊的政治制度來實現「一國」原則，以換取台灣現有的生活方式，以及其獨特的本土認同和西式政治體系。設計一個新的政治制度，協調社會主義中國與資本主義和西式民主台灣的特點，對雙方來說都是一項具有挑戰性的實踐和學術活動。
OPINION – William Lai’s speech and China’s military drills: Toward a military or political solution?
A thought-provoking speech made by Taiwan leader William Lai on October 10 triggered a military exercise conducted by mainland China on October 15, followed by an interesting visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the Dongshan county in Fujian province. This chain of three events has important political implications for the relations between Beijing and Taipei in the years to come.
On October 10, William Lai said provocatively that mainland China has “no right to represent Taiwan,” because “the Republic of China has already put down roots in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” and because “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other” (Taipei Times, October 11, 2024). Moreover, Lai reminded those who wishes to congratulate the PRC for its national day to choose their words carefully and to avoid terms like “the motherland.”
As with Lai’s inaugural speech on May 20 that immediately triggered mainland China’s military exercise, namely Joint Sword-2024A, his remarks on October 10 provoked another Chinese military exercise named Joint Sword-2024B in which simulations were conducted in the north, south and east of the island and in the Taiwan Strait.
The authorities in Beijing hit out at Lai’s remarks, which were regarded as “outright ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist claims,” according to State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Chen Binhua. Chen added that “Lai’s advocating for so-called ‘cooperation with the international community aims to rely on external forces to seek independence, creating the notion of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ on the international stage (CGTN, October 16, 2024).”
Chen said that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation had already confirmed China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, and as such there is only one China in the world and Taiwan in an inalienable part of the Chinese territory. Furthermore, in 1971, the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2578 that returned the seat of entire China, including Taiwan, to the government of the PRC, according to Chen.
Chen’s remarks were clearly a response to not only Lai’s provocative speech on October 11 but also Taiwan’s recent moves of “internationalizing” its status. On July 30, William Lai delivered a speech on Taiwan’s global vision at the annual summit of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China in Taipei. The summit attracted the participation of 49 lawmakers and officials from 23 nations and the European Parliament. Lai said that as Taiwan stands on the frontline of the democratic world, he and other leaders of democracies are determined to “defend our democracy and we are firmly committed to working together to maintain regional peace,” “to support the democratic umbrella with our partners,” and “to avert the threats of expanding authoritarianism.”
The US appeared to predict a possible Chinese military exercise before William Lai’s delivery of his speech on October 10, during which a spokesman for the US State Department said, “it is worthy emphasizing that using routine annual celebrations or public remarks as a pretext or excuse for provocative or coercive measures undermined peace and stability.”
After the drill conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), senior captain Li Xi, the spokesman of the PLA Eastern Theatre Command, commented that the drills “fully tested the integrated joint operation capabilities” of its troops.
The Taiwan defense ministry officials condemned the Chinese PLA moves while Taiwan’s outlying islands were put on high alert.
Yet, the mainland Chinese coastguard posted on its Weibo account and depicted the patrol’s route in the shape of a heart, projecting an image that the mainland “loves” Taiwan.
The US reacted to the most recent Chinese military drills by saying that there were no grounds for such drills and that China should avoid further moves that would undermine peace and stability in the East Asian region.
If a Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” were considered, arguably it will have to be designed in a more “liberal,” “flexible” and “innovative” way as to lure the support of most Taiwan people.
On October 16, the Chinese President Xi Jinping made a sudden and rare visit to Fujian’s Dongshan county. He did not make any comment on the Chinese military drills that, according to news reports, dispatched a record of 153 fighter aircrafts, the Liaoning aircraft carriers and other ships to surround Taiwan and its outlying islands.
The choice of Dongshan county was interesting. At the end of the Chinese civil war in 1950, the Dongshan Island was a place of combat between the PLA and the Taiwan military forces. The Taiwan military failed to retake the Dongshan Island in 1953.
On the day that President Xi visited the Dongshan county, Chen Binhua remarked that China is “striving for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and endeavor,” but “we will never commit ourselves to renouncing the use of force.”
Chen’s comment coincided with President Xi’s visit, and it was timed intentionally to send a message to Taiwan and the US that, while China is keen to reunite Taiwan with “utmost sincerity and endeavor,” the use of force cannot and will not be renounced.
In response to the PLA drills, the Taiwan national security bureau director, Tsai Ming-yen, said that the Chinese military exercise had led to the reactions and “condemnations” of the international community, which according to him has become more “supportive” of Taiwan than ever before. At the same time, the Taiwan defense ministry believed that the Chinese military exercises aimed at “legitimizing” the use of force against Taiwan, “undermining” Taiwan’s military and “depleting” the island’s military combat power (Reuters, October 16, 2024).”
Judging from a new pattern in 2024 that the PLA drills were conducted twice when William Lai made provocative remarks in May and October, the apparent escalations of cross-strait tensions have several significant implications.
First and foremost, the Chinese military exercise after the October 10 speech has been balanced by President Xi’s visit to Fujian’s Dongshan county. Although Dongshan Island is symbolically a victory of the PLA over Taiwan military forces in 1953, Fujian can also be seen as a region where mainland Chinese leadership has emphasized the importance of building up an economically prosperous district to prepare for the province’s closer socio-economic integration with Taiwan. Recently some mainland tourists have begun to visit Kinmen. As such, President Xi’s visit to Fujian’s Dongshan Island can be interpreted more positively, although State Council spokesman Chen Binhua’s comment tended to be more ambiguous but standardized in stressing both softline and hardline approaches to dealing with Taiwan.
Second, the most recent military exercise in October has appeared to increase the involvement of various types of forces, ranging from coastguard vessels to the aircraft carrier, as a stronger gesture and a preparatory move that, in the event of any sudden “liberation” of Taiwan, the PLA forces and coastguard vessels would be fully mobilized to deal with the Taiwan “separatists” in a decisive manner. In other words, the PLA deployment would be intensified and escalated if the circumstances are deemed as “necessary” – a stern warning of the recent war game to the leading authorities in Taiwan.
The international politics of handling Taiwan’s political future will continue to deserve our close attention. The challenge is whether there will be a peaceful solution between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait – a solution that would also be acceptable to at least some key international players even though China sees such international influence as politically unacceptable.
Third, if Fujian is designated as a province that aims at accelerating its prosperous region to integrate with Kinmen and Matsu first, like by building a bridge linking the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, then the peaceful gesture of accelerating the process of reunification will persist side by side with the hardline position – a dialectical tendency typical of not only Marxism and communist/socialist politics but also mainland China’s policy toward Taiwan.
Fourth, the PLA military drills did arouse international reactions and concerns. The US State Department spokesman Matthew Miller urged Beijing to exercise restraint and avoid actions that could undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The European Union added that the drills escalated cross-strait tensions. The Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba commented that Japan would prepare for any sudden development due to the issue of Taiwan. As such, the question of Taiwan’s political future is de facto an international concern even though the PRC rejects and dislikes such internationalization. The international politics of handling Taiwan’s political future will continue to deserve our close attention. The challenge is whether there will be a peaceful solution between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait – a solution that would also be acceptable to at least some key international players even though China sees such international influence as politically unacceptable.
Fifth, amid the cross-strait tensions, China has sanctioned some Taiwan separatists and blacklisted Taiwan’s Kuma Academy that trains the Taiwan people to resist any possible Chinese military “takeover.” Taiwan’s businessman Robert Tsao and legislator Puma Shen have been barred from entering mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau, according to State Council official Chen Binhua, because both are supportive of the civil-defense organization Kuma Academy in Taiwan. If so, the ideological war between mainland China and Taiwan has continued to intensify. It remains to be seen how this ideological war will evolve, and how it would perhaps escalate the military tensions between the two sides.
Sixth, it can be anticipated that if Lai’s remarks about Taiwan and mainland China remain provocative, a pattern of recurring military exercises will be seen across the two Straits. The questions will be whether such military drills will suddenly lead to an abrupt “liberation” of Taiwan within a very short period that will catch everyone by surprise. Another scenario is that such an abrupt conflict would perhaps bring about the removal of “separatist” core leaders in Taiwan, followed by the installation of a Taiwan regime supportive of mutual reunification. The third possibility is that any military move to “liberate” Taiwan would lead to a prolonged guerrilla war on the island of Taiwan where local identity is increasingly resilient and very strong.
Seventh, it is increasingly imperative for the mainland and Taiwan sides to explore a political settlement, with the help of middlemen or intermediaries, such as businesspeople who travel frequently between the two sides. Politically, the mainland side has been appealing to the Taiwan side to consider exploring the content of a Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.” The capitalistic lifestyle and existing freedom of the Taiwan people will remain intact, and foreign countries will, according to the mainland Chinese White Paper on the question of Taiwan in August 2022, be allowed to have their consular offices in Taiwan. However, the 2022 White Paper did not mention that Taiwan would retain its own military, implying that mainland China does not renounce the use of force on the one hand and that the question of Taiwan’s imported weapons from the US and other foreign nations would likely become a matter of serious negotiations in the long run. If China opposes the US in supplying weapons to Taiwan, this issue will become a bone of contention in any cross-strait negotiations in the years to come.
A special council composed of an equal number of mainland representatives and Taiwan representatives may have to be formed, dealing with a whole range of issues, including most importantly the implementation of a peace pact between the two sides, the details of socio-economic integration and infrastructure projects between Fujian and Taiwan, Taiwan’s possible constitutional revisions, and the number and participation of Taiwan representatives in China’s National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
If a Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” were considered, arguably it will have to be designed in a more “liberal,” “flexible” and “innovative” way as to lure the support of most Taiwan people. Once the Taiwan side, as expressed in the form of, say, the Legislative Assembly approving a mainland-Taiwan pact, is willing to accept the principle of one China, or the 1992 consensus, the mainland side would perhaps have to consider renouncing the use of military force. Mutual concession will be necessary to bring about a peace pact. The huge challenges will be twofold: how to convince the Taiwan legislature to accept the content of such a peace pact, and how to incentivize the mainland side to renounce the use of force to deal with Taiwan’s political future.
Politically, if the current political system of Taiwan can be retained, then a new political system incorporating the “one country” features may have to be more imaginative and yet feasible, such as having perhaps dual executives for Taiwan – one president appointed by the PRC and the other local “president” or chief executive directly elected by the Taiwan people. A special council composed of an equal number of mainland representatives and Taiwan representatives may have to be formed, dealing with a whole range of issues, including most importantly the implementation of a peace pact between the two sides, the details of socio-economic integration and infrastructure projects between Fujian and Taiwan, Taiwan’s possible constitutional revisions, and the number and participation of Taiwan representatives in China’s National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In other words, a special political system will have to be crafted to realize the principle of “one country” in exchange for not only Taiwan’s existing lifestyle but also its unique local identity and western-style political system. It will be a challenging practical and academic exercise for both sides to design a new political system that will harmonize the special features of socialist China and that of capitalistic and western-style democratic Taiwan.
Conclusion
The recent Chinese military drills in response to William Lai’s remarks on October 10 do not bode well for the development of cross-strait relations in the coming years because of the trend of increasing the frequency and expanding the scope of such drills. This recurring pattern of military drills, perhaps fortunately, has been slightly diluted by the Chinese Presidential visit to Fujian’s Dongshan county and Island – a symbolic move that clearly points to the mixture of hardline and softline tactics. China is reluctant to renounce the use of force to deal with Taiwan’s political future, while Taiwan possesses a western-style democratic system in which the rotation of political party in power has made the stronger and yet “separatist” Democratic Progressive Party look like a dominant party vis-à-vis a relatively weak pro-reunification Nationalist Party.
Taiwan’s political future, objectively speaking, has become an international concern even though the PRC views foreign intervention in its domestic affairs as politically unacceptable and surely violating its own national security. If so, all stakeholders have the vested interest to explore a peaceful political solution for Taiwan. This political solution, as argued and suggested above, necessitates a more imaginative but feasible way of adding perhaps a special layer of presidential elites on top of the current Taiwan political system, meaning that both sides may have to discuss the feasibility of having a mainland-appointed president alongside with a special chief executive, if not named local “president,” directly elected by the people of Taiwan.
A new presidential or constitutional council may be set up with equal number of representatives from the mainland and Taiwan to oversee the implementation of a peace pact, the closer socio- economic integration between Taiwan and Fujian, Taiwan’s constitutional revisions, and the question of Taiwan military’s cooperation with both the mainland and foreign counterpart. All these issues will likely present huge challenges that necessitate the political elites and think tank members from both sides of the two Straits to start brainstorming and exchanging their ideas with a view to averting the use of any military option to solve the question of Taiwan’s political future.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。（原文按此）
