亞太區三大潛在火藥庫中最危險的是韓、朝關係,因為南海水域爭端和兩岸局勢迄今仍是可控的,相比之下,韓國與朝鮮在政治和外交關係最不確定,所以擦槍走火的機會最大。
最近韓、朝關係緊張加劇。朝鮮當局批評韓國出動無人機在平壤散發宣傳單張,朝鮮官方回應態度強硬,警告今後堅決回應此類挑釁行為。韓國國防部否認這些無人機屬軍隊編制,但似乎不排除有韓國民眾遙控無人機進入朝鮮國土的可能性。
早於2023年12月,朝鮮領導人金正恩已呼籲定調韓國為「敵對國家」。近日朝鮮更切斷了與韓國鐵路和公路的聯繫,令韓、朝邊境的氣氛變得緊張。
此外,韓國媒體《中央日報》於2024年7月聲稱,金正恩「指示」其外交官淡化中朝關係。然而,沒有證據顯示朝鮮領導人對中國領導人不滿。
中韓領導人互發賀電祝建交75周年
2024年10月6日,中國國家主席習近平向朝鮮領導人金正恩致賀電,表示中方願意抓緊中朝建交75周年的機遇,加強戰略溝通協調,深化友好交流合作,續寫中朝傳統友誼新篇章,共同推動兩國社會主義事業行穩致遠,更好造福兩國人民。同樣,金正恩也向習主席致賀電,表示雙方執政黨都堅定走社會主義發展的道路。
儘管中朝兩國相對低調地互相祝賀建交75週年,但正如韓媒所報道,這並不意味中朝存在重大分歧。儘管朝鮮最近加強與俄羅斯的經濟和軍事合作,但此舉並非以犧牲中朝關係為代價。相反,即使朝鮮在軍事交易和技術轉移稍微向俄羅斯傾斜,中朝在意識形態上仍是重要兄弟,而且雙邊貿易正蓬勃發展,兩國也是重要經濟夥伴。
鑑於美、日、韓三國軍事合作升溫,而韓、美亦定期進行軍事演習,這促使平壤將韓國及其盟國視為主要軍事和安全的威脅,朝韓關係因此變得更不穩定。
在朝鮮看來,美、日、韓軍事聯盟對它的圍堵和遏制是真正的安全威脅,可能觸發朝鮮半島的軍事衝突,特別是朝鮮擁有核武,一旦擦槍走火將非常危險。
各方以零和態度看待朝鮮半島問題
美日韓聯盟認為,朝鮮無核化是實現朝鮮半島和平的必要條件,但平壤將本身核計劃視為軍事優先政策和針對三國聯盟的自我保護手段。顯然,各方持份者都以零和博弈的態度看待朝鮮半島的問題。
事實上,中日在釣魚島(日本稱「尖閣諸島」)主權的爭議不斷、台海兩岸關係持續緊張以及對在華日本公民安全的憂慮,都使日本視中國為國家安全威脅。最近中國外交部長王毅和日本新任外相岩屋毅的會談顯示,儘管兩國都渴望維持穩定的關係,但日本對中國在外交政策和對外關係所突顯的過分自信民族主義感到相當擔憂。
另一方面,韓國將中國視為有用的政治和經濟夥伴,能在無核化和國際關係穩定的議題上影響朝鮮,平壤則將中韓更密切的經濟關係視為中國立場搖擺的證明,令中國不願輕易捲入朝韓政治旋渦中。
基於國際政治的零和觀和極度互不信任,導致朝、韓、美、日中之間關係愈趨複雜,且有高度不確定和不穩定性。金正恩領導下的朝鮮不信任美國領導下美、日、韓聯盟,也懷疑中國對朝鮮半島外交政策的一致,朝鮮最近在軍事和經濟方面向俄羅斯傾斜,明顯是減少了對北京的經濟依賴。
馬來西亞試圖勸和中菲緊張關係
第二個潛在的軍事爆發點是中菲圍繞南海島礁的爭端。最近舉行的東盟系列峰會上,一些東南亞國家試圖勸和中菲緊張的關係。
馬來西亞總理安華表示,東盟呼籲儘早締結一項管理南海水域的行為準則。如能盡快敲定,將成為約束中菲海警行為的重要文本。下任東盟輪任主席國將由馬來西亞接任。
同一場合,中國總理李強表示,域外國家在南海制造地緣政治衝突,應尊重中國和地區國家共同維護南海和平穩定的努力。
據報道,菲律賓總統小馬可斯告訴李強,中國與東盟關係離不開中菲南海島礁爭議。馬尼拉顯然試圖將中國納入南海行為準則,這反映了馬尼拉與東盟之間的共同利益。如果是這樣,中國將不得不採取更微妙的外交方向,與菲律賓和東盟在處理中菲南海島礁爭端問題上達成共識。
中國批評賴清德宣揚「新兩國論」
第三個潛在的軍事爆發點是北京對台政策。最近台灣領導人賴清德於2024年10月10日發表言論激怒了北京,北京當局批評宣揚「新兩國論」。美國對中台局勢變化迅速作出回應,稱華盛頓渴望看到中國能自我克制。然而,中國最近對美國持續向台灣提供武器表示不滿,美國稱此舉是使台灣有足夠自我防衛能力,是遏制大陸軍事威脅的必要舉措。未來北京、台北和華盛頓之間的三角互動仍有待觀察。
從上述分析來看,鑑於平壤的核計劃和美日韓軍事同盟,亞太地區最危險的潛在火藥庫仍是韓、朝關係。隨着兩國間的宣傳戰不斷升級,朝鮮日益軍事化為韓國及其盟友帶來了更多的不安全感。
OPINION – Three potential flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific Region
Analytically, there are currently three potential flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region: South Korean relations with North Korea, cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan, and Sino-Philippines disputes over reefs and islands in the South China Sea.
Recently, relations between North Korea and South Korea have escalated to a more tense level than before. The North Korean authorities criticized the South Korean side for sending drones that distributed propaganda leaflets in Pyongyang. The official North Korean response has been firm and hardline, warning that North Korea would respond resolutely to such provocations in the future. The South Korean defense authorities denied that such drones belonged to their military, but they do not seem to exclude the likelihood that some South Korean civilians might fly their drones into North Korean territories. Several months ago, the South Korean side said that North Korean “balloons” carrying rubbish had flown into its territories.
Furthermore, the North Korean authorities have severed the railway and highway links with South Korea, and the border with the South has suddenly become more tense than before. In December 2023, the North Korean authorities regarded South Korea as a “hostile state,” while showing a stronger tendency to side with Russia militarily and economically than ever before. The South Korean media, namely Korea JoongAng Daily, claimed in July 2024 that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “instructed” his diplomats to play down Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing – a move following North Korean diplomacy of forming a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia in June 2024 (Korea JoongAng Daily, 31 July 2024). The Korea JoongAng Daily also reported that North Korea had tightened its control over some North Koreans who stayed in China and who wanted to visit their homes back in North Korea, restricting the usage of Chinese yuan payments and preventing North Koreans from having access to Chinese movies.
From an objective perspective, it is understandable that socialist North Korea might restrict the entry or infiltration of Chinese movies into North Korea for fear of the cultural influences of a more “capitalistic” China on its people. However, there is no concrete evidence to show that the North Korean leadership is unhappy with the Chinese counterpart. On 6 October 2024, President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China sent a congratulatory message to Kim Jong-un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, saying that China wants to grasp the opportunity of the 75th anniversary of Sino-North Korean diplomatic relations to strengthen strategic communications and coordination, deepen mutual exchanges and cooperation, and promote the development of socialist enterprises for the benefit of the citizens of both countries. Similarly, Kim Jong-un also sent a congratulatory message to President Xi, saying that the ruling parties from both sides have firmness in their faith and in their socialist path of development, and that both sides should consolidate and develop their relations further.
The most dangerous potential military flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region is the relationship between North Korea and South Korea. The reason is that, while the South China Sea dispute and the Taiwan issue are so far manageable, Pyongyang-Seoul relations tend to be more politically uncertain, militarily vulnerable, and diplomatically fluctuating than the other two potential flashpoints.
Although both China and North Korea congratulated each other on the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations in a relatively low-key manner, this does not mean that both countries have any major differences of opinion or “rift,” as the South Korean media appear to exaggerate. Indeed, North Korea has recently strengthened its economic and military relations with Russia, but this consolidated Pyongyang-Moscow relationship does not imply a zero-sum game at the expense of North Korea’s relations with China. Rather, amid the North Korean policy of leaning slightly towards Russia in military transactions and technology transfers, China remains an important ideological brother and a crucial economic partner where bilateral trade flourishes.
Yet, relations between North Korea and South Korea have oscillated to a more uncertain and unstable manner. Given South Korea’s military cooperation with the US and Japan and the regular military exercises between South Korea and the US, Pyongyang views South Korea and its allies as a major military and security threat. As such, the most recent saga concerning South Korean “drones” flying into Pyongyang deserves attention and further observation, because North Korea’s perception of a South Korean-American-Japanese military alliance surrounding, containing, and “threatening” Pyongyang is a real one that can and will likely trigger a sudden flashpoint on the Korean peninsula. As North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, and as Pyongyang sees Seoul’s ideological-military coalition with the US and Japan as a real security menace, relations between North Korea and South Korea remain highly volatile, militarily dangerous, and conflict-ridden.
Although both China and North Korea congratulated each other on the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations in a relatively low-key manner, this does not mean that both countries have any major differences of opinion or “rift,” as the South Korean media appear to exaggerate.
The problem on the Korean peninsula is that the stakeholders concerned see international politics in a zero-sum manner. The Seoul-Washington-Tokyo alliance views the denuclearisation of North Korea as a necessary move that would bring about peace on the Korean peninsula, but Pyongyang sees its own nuclearisation programme as a military-first policy and a self-protective shield against the triple alliance. Japan has been particularly sensitive to North Korea’s nuclearisation programme, and it must increase and improve its armament as a necessary self-defensive move. Japan also sees China as a national security threat because of Beijing’s ongoing disputes with Taipei, the two countries’ dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu (or “Senkaku” from the Japanese perspective) Island, and also because of how Japanese residents may be treated in mainland China after the recent death of a Japanese boy in Shenzhen. A recent meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and new Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya showed that, although both countries are keen to maintain stable relations, Tokyo has become quite concerned about the rise of assertive nationalism in China and in Beijing’s foreign policy and external relations.
On the other hand, South Korea sees China as a useful politico-economic partner who can and will influence North Korea along the path of denuclearisation and stabilization of international relations. Yet, China is reluctant to be dragged easily into a politically sandwiched position between North Korea and South Korea, while Pyongyang has regarded Beijing’s closer economic relations with Seoul as a testimony to China’s fluctuating stance. The mixture of a zero-sum view of international politics and the existence of profound mutual distrust has generated a high degree of volatility, uncertainties, and instabilities in the complex relations between Pyongyang, Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. Distrusting the US-led alliance with South Korea and Japan, and doubting China’s consistency in its foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang under Kim Jong-un has recently leaned towards Russia militarily and economically, clearly minimizing its economic dependency on Beijing. The recent mobilization of more North Korean soldiers along the “demilitarized zone” at the southern border and Pyongyang’s action of terminating the railway and highway connections with South Korea are by no means positive moves. Any sudden accident could trigger a tense and conflict-prone relationship between North Korea and South Korea.
The Chinese Premier Li Qiang said that foreign forces have been creating geopolitical conflicts in the South China Sea and that more dialogue will be necessary to calm the stakeholders
The second potential military flashpoint is the Sino-Philippines dispute over the reefs in the South China Sea. In the recent ASEAN Summit, some Southeast Asian countries have attempted to become middlemen in a process of reconciliation between Beijing and Manila. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, who will take over the rotating 10-member ASEAN chair in 2025, said that the bloc called for an early conclusion to a Code of Conduct governing the South China Sea. Such a Code of Conduct, if finalized as soon as possible, will become an influential instrument reining in the behavior of the maritime police forces of both China and the Philippines. The Philippines has in recent months strengthened its maritime and military relations with the US, Japan, and Vietnam – a move that appears to have deepened sour and distrustful relations with China. The Chinese Premier Li Qiang, who attended the ASEAN summit talks, said that foreign forces have been creating geopolitical conflicts in the South China Sea and that more dialogue will be necessary to calm the stakeholders. It was reported that Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. told Li Qiang that Sino-ASEAN relations cannot be separated from the Sino-Philippines dispute over the reefs in the South China Sea. Manila has clearly tried to bring China under the Code of Conduct governing the South China Sea, illustrating a common interest between Manila and ASEAN. If so, China will have to steer a more subtle and diplomatic direction towards a consensus with both the Philippines and ASEAN in dealing with the Sino-Philippines dispute over the reefs in the South China Sea.
The third potential flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region is Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan. Recently, remarks made by Taiwan leader William Lai on 10 October 2024 provoked Beijing, whose authorities criticized Lai for propagating a “new two-states theory” (Wen Wei Po, 11 October 2024). The US responded to the Beijing-Taipei dynamics quickly by saying that Washington is keen to witness mainland China’s self-restrained action. As such, a chain reaction involving Taiwan, mainland China, and the US can be seen. Whenever Taiwan’s leaders make any provocative statements, and whenever Beijing’s authorities react, Washington responds with an appeal for self-restraint and calm. Under circumstances where Beijing sees peaceful reunification with Taiwan as a priority, and if Taiwan’s leaders avoid remarks and actions provoking the Beijing side, Washington can still use diplomacy to maintain a harmonious relationship across the Taiwan Strait.
However, Beijing has recently expressed its displeasure over Washington’s continuous supply of weapons to Taiwan – a move that the US has asserted as necessary to make Taiwan militarily defensive in order to deter the mainland military threat. The triangular interactions and dynamics between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington remain to be observed carefully in the coming months and years.
From the above analyses, the most dangerous potential military flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region is the relationship between North Korea and South Korea. The reason is that, while the South China Sea dispute and the Taiwan issue are so far manageable, Pyongyang-Seoul relations tend to be more politically uncertain, militarily vulnerable, and diplomatically fluctuating than the other two potential flashpoints. The propaganda war between North Korea and South Korea has escalated, and the North’s increasing militarisation has generated more insecurity for Seoul and its allies. Given Pyongyang’s nuclearisation programme and the South Korean-American-Japanese triple military alliance, North Korea remains the most dangerous military and political flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社(MNA)網站,本社獲作者授權轉載。(原文按此)
!doctype>