從長期的戰略角度研判，預料台灣未來的政治前景將出現三個可能狀況：（一）與中國大陸和平統一；（二）中國軟硬兼施，使用武力攻台然後進行和平談判；（三）中國武力接管台灣。這三種假設取決於三個重要因素：中國對台灣問題的政策；台灣執政當局的取態；以及美國及其盟友的反應。
台灣政壇缺乏互信，兩岸對話難上加難
和平解決台灣問題是最理想的方案，可能性亦仍然存在，惟取決於幾項因素，首先是台灣執政當局是否真誠接受「九二共識」，即接受一個中國的原則，但對「一個中國，各自表述」。如果台方接受「九二共識」，可望順利打開兩岸談判的大門，為早前中國發表台灣問題白皮書中提到的分階段談判開路。然而，困難在於台灣執政的民進黨欠缺處理兩岸關係的明智策略，而國民黨一些深藍成員雖然努力調解兩岸緊張關係，但黨內仍然分歧。
最令人擔憂的現象，是民進黨相信藉着提升台灣的國際地位，以及與美國結成軍事聯盟，可以「有效地」威懾中國大陸。
不幸地，民進黨這種設想只會被中國視為挑釁，而美國對中國採取對抗策略，更令當前的僵局惡化，因為在中美角力下，美國不太可能會促成兩岸對話，令台灣問題的困局更難化解。此外，新加坡等第三國或許可充當中間人，一方面促進國民黨和民進黨溫和派之間的對話，另一方面則促進與中國大陸的對話。
然而，問題的複雜之處，在於民進黨溫和派把國民黨視為政敵，指責國民黨藍營向大陸低頭。台灣政壇缺乏互信和深刻的分歧，導致兩岸的政治和解與對話非常困難。
現時國民黨的選舉支持度仍然遜於民進黨。因此，假設 2024 年初台灣總統大選繼續由民進黨獲勝及主宰大局，而民進黨又不打算改變其大陸政策，那麼可以大膽的預測，從 2024 年初開始，兩岸關係將會進一步惡化。 2024 年將是高度敏感的一年，尤其值得注意的是美國總統大選將於 11 月舉行。從軍事角度考慮，美國總統大選或許會為中國提供一個機會，以強而有力的方式快速解決台灣問題。
美國會否對抗中國，保護台灣存有疑問
台灣未來政局第二種可能出現的狀況，是中國軟硬兼施，結合武力及作出一些妥協以實現統一。不管從理論和實際上考量，中國大陸有可能會對台灣發動快速軍事「進攻」，並對台灣島實施經濟封鎖，從而迫使對方達成政治和解方案。關鍵在於，中國軍隊是否有能力快速有效地「收復」台灣，而在另一方面，台灣軍隊和抵抗力量是否足以阻止這種「攻擊」。儘管台灣軍方及一些強硬派將會作出抵抗，台灣的軍力相對薄弱。
在此情況下，如果中國軍隊能夠快速控制局面，民進黨的強硬派及激進分子有可能面臨被捕和受到懲處，除非他們改變立場，或是勝利的一方考慮作出「局部特赦」。
然而，從香港反修訂《逃犯條例》抗議風波的經驗可見，對於任何違法者來說，即使獲得「局部特赦」也是非常困難，他們均因違法而不得不鋃鐺入獄。
一旦中國採取武力解決台灣問題的方案，美國不太可能會作出軍事干預。雖然美國一直向台灣提供武器，以遏制中國大陸的「威脅」，如果大陸武力攻台，美國協助「保衛」台灣的可能性不高。儘管美國和中國持續有外交爭拗，美國是否會在夏威夷或亞洲部署軍隊「保衛」台灣，以對抗中國的軍事接管，存在很大的疑問。
反而日本會擔當什麼角色令人擔憂。近日，日本國家安全保障局長秋葉剛男訪華時表示，日方不同意中國處理台灣問題的方式，包括在台灣附近海域進行軍演，並對五枚中國試射的導彈落在日本「專屬經濟區」表示擔憂。日本也對中國海警船進入有領土爭議的釣魚島水域感到不滿。如果中國大陸突然動用武力解決台灣問題，可以預料日本的反應會比美國更迅速和更強烈。
中國若採武統台灣，局勢變數難以預估
中國採取武力結合懷柔政策能否快速解決台灣問題，將取決於以下因素：（一）中國會否倚重國民黨藍營管治台灣；（二）是否會「懲罰」民進黨激進分子和其他強硬派；以及（三）台灣民眾對武統的反應。儘管台灣民調顯示，50%的民眾反對中國軍演，但若出現武力統一後，或許有很多台灣民眾會更願意接受快速達成和解的方案，因為穩定與和平，看來是絕大多數台灣民眾的優先選擇。
然而，當武力攻台的情況出現時，可以肯定的是，台灣一些強硬派極可能會堅決反抗，有些人或會逃離台灣流亡海外。中國軍隊需要用多少時間安撫民眾及穩定局面，將是一個重大挑戰。
俄羅斯出兵烏克蘭的戰爭顯示，俄羅斯領導層高估了自己的軍事實力，同時亦低估了烏克蘭的反抗力量。如果中國以武力快速「收復」台灣的情況出現，中國部署的軍事行動，會否像俄烏戰事那樣漫長，仍要拭目以待。從台灣軍隊近年經常出現事故衡量，台方軍力似乎相對薄弱，然而無論是大陸或台灣軍隊的戰鬥能力，多年來都未經實戰考驗，因此如果中國認為無法以和平手段實現統一，需要動用武力的話，其真正戰力及戰局如何發展，仍是未知之數。
第三種可能狀況就是中國武力攻台，並陷入長期戰鬥──這是中國大陸、台灣以至全球各地華人都不願設想的狀況。不過，如果有其他國家介入充當調停人，此情況也不太可能發生。參照以往歷史，新加坡有條件成為兩岸的中介。2015年11月，國民黨的時任台灣總統馬英九曾在新加坡與中共總書記習近平會面，雙方對推動兩岸和平發展達成共識，當時新加坡為兩岸對話提供了有效的中立平台。
事實上，馬英九離任多年後，仍然是調解兩岸關係最具影響力的中間人，有機會協助打破兩岸的政治僵局，問題是無論民進黨還是美國，都漠視他作為兩岸中間人的巨大潛力。台灣政壇存在心理和政治障礙──凡是與大陸當局交往的人，必然是受「拉攏」，違背台方的利益。然而，如果台灣真的希望與大陸和平共處，這種假設是錯誤的。
台灣先接受九二共識，兩岸僵局才有望破冰
兩岸要解決的一個重大問題，是如何分階段談判和平統一的進程。中國發布的台灣問題白皮書已提到需要一個分階段的談判過程──這是一個突破，有利打開談判和互相讓步的大門。舉例來說，如果第一階段的重點是台方接受「九二共識」，有可能換取中國放棄武力攻台。只要雙方開始交換條件及互相讓步，其他事情就可逐步解決。
儘管如此，可以預見雙方就如何處理諒解備忘錄（MOU）的內容將會出現阻礙。在理想情況下，如果台方是由國民黨藍營和一些民進黨溫和派組成的聯盟，雙方達成諒解備忘錄，可望不需要經過台灣立法院審議和批准。然而，雙方若要達成正式的協議，將會引發台灣的強硬派要求必須交由立法機關辯論和投票。這是合乎民主程序的政治進程，卻不利於化解兩岸緊張關係及永久和平。
如果兩岸就處理台灣問題的基本原則能夠達成諒解備忘錄，將是最理想的第一步，接着可進行第二階段談判，就台灣參與國際組織以至台灣軍隊的地位等議題，進行較長期的磋商。白皮書並沒有提到台灣軍隊的問題，但如果有和平統一的方案，可以大膽預測，未來台灣很可能在有條件約束下擁有自己的軍隊。
總括而言，可以大膽預測，兩岸未來局勢將出現三種可能狀況。局勢的演變將主要取決於執政當局的政策，如果台方接受「九二共識」，兩岸關係將會取得突破。然而如果台方不接受的話，中國以武力實現統一或許只是時間問題。美國、日本和新加坡等外部因素，對兩岸關係的未來發展亦發揮關鍵作用。美方若能遏制台灣的激進分子繼續挑釁大陸，並明白以國民黨重量級人物作為中間人的重要性，兩岸關係仍有突破的可能。
另一方面，如果中國使用武力解決台灣問題，日本可能會感到受威脅。新加坡則有可能發揮關鍵的角色，不僅可為國民黨及民進黨溫和派組成的聯盟提供中立的兩岸對話平台，而且可在緊急時刻介入，提出和平解決方案。從中國早前對台灣問題發布白皮書的內容研判，北京對解決台灣問題的決心是明確和不容置疑的。解決問題的時機有可能在未來幾年來臨，抑或在幾十年後出現，且拭目以待。
Predicting the future of Taiwan: Three scenarios
From a long-term strategic perspective, the political future of Taiwan will likely witness three scenarios: (1) peaceful reunification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC); (2) a combination of China’s use of force followed by a peaceful negotiation process with Taiwan; and (3) a forceful takeover of Taiwan. These three scenarios will be contingent on three main factors: the PRC policy toward Taiwan, the position of the ruling Taiwan authorities, and the responses from the US and its allies.
In the most ideal scenario, a peaceful solution to tackling Taiwan’s political future remains possible, but it is contingent on, firstly, whether the ruling authorities on Taiwan really accept the 1992 consensus, namely there is only one China, but the meaning of what China means is open to the two sides’ interpretation. If the ruling authorities on Taiwan accept the 1992 consensus, the door of cross-strait negotiations will open smoothly, paving the way for a stage-by-stage process as suggested in the recent White Paper published by the PRC government. The crux of the problem is that the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) currently lacks a skillful policy toward mainland China, while the Kuomintang (KMT) remains divided although some members of the dark blue camp have been acting as the go-betweens mediating the PRC side and the hardliners on Taiwan’s political scene.
The most troubling phenomenon of Taiwan’s political future is the assumption of the DPP authorities, who believe that the continuous internationalization of the island’s status and a military alliance with the US can act as an “effective” deterrence against the mainland.
Unfortunately, this assumption is problematic and provocative to the mainland side. Compounding the current impasse is the US policy of confrontation toward China. Open disagreement between the US and the PRC without sufficient middlemen is pointing to a deadlock over Taiwan’s political future, unless the US side facilitates a dialogue between the two straits, and unless a third country – perhaps Singapore – may be able to act as an intermediary promoting the dialogue between the KMT and DPP moderates on the one hand, if not DPP hardliners, and the mainland side on the other.
Yet, the complexity is that the DPP moderates see the KMT as their political foes, accusing the KMT blue camp of bowing to the mainland side. Political distrusts and deep divisions in Taiwan’s domestic politics have made political reconciliation and dialogue between the Taiwanese side and the mainland counterpart very difficult.
At present, the KMT remains electorally weaker than the DPP. As such, if the early 2024 presidential election in Taiwan would continue to envisage a DPP victory and monopoly, and if the DPP does not change its policy toward the PRC, a deterioration of cross-strait relations can be boldly anticipated from early 2024 onwards. The year 2024 would be a highly sensitive year, especially if the US presidential election will be held in November. Militarily speaking, the presidential election in the US would perhaps present an opportunity for the mainland Chinese side to settle the Taiwan issue quickly and perhaps forcefully.
The second scenario is a combination of force and compromise. The mainland may, theoretically and practically speaking, launch a swift military “attack” on Taiwan and economic blockade of the island, thereby forcing a quick political settlement. The crux of the problem is whether the PRC military would have the capability of launching a rapid and an effective “recovery” of Taiwan. Compounding the problem is whether the Taiwan military and resistance would be strong enough to deter such “attack.” However, the Taiwan military remains relatively weak, even though some hardliners in the military and society would perhaps resist.
In the second scenario of combining force with a quick settlement, the DPP hardliners and radicals would likely encounter the possibility of arrest and punishment, unless they change their positions and unless a “partial amnesty” would be considered by the victorious power from the mainland.
Yet, the experience of Hong Kong after the anti-extradition bill protests has shown that even a “partial amnesty” can be very difficult for any law-offenders, who have to be imprisoned due to their violation of the law.
It would be unlikely to witness the military intervention from the US in case the PRC adopts a forceful solution in Taiwan. The US has been supplying weapons to Taiwan for the sake of deterring the mainland Chinese “threat.” However, it remains unlikely that the US would help “defend” Taiwan in case of a mainland forceful solution.
The worrying actor would rather be Japan. In a recent visit to Beijing, Japan’s national security adviser Takeo Akiba expressed the Japanese side’s opposition to the way in which the PRC has been dealing with Taiwan, including the military drill and exercise, and the arrival of five Chinese missile at Japan’s “exclusive economic zone.” Japan was also unhappy with the Chinese maritime vessels going into the waters of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese), which remains a bone of territorial contention between Japan and China. In case of a sudden mainland use of force to settle the Taiwan issue, it can be anticipated that Japan would react even more rapidly and strongly than the US.
Despite the open megaphone diplomacy between the US and China, it is highly doubtful whether the US would deploy its military in Hawaii or Asia to “defend” Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC’s military takeover.
The scenario of combining force with a quick settlement on Taiwan will also depend on (1) whether the PRC would rely on the KMT blue camp to govern Taiwan, (2) whether it would “punish” the DPP radicals and other hardliners on the island, and (3) the reactions of the Taiwan people to such forceful takeover. Although public opinion in Taiwan shows that 50 percent of the population are against the mainland Chinese military drills, it is possible that many Taiwanese would prefer to accept a peaceful settlement quickly after a forceful takeover. Stability and peace appear to be the priorities in the minds of an overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese.
However, one thing would be certain in case of a combined forceful and quick settlement, some Taiwan hardliners would likely resist. Some may flee the island republic. The length of time of pacification by the mainland Chinese military would emerge as a challenge.
The Ukrainian conflict with Russia shows that the Russian leadership overestimates its own military might and underestimates the local resistance. In case of a scenario of combined forceful and quick settlement, whether military force deployed by the mainland would be a prolonged one similar to the example of the Ukrainian-Russian conflicts remains to be seen. However, given the frequent occurrence of military accidents in Taiwan, it appears that the Taiwan military is relatively weak. Of course, both the militaries on the mainland and Taiwan have been untested in their fighting capabilities for many years – a unknown factor that will unveil and shape the developments of any military conflicts if a peaceful solution would be exhausted from the mainland perspective.
The third solution would be a forceful takeover with a prolonged period – a scenario that would not like to be envisaged by the Chinese in the mainland, Taiwan and all over the world. This scenario, however, would be quite unlikely if other countries intervene as mediators. Singapore is well positioned to be a go-between, given its historical record of providing a useful and neutral platform for the KMT under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential leadership to reach a peaceful consensus with the Chinese Communist Party lead by Xi Jinping in November 2015.
In fact, Ma Ying-jeou remains the most influential middleman who can and will likely break the political impasse between Taiwan and mainland China. The problem is that neither the DPP nor the US side so far recognizes his tremendous potential to be an effective intermediary between the Taiwan side and the mainland side. A psychological and political barrier exists in Taiwan: those who interact with the mainland authorities are bound to be politically “coopted” against the interest of the Taiwan side. Nevertheless, this assumption is wrong if Taiwan wishes to have a genuine peaceful solution and coexistence with the mainland.
One big problem between the mainland and Taiwan sides is how both parties would negotiate a stage-by-stage process of a peaceful reunification. The White Paper published by the PRC has already mentioned the need for a stage-by-stage process – a breakthrough opening the door to negotiation and mutual concessions. For example, if the first stage is characterized by the Taiwan side accepting the 1992 consensus, this can be exchanged with the mainland side renouncing the use of military force to settle the Taiwan issue. Once these concessions are exchanged, other matters would be solved gradually.
Still, a predictable hurdle on both sides is how to handle the content of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), if not necessarily an agreement between them. If the Taiwan side is ideally composed of a coalition including the KMT blue camp and some DPP moderates, such MOU would arguably not have to be deliberated and approved by the Taiwan Legislative Assembly. However, a more formal agreement would trigger the demands from some hardline Taiwanese that it would have to be discussed, debated and voted in the Taiwan legislature – a politicized process that would stick to democratic procedures but would not be conducive to a quick and an effective settlement bringing about permanent peace.
A MOU producing the main principles dealing with the Taiwan future would be the most ideal first step, followed by a longer negotiation process in the second stage about Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and even the status of the Taiwan military. The White Paper has not mentioned the question of Taiwan’s military, but if there were a peaceful solution on Taiwan’s future, it can be boldly predicted that the island would likely have its own military, a scenario perhaps subject to some conditions.
In conclusion, it can be boldly predicted that there will be three main scenarios between mainland China and Taiwan. The evolution of these scenarios will depend mainly on the policy of the ruling authorities on Taiwan. If the 1992 consensus were accepted by the Taiwan authorities, then a breakthrough would be made. If not, a solution that would entail force from the mainland would perhaps be a matter of time. The external actors, such as US, Japan and Singapore, will also play a key role in shaping the ways in which cross-strait relations will evolve. If the US reins in some Taiwan radicals who continue to provoke the mainland, and if it understands the importance of utilizing the KMT heavyweights as an intermediary, a breakthrough in cross-straits relations would still be possible. Japan, on the other hand, would likely feel very uncomfortable if any force would be used by the mainland side to settle the Taiwan issue. Singapore would likely play a key role in not only providing a neutral platform for a dialogue between a coalition of KMT and DPP moderates, but also intervening in a critical moment to help bringing about a peaceful settlement. With the publication of the White Paper by the mainland, Beijing’s determination to settle the issue of Taiwan is clear and unquestionable. The timing of such settlement will likely occur in the coming years, if not decades.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
