鑑於美國總統拜登最近表示，如果台灣遭遇大陸「入侵」，美國將在軍事上保衛台灣，儘管美國國務卿布林肯聲稱，美國不希望與中國發生衝突或冷戰，但所有跡象都表明，東亞新冷戰已迫在眉睫，原因有以下幾點：
拜登涉台「口誤」 反映美戰略轉變
首先，拜登就美國對台政策的講話，將美國的立場從戰略模糊轉為戰略清晰，試圖傳達一個信息，即美國決心以威懾手段將中國對台灣的軍事「威脅」降到最低。然而，問題是這種威懾戰略是否奏效，基於3個假設：第一個假設是解放軍不會在軍事上比台灣軍隊佔優勢──考慮到解放軍的武器裝備和能力的快速進步，這一假設是有問題的，儘管人們可以爭辯說解放軍在經歷了30年的和平之後，這種能力仍未得到檢驗。
第二個假設是，台軍確實有能力震懾解放軍的「威脅」。鑑於台灣軍方不時發生事故，加上台軍自1960年代以來未曾經歷過衝突，台軍能否悍衛台灣很值得懷疑。
第三個假設是，美國的軍事能力現在並將繼續超越解放軍，因此能夠在兩岸任何衝突中發揮最重要的威懾作用。當然，美國的威懾能力遠比台灣的軍事能力重要。
其次，中美領袖的意識形態聲浪，正在令東亞和平出現紛擾，因為近年來中美雙方都展開了「麥克風外交」。雖然布林肯強調美國不想發生衝突，但他5月26日在喬治華盛頓大學發表的演講，與他的前任龐佩奧2020年7月23日在尼克遜圖書館的演講有一個共同點──都非常重視意識形態，以及珍視人權「普世價值」的古典自由主義政治文化。從中國政府近期發表的《民主白皮書》來看，中美兩國在管治的意識形態和精英政治文化方面仍存在巨大差異。正是美國的自由主義價值觀與中國的家長式價值觀之間的衝突，將東亞推向了新冷戰的道路。
華府指中國威脅 北京視美國霸權
第三，雖然美國認為中國是真正的軍事威脅，包括中國在南海的軍事活動和解放軍對台灣的軍事「威脅」，但中國一直將美國視為一個霸權國家，不僅對中國，且對其他發展中國家強加其民主和人權觀。美國對「中國威脅」的認知，與中國對美國全球霸權的認知互相交纏。在東亞，北韓、中國和俄羅斯站一邊；美國、南韓、日本和台灣則站在另一邊。
由澳洲、印度、日本和美國組成的四方安全對話（QUAD）的出現與活躍，加深了新冷戰的陰影。另一個被中國視為對抗性情報組織的政治集團是「五眼聯盟」，成員包括澳洲、加拿大、紐西蘭、英國和美國。近來中國與所羅門群島的關係升溫，已經引起澳洲的警惕。傳統上，澳洲將太平洋島國視為其勢力範圍。對於以美國為首在東亞的政治集團來說，令「中國威脅」形象加倍的是，解放軍在南海的一些島嶼上部署了軍事設施，尤其是在這些島嶼的主權仍然是爭論焦點的情況下。如果中國的軍事威脅在美國及其盟友眼中是「真實的」，那麼新冷戰迫在眉睫便是不可避免的事。
拜登若「保衛」台灣 勢與解放軍交手
第四，俄烏戰爭的爆發，使東亞地區的國際關係惡化。美國很想將烏克蘭與台灣相提並論，但從中國大陸的角度看，這種比較是誤導和「錯誤」的，首先是因為傳統上，台灣上一直是中國大陸的一部分。最重要的是，將烏克蘭與台灣相提並論的比較主義者，忽視了烏克蘭未能在俄羅斯與北大西洋公約組織（NATO）之間發揮緩衝作用的事實。烏克蘭申請加入北約，對於高度民族主義的俄羅斯領袖普京的確構成了真正的軍事「威脅」，普京一直視烏克蘭為歷史上俄羅斯領土的一部分。
然而，台灣並沒有成為中國大陸與以美國為首的盟國之間的緩衝地帶。然而，如果美國試圖將台灣變成一塊完全的「保護地」，就像拜登總統透露美國在大陸「入侵」台灣時保衛台灣的決心一樣，那麼北京與台北發生軍事衝突的可能性就會增加。特別是如果中國大陸有統一台灣的時間表，如果大陸不能等太久讓台灣在政治上加入中華人民共和國，耐心就會耗盡，大陸和台灣之間的突然衝突將成為現實，特別是在台灣支持「九二共識」的國民黨可能無法贏得2024年的總統大選的情況下。
綠營對抗非出路 兩岸對話保平安
第五，北京與台北關係令人擔憂的是，台灣民進黨從未接受中共與國民黨1992年達成的共識──民進黨並沒有參與會談，這點可以理解。但是，如果民進黨太過明確地親美，政治上過分挑釁，卻沒有作出任何與大陸對話的姿態，北京對台灣的耐心最終可能會消磨殆盡。民進黨可以採取更明智的策略，是制定與大陸接觸和對話的政策，否則，民進黨採取的對抗策略，特別是如果美國未能遏制民進黨的激進主義，也不鼓勵民進黨精英至少在經濟議題和人員往來，包括貿易、兩岸民眾互訪，促進學生和文化交流等方面與中共對話，將會使台灣與大陸的關係惡化。
如果東亞特別是北京和台北之間的衝突終將成事實，那會爆發怎樣的衝突呢？最有可能的是大陸軍機與台灣軍機發生「擦槍走火」的意外事件；第二種可能的情況是大陸軍隊突然「入侵」台灣，使台灣的軍事基地癱瘓，然後解放軍迅速進行兩棲登陸；第三種情況是經濟封鎖，但這意味着需要更長的時間，以及要面對台灣民眾的更強硬的抵抗。其他可能包括大陸突然派出突擊隊攻佔台灣的戰略要地，抓住政治領袖，隨後解放軍登陸並迅速「解放」台灣。 在所有這些情況下，軍事衝突極有可能發生，儘管對台灣的經濟封鎖可能會帶來緊張局勢，而不是軍事衝突。
東亞其他有可能發生衝突的地方，包括北韓和日本，特別是日本自衛隊的裝備一直在更新換代，而北韓的軍事能力亦不容小覷。
大陸促統分階段 經濟入手減緊張
問題的關鍵是如何盡量避免衝突，減少「麥克風外交」，實現和平對話與談判。大陸對台灣決策單位可以採取分階段的政策：第一階段強調經濟與人員的互動；第二階段是台灣與福建的經濟融合；第三階段進行更深入的談判。另一方面，美國的政治領袖應考慮爭取民進黨領導人對大陸採取接觸和對話，而不是對抗的政策。
此外，美國政府應該依靠「密使」或「特使」來調解緊張的美中關係；美國也應該遏制台灣的激進勢力，防止他們把台灣推向與大陸發生軍事衝突。最後，國民黨領袖和精英可以也應該充當中間人，促成中共與台灣執政當局之間的對話。如果美國是真心促進中國大陸和台灣的「和平統一」，就應該盡量利用和探索多種對話溝通的渠道。
總之，東亞最近的事態發展，一方面令中美的緊張關係升溫，另一方面也令大陸與台灣之間的緊張關係升溫。美國政府已將其對台灣戰略模糊的立場，轉變為戰略清晰；華府認為明確的威懾姿態，可以阻止解放軍「入侵」台灣。然而，威懾也可能促使大陸在台灣問題上採取更加強硬的立場，特別是如果台灣執政黨對於與大陸的對話、溝通和接觸採取永久拖延的策略。
美國能夠採取的一種明智政策，是向台灣的執政黨施壓，與大陸當局就經濟、教育、文化和人員交流的各個方面展開會談，然後探討台灣與福建之間經濟融合的對話。如果不是這樣，雙方持續的「麥克風外交」和互相對「真正軍事威脅」的認知，可能會在未來幾年把兩岸關係推向潛在的軍事攤牌，尤其是在民進黨很可能在2024年初再次贏得總統大選之後的幾年。
The New Cold War in East Asia
In light of US President Biden’s recent remark that the US would defend Taiwan militarily if Taiwan encounters a mainland “invasion,” and although US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has asserted that the US does not want to have conflicts or a Cold War with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), all signs are pointing to a looming new Cold War in East Asia for several reasons.
First, Biden’s remark on US policy toward Taiwan has changed the American stance from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, trying to convey a message that the US is determined to use deterrence to minimize the PRC military “threat” to Taiwan. However, the question whether such deterrence strategy will work is based on three assumptions. The first assumption is that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would not be militarily preponderant over Taiwan’s military – an assumption that is questionable given the rapid advancement on the part of the weaponry and capability of the PLA, even though one can argue that the PLA capability remains untested after three decades of peace. The second assumption is that the Taiwan military does have the capability to deter the PLA “threat.” Given the fact that military accidents occur constantly in Taiwan, and that the Taiwan military has not yet experienced conflicts since the 1960s, it is highly doubtful whether the Taiwan military will be able to defend Taiwan. The third assumption is that the US military capability is and will be superior to the Chinese PLA, thereby playing the most important deterrence role in any cross-strait conflicts. Of course, the US deterrence capability is far more important than the Taiwan military capability.
Second, the ideological overtones of US and Chinese leaders are disturbing for peace in East Asia because megaphone diplomacy has been shown by both sides in the recent years. While Blinken emphasizes that the US does not want to have conflicts, his speech delivered at George Washington University on May 26 had one thing in common with his predecessor Mike Pompeo at the Nixon Library on July 23, 2020 – both attached immense importance to the ideology and political culture of classical liberalism that cherishes the universal value of human rights. Judging from the recent PRC government’s documents on democracy and human rights, China and the US remain vastly different in their ruling ideologies and elite political cultures. It is the clash between the US value of liberalism and the Chinese value of paternalism that is propelling East Asia along the path of a new Cold War.
Third, while the US perceives China as a real military threat, including the Chinese military activities in South China Sea and the PLA military “menace” to Taiwan, the PRC has been seeing the US as a hegemonic power imposing its values of democracy and human rights on not just China but also the developing world. The US perception of the Chinese threat is intertwined with the Chinese perception of American hegemony in the world, including East Asia where North Korea, China and Russia stand on one side and where the US, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are standing on the other side. Compounding this shadow of a new Cold War is the emergence and activeness of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) that is composed of Australia, India, Japan and the US. Another political bloc perceived by China as a confrontational intelligence organization is the Five Eyes, which include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the US. The recent warmer relations between the PRC and the Solomon Islands have already raised the alarm of Australia, which has traditionally seen the islands of the Pacific Ocean as falling into its sphere of influence. Compounding the image of the China threat to the US-led political blocs in East Asia has been the military installation of the PLA in some islands in the South China Sea, especially as the sovereignty of these islands have remained a bone of contention. If the perception of military threats from China is a “real” one in the eyes of the US and its allies, the looming of a new Cold War is inevitable.
Fourth, the emergence of the Russian-Ukrainian war has worsened the international relations of East Asian states. It is tempting for the US to compare Ukraine with Taiwan, but such a comparison is misleading and “wrong” from the PRC perspective, because in the first place Taiwan has been traditionally a part of mainland China. Most importantly, comparativists who link Ukraine with Taiwan have ignored the fact that Ukraine has failed to function as a buffer state between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By joining NATO, Ukraine did constitute a real military “threat” to the highly nationalistic Russian leader Putin, who has been seeing Ukraine as historically part of the Russian territory. Taiwan, however, has not been a buffer between mainland China and the US-led allies. Yet, if the US attempts to turn Taiwan into a full protectorate, like what President Biden revealed the US determination to defend Taiwan in case of a mainland “invasion” into the island, the prospects of a Beijing-Taipei military conflict would be heightened. In particular, if the PRC has a timetable to seek to reunify Taiwan, and if the mainland cannot wait for too long for Taiwan to join the PRC politically, patience would run out and a sudden conflict between the mainland and the island would become a realistic possibility, especially if the pro-reunification Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) in Taiwan would perhaps fail to win the presidential election in 2024.
Fifth, what is worrying about Beijing-Taipei relations is that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan has never accepted the 1992 consensus reached by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT – an understandable position as the DPP was not involved in the discussion. However, if the DPP is too explicitly pro-US and too politically provocative without any gesture to have dialogue with the mainland, Beijing’s patience over Taiwan may eventually run out. A smarter strategy adopted by the DPP is to devise a policy of engagement and dialogue with mainland China. Otherwise, a confrontational strategy adopted by the DPP worsens the relations between Taiwan and the PRC, especially if the US fails to rein in the radicalism of the DPP and does not encourage the DPP elites to talk to the CCP at least on the issues of economic and human interactions, including trade, visits by tourists on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and accelerated student and cultural exchanges.
If the prospects of conflicts in East Asia, especially between Beijing and Taipei, would be real, what forms of conflicts would erupt? The most likely scenario is military accidents in which mainland military planes clash with the Taiwan counterparts. The second scenario is a surprise “invasion” by the mainland military in Taiwan through the paralysis of Taiwan military sites followed by a rapid amphibious landing. The third scenario is an economic blockade which however would entail a much longer timespan and stiffer resistance from the people of Taiwan. Other scenarios include a sudden dispatch of mainland commandoes to capture the strategic location and political leaders of Taiwan, followed by the landing of PLA personnel to “liberate” the island quickly. In all these scenarios, military conflicts would be highly likely although economic blockade of Taiwan would likely bring about tensions rather than military conflicts.
Other conflict-ridden scenarios in East Asia may involve North Korea and Japan, especially as Japan has been rearming itself defensively and effectively while North Korea’s military capability remains strong.
The crux of the problem is how to minimize conflicts, reduce megaphone diplomacy and bring about peaceful dialogue and negotiations. The mainland policymakers in Taiwan can adopt a stage-by-stage policy in which the first stage emphasizes economic and human interactions, the second stage economic integration between Taiwan and Fujian, and the third stage dealing with detailed negotiations. On the other hand, the US policymakers should consider wooing the DPP leaders to adopt a policy of engagement and dialogue rather than that of confrontation toward the PRC. Furthermore, the US government should rely on secret envoys or emissaries to mediate between the tense relations between the US and the PRC. The US should rein in the radical elements in Taiwan and prevent them from pushing a scenario toward military conflicts with the mainland. Finally, the KMT leaders and elites can and should function as intermediaries to bring about dialogue between the CCP and the ruling regime in Taiwan. Multiple channels of dialogue and communications should be used, maximized and explored if the US is keen to foster “peaceful reunification” between mainland China and Taiwan.
In conclusion, recent developments in East Asia have heightened the relations between US and China on the one hand, and between mainland China and Taiwan on the other hand. The US government has changed its strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity over Taiwan, believing that an explicit deterrence gesture would prevent the PLA from “invading” Taiwan. Yet, deterrence may stimulate a more hardline stance from the PRC over Taiwan, especially if Taiwan’s ruling party adopts a permanently delaying tactic toward dialogue, communication and engagement with the mainland. A wise policy adopted by the US is to pressure the ruling party in Taiwan to start discussion with the mainland authorities on all aspects of economic, educational, cultural and human interactions, after which a dialogue over economic integration between Taiwan and Fujian can be explored. If not, continuous megaphone diplomacy and the mutual perceptions of “real military threats” would likely propel cross-strait relations to a potentially military showdown in the coming years, especially the years after the DPP would likely again win the presidential election in early 2024.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
