美國國務卿布林肯4月24日至26日對中國進行為期3天的訪問，並與中國外交部長王毅和國家主席習近平會晤，展現了中美外交在多種問題上處理不同觀點的新外交模式──從可以達成共識的「低層政治」問題，到需要重申立場而不是立即尋求解決方案的「高層政治」問題。
中方接待細節 反映雙邊關係狀況
布林肯訪華原本中方是要低調處理的，但隨着4月24日至4月26日的訪問，他最終與習近平主席的會晤，展現了中國獨特的處理方式，其政治重要性日益突顯。這意味着北京在處理與華盛頓的關係時，從相對冷淡轉向了漸趨熱情。4月24日，布林肯抵達上海時，由上海市外事辦主任孔福安到機場迎接，這與布林肯上次訪華時，獲外交部負責美國事務的官員接機不同。這次他下飛機時，中國官員對他問候的語氣，比上次訪問時的語氣似乎沒那麼熱情──這或許隱含着中美關係從2023年6月至今惡化的訊息。中美關係的惡化也可以從4月26日王毅對布林肯的談話中看出，王毅表示「影響中美關係的負面因素仍在上升積累」。
習近平：中美兩國要言必信，行必果
最耐人尋味的是，習近平主席在與布林肯會面時坐在長桌中間，而布林肯率領的美國代表團則坐在他的右邊，布林肯聽習近平講話，兩人並排站着在拍官方照片。央視新聞也顯示，這次習近平與布林肯握手僅一秒，與2023年6月布林肯訪華時握手兩秒不同。中國作為東道主，國家主席的地位自然遠高於美國國務卿。從另一個角度看，中國仍然是一個自信的國家，沒有必要像中國歷史上弱小的清朝那樣，在外國帝國主義的衝擊下向任何外國列強「磕頭」。相反，習近平領導下的中國不僅充滿自信，而且堅持其對外關係原則。
因此，習近平主席對布林肯的講話有着重要的政治意義。他表示，中美兩國應該做夥伴，而不是當對手。習近平指出，兩國應該彼此成就，而不是互相傷害；兩國也應該言必信，行必果，而不是說一套、做一套。習近平此番言論是對美國對華外交政策的直接批評，並表示美國不應將中國視為競爭對手，而應視為合作夥伴。所謂「說一套、做一套」的評論，不僅是指美國對台灣的政策──正如王毅一再強調的那樣，台灣仍然是美國不應跨越的紅線──還有美國最近就與華經貿爭端採取的打壓行動。
有意思的是，正如電視新聞報道那樣，習近平講話的語氣相對嚴肅，語速緩慢，這或許表明中國最高領導人向美國最高外交官表達他誠懇的觀點，並向他提出鄭重建議。
王毅促撤銷制裁中企 對台灣勿逾越紅線
王毅在會見布林肯時明確表示，中國人民的發展權利不可剝奪，中國經貿科技不該被「打壓」。王毅認為，在貿易問題上，兩國應該公平競爭，而不是對對方遏制圍堵。此外，他呼籲美方停止「炒作」中國「產能過剩」的「虛假敍事」──這是對耶倫近期訪華期間強調北京「產能過剩」的間接、不點名批評。王毅也敦促美方撤銷對中國企業的「非法」制裁，停止對中國商品加徵關稅。
4月18日，美國貿易代表辦公室宣布發起對中國海事、物流和造船業的301調查，美國總統拜登呼籲對中國鋼鐵和鋁的現有關稅稅率提高兩倍。這項調查是對美國5個全國工會請願書的回應，這些工會指控中國利用「不公平、非市場的政策和做法」來主導海事、物流和造船行業。在訪問搖擺州賓夕法尼亞州期間，拜登告訴一群鋼鐵工人，中國人「不是在競爭，而是在作弊」。王毅有關美國關稅的言論，可以視為對美國提高中國鋼鐵和鋁關稅措施的反應。
在台灣問題上，王毅的言論政治色彩十分鮮明。他強調，台灣是中美關係第一條不可逾越的紅線，美國應該停止武裝台灣，支持中國和平統一。如果說習近平主席在舊金山會議上向拜登總統提到美國武裝台灣的行動，那麼王毅在會見布林肯時所說的不僅是重申中方立場，而且暗示如果中國大陸和台灣未來可能有任何政治對話，美國是否繼續對台軍售，很可能是一個需要美國考慮，以及北京與華盛頓需要談判的議題。
在布林肯訪華前不久，或許會刺激到中方的是，在布林肯抵達上海前幾個小時，拜登總統簽署了一項兩黨支持的法案，其中包括對台灣提供數十億美元的軍事援助。美國對台武器供應仍然是美中關係中的一根刺，但從華盛頓的角度來看，台灣有必要「威懾」大陸的軍事威脅。
王毅勸美放棄小圈子政策
王毅對美國亞洲外交政策的評論值得關注。他表示，美方應放棄在亞太地區製造「小圈子」的政策，不應強迫區內其他國家選邊站隊，不應駐紮和部署中程導彈。
王毅的上述說法表明，中國對美國強化亞太聯盟的軍事舉動，包括最近傳出的日本將加入澳洲、英國和美國在2021年9月成立印太地區三邊安全夥伴關係AUKUS的消息表示不滿。4月24日，中國國防部發言人吳謙表示，中方對此表示高度關注和嚴重關切，反對任何製造集團對抗和分裂傾向的行為。吳謙也表示，亞太地區不應成為地緣政治競爭中心，美國、英國、澳洲的行為正在挑戰亞洲的和平與穩定。因此，王毅對布林肯的言論可視為對吳謙言論的重申。
根據韓聯社報道，美國正在考慮將韓國、加拿大和紐西蘭作為ANKUS加日本的新合作夥伴。如果屬實，除了最近有報道指美國將在菲律賓呂宋島部署中程導彈外，以美國為首的技術和軍事同盟將鞏固其在亞太地區的盟友。中菲在南海的島礁爭端已經推動馬尼拉與華盛頓、馬尼拉與東京之間的軍事同盟，讓北京感到美國在日本的支持下正在加強對菲律賓的軍事「遏制」做法。
事實上，亞洲的地緣政治和軍事緊張局勢正在加劇。北韓領導人金正恩最近視察了新型火箭的試射，這種火箭可用於攻擊南韓首爾，並可協助俄羅斯對烏克蘭的戰爭。240毫米口徑多管火箭炮的預計射程為40公里和60公里。如果屬實，美國及其盟友自然會加強軍事合作和準備，特別是日本，它對北韓的軍事能力感到擔憂，並且在美國的明確支持下迅速重新武裝起來。儘管有這些軍事舉動，中美雙方在4月23日於青島舉行的西太平洋海軍論壇第19屆年會上進行了對話，中方呼籲22個成員國和7個觀察員國加強溝通、加強合作、促進發展，保護海軍安全和海洋福祉。
五點共識 收窄兩國分歧
布林肯訪華確實在處理華盛頓和北京之間的分歧方面取得了一些成果，雙方達成五點共識：第一，雙方在舊金山會晤共識基礎上，持續落實兩國領導人關於穩定與發展中美關係的重要共識；第二，雙方同意保持高層交往和各層級接觸。繼續發揮外交、經濟、金融、商務等領域磋商機制作用；第三，雙方宣布將舉行中美人工智慧政府間對話首次會議；繼續推進中美關係指導原則磋商；舉行新一輪中美亞太事務磋商、中美海洋事務磋商；繼續開展中美領事磋商。中美禁毒工作組將舉行高層會議。美方歡迎中國氣候變化事務特使劉振民訪美；第四，雙方將採取措施擴大兩國人文交流，歡迎對方國家留學生，辦好5月在中國西安舉行的第14屆中美旅遊高層對話；第五，雙方就國際地區熱點問題將保持協商，雙方特使將加強溝通。
上述五點共識體現了美中如何透過外交方式處理意識形態、軍事和政治分歧。透過處理「低層政治」議題，如禁毒、氣候變遷、教育和人員交流等，中美關係至少可以比以往略有改善。此外，就包括爭議熱點在內的一系列問題進行持續對話，不僅有利於控制分歧，也有利於控制突發衝突和軍事危機的可能性。正如布林肯在會見期間告訴習近平的那樣，雙方可以通過高層面對面的會晤來最大程度地減少誤解、誤判和誤會──無論特朗普是否可能會在即將到來的美國總統選舉中重新當選，此舉或許將為當前的中美關係開創先例。
布林肯在會見中方時也提出了美方關心的一些問題，包括對中國向俄羅斯軍事基礎設施提供後勤物資的擔憂，以及所謂中國「干預」美國大選的問題。或許，上述兩個問題並不能指望立即取得重大突破。儘管如此，布林肯明智地帶來了一些官員，這些官員可以與中國同行，就可以在操作層面改善美中關係的問題進行溝通。陪同布林肯訪問的官員包括負責國際麻醉品和執法事務的助理國務卿羅賓遜和網絡空間和數碼政策無任所大使菲克。
中美雙方都在盡力控制分歧
總而言之，布林肯訪華及與王毅和習近平的會談表明，美中雙方一直在透過面對面的對話和會晤來管控分歧。這種管控分歧的新外交有以下特點：一、區分「低層政治」與「高層政治」議題；二、處理禁毒、氣候變遷、人員和學生交流等實際問題；三、在正式會議上重申在「高層政治」議題上的立場；四、就如何管理分歧提出五點共識，以盡量減少誤會、誤解和誤判。因此，中美雙方都在盡力控制分歧，以積極、有成效的方式減少危機和衝突。如果是這樣，那麼在亞太地區的地緣政治緊張局勢、軍事炫耀活動和聯盟建設活動中，我們就有理由保持政治上的謹慎樂觀。
The new Sino-US diplomacy of managing divergence: Blinken’s visit to China
The three-day visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China from April 24 to April 26 and his meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and President Xi Jinping demonstrated the emergence of a new Sino-US diplomacy of managing their divergent views over a multiplicity of issues, ranging from issues of “low-level” politics that can reach consensus to issues of “high-level politics” that necessitate reiterations of their positions rather than a search for immediate solutions.
Blinken’s visit to China was originally handled by the Chinese side in a low-key manner, but his eventual meetings with President Xi Jinping demonstrated a unique Chinese way of managing his visit in an increasingly politically important manner as time passed from April 24 to April 26—an implication that Beijing handles its relations with Washington from an approach of relative coolness to one of increasing warmness. On April 24, when Blinken arrived in Shanghai, he was received at the airport by the Shanghai city’s foreign affairs office director, unlike Blinken’s last visit to China, when he was greeted by an official dealing with American affairs in the Foreign Office. It looked as if the official nomenklatura of the Chinese official greeting him this time when he stepped down from the plane was comparatively lower than his last visit—perhaps an implicit message that Sino-US relations deteriorated from June 2023 to the present. Such a deterioration of Sino-US relations could also be seen in the remarks of Wang Yi to Blinken on April 26, when Wang commented that “the negative factors shaping Sino-US relations are still ascending and aggregating.”
Most interestingly, during the meeting with Blinken, President Xi Jinping was sitting in the middle of the long table, whereas the American delegation led by Blinken sat on his right-hand side, with Blinken listening and speaking to Xi, and both were shown standing side by side in an official photo. The CCTV news also showed that Xi and Blinken shook hands for one second this time, unlike the two seconds last time when Blinken visited China in June 2023. From the perspective of political symbolism, the phenomenon of President Xi sitting in the middle refers to the position of China as a host, with the president’s status naturally much higher than that of the US Secretary of State. From another perspective, China remains a self-confident country without any need to, unlike the weak Qing dynasty in Chinese history under the onslaught of foreign imperialism, “kowtow” to any foreign power. Instead, China, under the leadership of Xi remains not only self-confident but also insistent on its principles on foreign relations.
As such, President Xi Jinping’s remarks to Blinken were politically important. He said that both China and the US should be partners rather than competitors. Both countries, Xi said, should make mutual achievements instead of harming each other, and both countries should also trust their words and take actions to have fruitful results rather than saying one thing but doing another matter at the same time. Xi’s comments here were direct criticisms of US foreign policy towards China, saying that the US should not treat China as a competitor but as a cooperative partner. The comments on the US action as not conforming to its words implicitly refer to the US foreign policy on not only Taiwan – as Wang Yi repeated that Taiwan remains a red line that the US should not cross—but also trade matters in which the US has recently taken action to struggle with China.
Interestingly, President Xi spoke in a relatively serious tone and at a at a slow pace, as shown in the TV news, implying perhaps an indication that the top Chinese leader was voicing his heartfelt views and giving his solemn advice to the top US diplomat on the topic of Sino-US relations.
Wang Yi, during his meeting with Blinken, explicitly said that the Chinese people’s developmental rights should not be exploited, and that Chinese technology should not be “suppressed.” Wang argued that on trade issues, both countries should have fair competition rather than suppression and containment from the other side. Moreover, he hoped that the US side should stop “cooking up” the “fake story” of China’s “excessive industrial capacity”—an i indirect and unnamed criticism of Janet Yellen’s emphasis on Beijing’s “excessive industrial capacity” during her recent visit to China. Wang also urged the US side to repeal the “illegal” sanctions imposed by the US on Chinese enterprises and to stop levying tariffs on Chinese goods.
On April 18, US President Joe Biden called for the existing tariff rate on Chinese steel and aluminium to be tripled as the US Trade Representative’s office announced the launch of another Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. The investigation was a response to a petition by five US national labour unions accusing China of utilising “unfair, non-market policies and practices” to dominate the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. During a visit to the swing state of Pennsylvania, Biden told a group of steelworkers that the Chinese are “not competing” but “cheating (South China Morning Post, April 22, 2024, p. A1).” Wang Yi’s comments on the US tariffs could be seen as a reaction to the US move to enhance the tariff rate on Chinese steel and aluminium.
On the matter of Taiwan, Wang Yi’s remarks were politically very explicit. He emphasised that while Taiwan is a politically red line that the US side should not cross, the US should stop arming Taiwan and the US should support China’s peaceful reunification. If President Xi mentioned to President Joe Biden the US action of arming Taiwan in the San Francisco meeting, then what Wang Yi said during his meeting with Blinken was not only a reiteration of the Chinese position, but also an implication that, if mainland China and Taiwan may have any political dialogue in the future, the prospects of US arms sales to Taiwan will likely be a matter of negotiation that will necessitate US consideration and Beijing-Washington discussions.
What perhaps stimulated the Chinese side shortly before the Blinken visit to China was that hours before Blinken landed in Shanghai, President Biden signed a bipartisan bill that included billions of dollars in defence aid for Taiwan. The US weapons supply to Taiwan remains a thorn in US-China relations, but from Washington’s perspective, it is necessary for Taiwan to “deter” the Chinese military threat.
Wang Yi’s comments on US foreign policy towards Asia were noteworthy. He remarked that the US side should abandon the policy of creating “small circles” in the Asia-Pacific region, that the US should not force other countries in the region to take sides, and that the US should not station and deploy medium-range missiles in Asia.
Wang’s remarks above showed that China is unhappy with the US military moves in strengthening its alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, including the recent news that Japan is going to join the AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership for the Indo-Pacific region between Australia, the UK, and the US that was established in September 2021. Canada is also considering the enhancement of its submarines in response to the activities from China and Russia in the North Pole. On April 24, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said that China paid attention to all these moves, expressed its grave concern, and opposed any move to create bloc confrontation and splittist tendencies. Wu also said that the Asia-Pacific region should not become a geopolitical rivalry centre and that the actions of the US, UK, and Australia are challenging the peace and stability of Asia. Hence, Wang Yi’s remarks to Blinken could be seen as a reiteration of the comments made by Wu Qian.
According to Yonhap News Agency, the US is considering the addition of South Korea, Canada, and New Zealand as the new partners to ANKUS plus Japan. If so, a technological and military alliance led by the US will consolidate its alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, apart from a recent report saying that the US is going to deploy and station medium range missiles in Luzon of the Philippines. The Sino-Philippine disputes over the islands and reefs in South China Sea have already propelled the military alliance between Manila and Washington, and between Manila and Tokyo, making Beijing feel that the US together with Japan’s support are enhancing their military “containment” policy toward China, although the US side has consistently denied it adopts any “containment” approach.
Indeed, the geopolitical and military tensions in Asia are rising. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has recently inspected the tests for a new rocket that could be used to attack Seoul in South Korea and that could assist Russia in its war against Ukraine. The 240-millimeter multiple rocket launcher has an estimated range of 40 kilometres and 60 kilometres. If so, it is natural that the US and its allies have been enhancing their military cooperation, cooperation, and preparedness, especially Japan which is worrying about the North Korean military capabilities and whose rearmament is rapid with the explicit US support. Despite all these military moves, the Chinese and American sides have engaged each other with dialogue in the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao on April 23 in which the Chinese side appealed to 22 member states and 7 observer states to enhance communications, increase cooperation, promote development, and protect naval safety and ocean well-being (Oriental Daily, April 25, 2024, p. A17).
The Blinken visit to China does have some achievements in managing divergence between Washington and Beijing. Both sides reached a five-point consensus. First, both sides continue to implement the directives from the chief executives of the two countries to stabilise and develop Sino-US relations based on the consensus from the San Francisco meeting. Second, both sides agree to maintain high-level interactions and talks at various levels of the government, and to continue to utilise diplomatic, economic, monetary, and commercial mechanisms. Third, both sides agree to adopt Artificial Intelligence in their first government-to-government meeting and to propel the development of Sino-US dialogue on Asia-Pacific affairs, ocean affairs, and the discussions between their embassies. The Sino-US working group against narcotics will hold a high-level meeting, and the US side will welcome Chinese climate change envoy Liu Zhenmin to visit the US. Fourth, both sides will expand the exchange of people in the humanities and educational sectors, welcoming the arrival of more exchange students and organising a high-level Sino-US tourist dialogue in the city of Sian in May. Fifth, both sides will send envoys to enhance their communications over the hot spots internationally so that mutual consultation will persist.
The five-point consensus above shows how the US and China manage the ideological, military, and political divergence in a diplomatic manner. By dealing with issues of low-level politics, such as anti-narcotics, climate change, and educational and personnel exchanges, Sino-US relations can be improved at least slightly than ever before. Moreover, continuous dialogue over a whole range of issues, including the contentious hot spots, will be conducive to the management of not only divergence but also the possibilities of sudden conflicts and military crises. As Antony Blinken told Xi Jinping during their meeting, both sides can minimise misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings through face-to-face meetings at the high level—perhaps a move setting a precedent for the ongoing US-China relations regardless of whether Donald Trump may return to presidential power in the upcoming US presidential elections.
Blinken also brought up some issues of US concern during his meetings with the Chinese side, including the concern about Chinese logistical supplies to the Russian military infrastructure, and the question of so-called Chinese “intervention” in US elections. Perhaps the two issues above could not be expected to achieve any significant and immediate breakthrough. Nevertheless, Blinken wisely brought with him officials who could communicate with their Chinese counterparts on issues that can improve US-China relations at the operational level. Todd Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Nathaniel Fick, ambassador-at-large for cyberspace, were among the officials accompanying Blinken’s visit.
In conclusion, the Blinken visit to China and his talks with Wang Yi and President Xi showed that both the US and China have been managing their divergence through face-to-face dialogue and meetings. This new diplomacy of managing divergence carries the characteristics of (1) separating the issues of “low-level politics” from those of “high-level politics,” (2) dealing with the practical issues of anti-narcotics, climate change, personnel, and student exchanges in a more in-depth and productive way, (3) reiterating their positions on issues of “high-level politics” in formal meetings, and (4) coming up with the five-point consensus on how to manage their divergence for the sake of minimising misperceptions, misunderstandings, and miscalculations. As such, both China and the US are trying their best to control their divergence and minimise crises and conflicts in a proactive and productive way. If so, there are grounds for cautiousness and political optimism amidst all the geopolitical tensions, military muscle-flexing activities and alliance-building activities in the Asia-Pacific region.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：https://tinyurl.com/yc33tvym
