最近深中通道的開通，加上港珠澳大橋的營運，以及澳門與橫琴的深化合作，都為華南地區指明了一個新的重要方向：香港與深圳邊境地區及澳門與橫琴之間的區域融合，將分別在2047年和2049年左右不可避免，這對廈門與金門未來的關係有重大影響。
珠江口跨海交通新面貌
最近開通的深中通道對華南地區具有地緣政治和社會經濟意義。這條全長24公里的通道，不僅以深圳機場互通立交為起點，橫跨珠江口與中山馬鞍島相連，還將中山至深圳的行車時間從2小時縮短至30分鐘。這項大型工程擁有1條水下隧道、2座橋樑和2個人工島，成為位於著名的虎門大橋以北僅 30 公里、另一大型基建工程港珠澳大橋以南 31 公里的重要交通樞紐。這3大交通網絡可被視為珠江口基礎設施整合的最重要標誌。正如廣東省交通集團黨委書記鄧小華所說，這些橋樑「為大灣區提供了跨海、跨江的通道，促進了城市群的互聯互通」。
總之，大灣區各主要城市互聯互通更加便利，為華南地區更深層的地域融合奠定了堅實的基礎。我們殷切期望這些城市在經濟合作中更緊密地互動，在未來幾年共同打造華南經濟龍頭。
基建轉型地緣政治意義大
如果區域融合被定義為地理、社會和經濟再造的綜合過程，使區域界線更不固定、更具彈性和靈活性，方便區域居民以至外國人進出，那麼最近在珠江口完成和正在進行的基建轉型，便具有非常重要的地緣政治意義，包括最近內地允許港澳永久性居民當中的非中國籍人士申請回鄉證的政策。
香港現在透過西鐵、港珠澳大橋和鄰近的前海合作區與內地建立了更便捷的聯繫，預計未來幾年，內地將與香港特別行政區在服務、金融和資訊科技領域建立更密切的合作。
澳門與珠海橫琴一體化進程快
澳門的蛻變甚至比香港快得多。隨着澳門與橫琴在社會經濟融合方面的深入推進，愈來愈多的澳門人搬遷到橫琴「澳門新街坊」居住。北京中央政府也授權澳門擁有更多海域，甚至從珠海吸收3700平方公尺的土地來建造輕軌東線。截至2024年3月，澳門土地總面積擴大至33.3平方公里。澳門的實體空間已經擴大，如果來自澳門貨物免稅的橫琴一線很可能在2049年左右或之後與澳門合併，那麼澳門的實體空間遲早會進一步擴大。
這對香港和澳門的管治和經濟影響是顯而易見的。香港要重新定位自己，成為深圳快速發展不可或缺的一部分，包括前海，創業公司如雨後春筍般湧現，釋放內地和香港青年的創新潛力，而北部都會區的發展則要加快，香港與深圳的邊境地區將變得人口愈來愈多，經濟更加繁榮，其高等教育、資訊科技和研究中心須盡快建成。否則，如果沒有更快的時間表，香港可能會落後於華南地區快速的區域融合步伐，特別是與澳門在社會和經濟上與橫琴日益融合的速度形成鮮明對比。
這對香港當局的影響是，政府必須設計和制定計劃，例如建造一座連接深圳和新田地區的橋樑或隧道，根據《北部都會區行動綱領》，到2023年，新田地區的預計人口將達到147000人。
港深融合不可免 北都成發展重點
同樣，香港必須加快和深化與前海合作區在高端專業服務和物流供應鏈方面的合作，包括盡早建造連接元朗洪水橋和前海的港深西部鐵路。如果香港當局意識到港深融合不可避免，那麼港島西至洪水橋鐵路的建設速度最好加快。北都公路亦應成為新界基建發展的重點。否則，基建設施竣工的任何拖延，都可能導致區域融合出現差距，澳門與橫琴的合併可能會比香港與深圳邊境的全面融合快得多。
正面消息是，港鐵正計劃興建12條鐵路線和約30個新車站，以縮短香港境內的旅行時間，並改善與深圳的互聯互通。這些路線包括香港島、大嶼山。北部都會區及新界區。事實上，北部都會區和新界區的新站必須加快步伐，以實現區域融合的必然趨勢。
總體而言，在香港強大的金融和貨幣中心，以及澳門獨特的旅遊中心的協助下，深圳有望成為華南地區政治上可靠、實際上最重要的經濟火車頭。深圳 GDP 成長率高達 5.5%，中央期望將之打造成為服務優質、公共衛生典範、環境高標準、可持續發展的高科技和產業創新戰略高地。中央政府一直渴望在地方官員的大力推動下，將深圳打造成國家資訊科技中心，吸引香港和其他地方的人才，成為有影響力的消費中心和外資聚集地。
因此，華南地區的分工比以往任何時候都更加突出：香港要以穩固的普通法體系強化其國際金融中心地位，以吸引外資，同時保持超級聯繫人的地位；澳門將轉型為經濟多元化經濟體，擺脫賭場資本主義，同時鞏固其為中國加強與葡語國家經濟和外交關係的平台功能；深圳將繼續以前海為橋頭堡，加速人民幣國際化進程，建設大灣區保險服務中心。
在這種情況下，香港和澳門必須加快基礎建設，維護社會政治穩定（這就是為什麼國家安全對兩個特別行政區都極為重要），顯示兩地有能力解決民生問題（住房、社會福利、扶貧和持續發展），並在國家發展藍圖中迅速重新定位自己的戰略性角色。
廈金大橋廈門段 正在動工興建
對華南地區跨地域融合的另一個重要但可能被忽視的影響是，中央當局似乎採取了類似的戰略，利用發展基建來處理台灣的一小部分地區，特別是金門。連接金門的廈金大橋廈門段正在動工興建。儘管這座大橋在台灣引發了意料之中的政治爭論，但福建部分地區（廈門）和台灣一小部分地區（金門）之間的逐步融合進程似乎遲早會發生，反映澳門與橫琴合作、香港與深圳合作的模式正在廈門與金門之間複製。
港澳回歸政治先行 台灣統一基建引路
綜上所述，珠江口的區域融合，包括香港與深圳邊境合作、澳門與橫琴融合，趨勢已經明顯出現。2049年左右，澳門特別行政區和橫琴之間很可能會發生正式的邊界合併進程，特別是從一個地區吸收部分土地到另一個地方，也可能在2047年左右或之後發生在香港特別行政區和深圳選定的邊境地區（如前海）之間。澳門與橫琴融合的進程似乎要快得多，從目前的快速步伐來看，由於地理位置接近，與橫琴共同開發的範圍雖小但目標明確，而且立即實施了實體融合和集中居住遷移。
澳門和香港與內地融合模式對廈門和金門融合的長期地緣政治和經濟影響不容忽視。原因是，隨着廈金大橋廈門段的建設，類似的基建設施發展先於人員互動和經濟合作的模式開始了。如果這個分析準確，那麼這座新橋很可能成為未來幾年大陸與台灣社會經濟分階段融合進程的一部分。香港和澳門與內地融合模式的獨特之處在於，它們分別於1997年和1999年與祖國實現政治統一，先於基礎設施擴建和整合。就中國大陸嘗試與台灣一體化的情況而言，基建設施發展現在似乎是一個重要的開端，可能會導致更密切的經濟合作和更多的人員往來，隨後是一個充滿希望和理想的階段性但艱難的政治對話談判，也許還有融合與統一的過程。
Toward Territorial Integration between Hong Kong, Macau, Shenzhen and Zhuhai: Implications for Xiamen and Kinmen
The recent opening of the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Link, together with the operation of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge, and the deepening cooperation between Macau and Hengqin are pointing to a new and significant direction in South China: the inevitability of territorial integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen’s borderland areas and between Macau and Hengqin around 2047 and 2049 respectively, with significant implications for Xiamen’s future relations with Kinmen.
The most recent opening of the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Link has geopolitical and socio-economic significance for South China. The 24-kilometer passage not only starts at the strategic Shenzhen airport interchange and connects with Ma’anshan Island in Zhongshan across the Pearl River, but also reduces the travel time between Zhongshan and Shenzhen from two hours to only 30 minutes. The megaproject has one underwater tunnel, two bridges and two artificial islands, becoming a key transportation connector located just 30 kilometres north of the famous Humen Bridge and 31 kilometres south of another megaproject, namely the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge. These three transportation networks can be seen as the most important hallmark of infrastructure integration in the Pearl River Estuary. As Deng Xiaohua, the head of Guangdong Provincial Communications Group, said, these bridges provide the “cross-sea and cross River passages in the Greater Bay Area (GBA), boosting connectivity of the city cluster.”
In short, all the main cities in the GBA are now more conveniently interconnected, providing a solid foundation of deeper territorial integration in South China. All these cities are expected and required to interact more intensively in economic cooperation, bringing about an economic powerhouse collectively in South China in the coming years.
If territorial integration is defined as a combined process of geographical, social and economic reengineering that makes the regional boundaries more fluid, porous and flexible with the ease of entry and exit of regional residents and even foreigners, then the recent and ongoing infrastructure transformations in the Pearl River Estuary are very geopolitically significant, including a recent mainland policy of allowing non-Chinese residents of Hong Kong and Macau to apply for mainland visit permits.
Hong Kong is now connected easily with the mainland through the High-Speed West Rail, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai Bridge and the nearby Qianhai Cooperation Zone, which is expected to forge closer collaboration with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) in their service, financial and information technology sectors in the coming years.
Macau’s metamorphosis is even much faster than Hong Kong. With the deepening and raid process of economic and social integration with Hengqin, more Macau people are moving to live in the new Macau Neighborhood in Hengqin. Macau has also been empowered by the central government in Beijing to possess more territorial waters and even to absorb 3,700-square-metre plot of land from Zhuhai to build the eastern line of the Light Rail Transit system. As of March 2024. Macau’s total land area was expanded to 33.3 square kilometres. Macau’s physical space has been expanded and will be augmented further sooner or later if the first line of Hengqin, where goods from Macau are tax-exempted, will quite likely be territorially absorbed into Macau perhaps around or after 2049.
The economic and governing implications for Hong Kong and Macau are obvious. While Hong Kong has to reposition itself as an indispensable part of Shenzhen’s rapid development, including Qianhai where start-up companies have mushroomed and unleashed the innovative potential of youths from the mainland and Hong Kong, the development of the Northern Metropolis has to be accelerated so that Hong Kong’s borderland with Shenzhen will become increasingly populated and more economically prosperous, with its higher education, information technology and research hubs being constructed as soon as possible. Otherwise, without a much faster timeline, Hong Kong would likely lag behind the very rapid pace of territorial integration in South China, especially in contrast with the speed in which Macau has been increasingly socially and economically integrated with Hengqin.
The implication for the Hong Kong authorities is that they must design and formulate plans of, say, building a bridge or a tunnel linking Shenzhen with San Tin area, which according to the Northern Metropolis Action Agenda in 2023 will have a projected population of 147,000 to 159,000 by 2033. The Hong Kong SAR government must also speed up all the action plans from now to 2033 if territorial integration is actually a long-term developmental plan in South China in the psyche of central authorities.
Similarly, Hong Kong must accelerate and deepen the collaboration of high-end professional services and logistics supply chains with the Qianhai Cooperation Zone, including an earlier construction of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Western Rail Link connecting Hung Shui Kiu in Yuen Long with Qianhai. The Hong Kong Island West-Hung Shui Kiu Rail Link should ideally be speeded up if the Hong Kong authorities sense the inevitability of territorial integration between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The Northern Metropolis Highway should also be a priority of infrastructure development in the New Territories. Otherwise, any delay in infrastructure development and completion may point to a gap in territorial integration, whereby Macau’s territorial integration with Hengqin will likely be much faster than Hong Kong’s full integration with Shenzhen’s borderland.
Positively, the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR) is planning to build 12 railway lines and some 30 new stations, reducing the travel time within Hong Kong and improving its interconnectedness with Shenzhen. These lines include the Hong Kong Island, Lantau Island. Northern Metropolis and the New Territories. In fact, the new stations in Northern Metropolis and New Territories must be accelerated toward the inevitable thrust of territorial integration.
Overall, Shenzhen is well positioned to become perhaps the politically reliable and indeed the most important economic locomotive in South China, assisted by Hong Kong’s strong financial and monetary centre and Macau’s unique tourism hub. Shenzhen, with its strong GDP growth rate of 5.5 percent, is expected by the central authorities to be a strategic, high- ended, technologically innovative megacity that offers high-quality services, model public health and high environmental standards with sustainability. The central authorities have been eager to shape Shenzhen, with immense efforts from its local officials, into a national information technology centre, attracting talents from Hong Kong and elsewhere and becoming an influential consumption centre and foreign investment magnet.
As such, the division of labour in South China is becoming more prominent than ever before: Hong Kong is to strengthen its international financial and monetary centre with its solid common-law system attracting foreign investment while retaining its role as a superconnector; Macau is to transform itself into an economically diversified economy away from casino capitalism while consolidating its platform function for China to enhance economic and diplomatic relations with Portuguese-speaking countries; and Shenzhen is to continue using Qianhai as a bridgehead to accelerate the process of internationalizing Renminbi and to build up its GBA insurance service centre.
Under these circumstances, Hong Kong and Macau must accelerate their infrastructure projects, maintain socio-political stability (which explains why national security is extremely important to both SARs), govern their regions with demonstrated capability to tackle livelihood issues (housing, social welfare, poverty alleviation sustainable development), and quickly reposition their strategic roles amid the motherland’s developmental blueprint.
The other important but perhaps neglected implication for territorial integration in South China is that the central authorities appear to adopt a similar strategy of utilizing infrastructure development in dealing with a small part of Taiwan, notably Kinmen where a bridge on the Xiamen side connecting Kinmen has already begun. Although the bridge has expectedly aroused political debate in Taiwan, it seems that a silent process of stage-by-stage integration between parts of Fujian (Xiamen) and a small part of Taiwan (Kinmen) would likely take place sooner or later, with the shadows mirroring the models of Macau-Hengqin cooperation and Hong Kong-Shenzhen collaboration.
In conclusion, territorial integration in the Pearl River Estuary, including Hong Kong’s cooperation with Shenzhen’s borderland and Macau’s integration with Hengqin, is clearly emerging. A formal process of territorial integration, specifically absorbing parts of the territories from one region to another place, will quite likely occur between the Macau SAR and Hengqin around 2049, and it would also perhaps take place between the Hong Kong SAR and Shenzhen’s selected borderland (like Qianhai) around or after 2047. Macau’s territorial integration with Hengqin appears to proceed in a much faster pace, judging from the currently rapid pace and smaller but targeted scope of co-development with Hengqin due to geographical proximity and an immediate implementation of physical integration and focused residential migration.
The long-term geopolitical and economic implications of the Macau and Hong Kong models of integration with the mainland for a possible Xiamen-Kinmen integration cannot be neglected. The reason is that a similar pattern of infrastructure development preceding human interactions and economic cooperation is beginning with the construction of the Xiamen side of the bridge linking Xiamen with Kinmen. If this analysis is accurate, then this new bridge will likely be part of a stage-by-stage process of socio-economic integration between the mainland and Taiwan in the coming years. What is unique in the model of Hong Kong/Macau integration with the mainland is that their political reunification with the motherland in 1997 and 1999, respectively, preceded infrastructure expansion and integration. In the case of mainland China’s attempt at integration with Taiwan, it appears that infrastructure development is now an important inception leading to perhaps closer economic cooperation and more human interactions, followed hopefully and ideally by a stage-by-stage but difficult process of political dialogue, negotiations and perhaps integration and reunification.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網：https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-toward-territorial-integration-between-hong-kong-macau-shenzhen-and-zhuhai-implications-for-xiamen-and-kinmen/
