港澳新興經濟重新定位的地緣政治分析

麥金德的「心臟地帶」理論,可以應用於我們對香港和澳門正在出現的新興經濟重新定位的更深入理解。

國務院副總理何立峰近期表示,中央支持香港保持國際化特色和資金融通功能。珠海市委書記陳勇最近表示,珠海更好地配合澳門的經濟適度多元化,以及擴大與葡語國家的經貿合作,分別指向港澳兩個特別行政區的新興經濟定位。

香港新興經濟重新定位

在11月7日舉行的國際金融領袖投資峰會上,國務院副總理何立峰就香港國際金融中心建設提出三點建議。他說,香港要着力加強自身建設,進一步提升影響力。就金融基建而言,他指的是:一、在北京支持下,香港要在促進跨境貿易投資便利化;二、香港要在擴大金融業對外開放等方面先行先試; 三、要持續完善優化內地和香港金融互聯互通機制:四、強化離岸人民幣業務的樞紐功能;五、增強國際資產管理中心的功能:六、打造亞太區域金融科技樞紐和亞洲綠色金融中心,以及七:不斷完善和提升香港國際金融中心的功能。

二是何立峰指出,香港要繼續保持國際化的特色,進一步拓展朋友圈,更好發揮國際金融中心的資金融通功能。香港亦應透過開拓東盟、中東等市場,積極參與區域合作,加強與全球金融業界的業務往來。

三是何立峰表示,香港要適應國際和區域市場變化,積極參與大灣區建設,進一步融入國家發展大局,並在參與國家發展和現代化建設中發展壯大自身的實力。

他的演講對於香港新興經濟重新定位具有重要意義。基本上,他描繪了中國為增強和重塑香港經濟地位而採取的雙管齊下的策略:借用英國地緣政治學家麥金德(Halford MacKinder)的術語,依託中國的「心臟地帶」,在香港與大灣區的經濟融合中,在北京的認可與支持下,擴大香港的對外經濟關係,開拓東盟和中東市場。簡言之,就是憑藉雙管齊下的策略:依託和滲透內地「心臟地帶」,以及在國家一帶一路倡議下,加強香港對外經濟合作。

國務院副總理何立峰表示,中央支持香港保持國際化特色和資金融通功能。(國際金融領袖投資峰會圖片)
國務院副總理何立峰表示,中央支持香港保持國際化特色和資金融通功能。(國際金融領袖投資峰會圖片)

澳門新興經濟重新定位

11月10日,珠海市委書記陳勇訪問澳門並會見行政長官賀一誠。巧合的是,陳勇的言論指出了澳門新興經濟的重新定位。

陳勇表示,珠海與澳門長久以來關係密切,兩地居民交往頻繁。珠海將進一步透過橫琴深度合作區建設,更好配合澳門的經濟適度多元發展,並主動研究在更多領域上,為澳門居民到深合區生活和工作提供便利。他指出,隨着粵港澳大灣區澳珠極點建設的加速,必將對粵西地區起到更有效、更強的輻射帶動作用。珠海亦希望藉着澳門「一中心、一平台、一基地」的發展定位,不斷擴大與葡語國家的經貿合作,實現珠澳共同發展。

儘管何立峰是中央級的高官,陳勇是地方黨委書記,但他們的言論可以綜合起來看,反映出中央和地方政府認識到港澳在經濟和戰略上重新定位的必要性。

吸引外資外貿 進入心臟地帶

從麥金德的地緣政治角度來看,香港與大灣區更深層次的經濟融合和互動,可以被視為中央政府利用香港的傳統優勢作為窗口,吸引更多外資和貿易進入「心臟地帶」的計劃。這是中央政府推動香港加強金融和貨幣中心地位,同時吸引更多東盟、中東等其他地區國家到內地投資和貿易的新措施。行政長官李家超近期率領商界代表團訪問中東和東南亞,可視為北京方面大力支持的措施。

最重要的是,北京最近發布的一帶一路白皮書已經點名香港作為仲裁中心的角色。換言之,從地緣政治角度來說,中央政府試圖利用香港的普通法體系,將香港打造成國際企業的仲裁中心。

事實上,香港政府已表示有興趣加入《區域全面經濟夥伴協定》(RCEP),並已獲得北京中央政府的支持。雖然香港參與RCEP尚需時日,但其意圖和北京的支持再次顯示了地緣政治和地緣經濟的盤算:香港必須加強其作為祖國超級聯繫人的角色──這個超級聯繫人的想法源於前行政長官梁振英,但其內容直到現任李家超政府才完全具體化。

珠海市委書記陳勇(左)會晤澳門行政長官賀一誠,談及澳門新興經濟的重新定位。(澳門特區政府圖片)
珠海市委書記陳勇(左)會晤澳門行政長官賀一誠,談及澳門新興經濟的重新定位。(澳門特區政府圖片)

加強與葡語國家關係

陳勇的言論,說明了內地當局如何看待澳門新興的經濟角色。2023年10月的「一帶一路」白皮書明確指出,澳門作為加強中國與葡語國家關係的平台角色。自2003年10月以來,澳門一直透過中國與葡語國家經貿合作論壇發揮重要作用。

最近有傳媒報道指出,葡萄牙在中國的一帶一路倡議中獲得了經濟利益,而意大利則因認為缺乏具體經濟利益,有意退出一帶一路計劃。鑑於葡萄牙與中國之間長期以來和諧的外交和經濟關係,可以預見,澳門作為北京加強與葡語國家經濟關係的平台角色將繼續擴大。

經濟適度多元化

陳勇關於珠海和澳門合作,如何惠及粵西的評論,也反映了中國以已開發地區帶動欠發達地區發展的國家發展策略。

有趣的是,陳勇的言論是在澳門政府公布經濟適度多元化規劃之後發表的──這個規劃是在6月至7月與公眾進行13輪諮詢後於2023年8月發表的文件。

澳門政府公布的經濟適度多元化規劃,涵蓋綜合旅遊休閒產業、中醫藥及保健品產業、現代金融貨幣產業、高新技術產業和傳統產業提升5個領域,同時發展會展業與文化體育產業。

這個規劃落實了中央政府要求澳門做的事情,即「適度」的經濟多元化。然而,從批判的角度來看,多元化規劃缺乏具體的關鍵績效指標。產業多元化5個領域的27個指標中,到2028年已有13個指標有具體統計數字,主要集中在高新技術發展和會展體育文化產業領域。如果一半的指標缺乏績效目標,那麼,澳門政府很容易宣稱到2028年取得了成就──也許具有諷刺意味的是,這反映了「適度」一詞,因為中央當局可能認為一定程度的經濟多元化,將有助最終實現這一目標。

多元化規劃中最模糊的部分,是澳門的高等教育機構如何幫助澳門的經濟重新定位及深化與橫琴的融合。規劃提到2022年澳門高等教育機構的學生人數為44052人,但它表示到2028年「學生人數將適當增加」。從關鍵角度來看,除了依賴輸入人才(尤其是內地人才)之外,勞動力規劃和本地培訓,對於促進澳門新興經濟的重新定位也是必要的。

從欣賞的角度來看,多元化規劃確實提到了將與高科技產業相關的高等教育計劃,從2022年的24個擴大到2028年的40個的必要性。

總之,澳門當局如何根據市場需求和行業需求隨時調整目標(如果存在的話),還有待觀察。

近期,福建不僅與台灣金門,而且與澳門也加強了交流和互動,這一趨勢表明福建省在大陸加強與台灣經濟融合的努力中的作用日益增強。鑑於這種地緣經濟的轉變,澳門在福建與台灣的經濟互動過程中可以發揮作用。具體來說,鑑於澳門居民中有相當大比例有福建血統,澳門應可以加強與福建的經濟關係。從地理位置上看,澳門可以與福建建立更緊密的經濟關係,同時利用珠海橫琴的物理空間,實現經濟「適度」多元化的目標。

澳門政府公布的經濟適度多元化規劃,其中一個重點是發展綜合旅遊休閒產業。(Shutterstock)
澳門政府公布的經濟適度多元化規劃,其中一個重點是發展綜合旅遊休閒產業。(Shutterstock)

綜上所述,麥金德的「心臟地帶」理論,可以應用於我們對香港和澳門正在出現的新興經濟重新定位的更深入理解。

香港要充分利用內地腹地,深化與大灣區的經濟融合,同時透過國家一帶一路倡議鞏固對外經濟關係,特別是東盟和中東地區,以增強超級聯繫人的作用。香港作為經濟超級聯絡人的角色在地緣政治上具有重要意義。在中美強權政治持續不斷的情況下,香港可以透過與內地更深層次的融合,充分拓展經濟空間,同時利用祖國的一帶一路倡議,透過中國主導的各種論壇、透過城市參與更多國際組織。

另一方面,澳門已經得到了祖國的大力支持,利用橫琴這一龐大腹地的一小部分,實現經濟「適度」多元化的目標。同時,澳門將繼續發揮中國與葡語國家之間的聯繫紐帶作用,但它可以也有潛力擴大與福建的經濟關係,而福建在未來幾年內地與台灣經濟融合的過程中,日益發揮着至關重要的作用。如果香港和澳門的經濟重新定位已經明確,那麼下一個挑戰就是兩座城市如何實現國家規劃和目標。

A geopolitical analysis of the emerging economic repositioning of Hong Kong and Macau

The recent remarks made by Vice-Premier He Lifeng on the central government’s support of Hong Kong to retain its hallmark of internationalization and its role of capital mobility, and the recent comments by Zhuhai party-secretary Chen Yong that Zhuhai on Macau’s economic diversification and business cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries have pointed to the new economic repositioning of the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions, respectively.

During the Summit of the Global Financial Leaders’ Investment Summit on November 7, China’s Vice-Premier He Lifeng made several important points on the economic role of Hong Kong. He said that Hong Kong should strengthen its financial infrastructure to increase its level of influence. By financial infrastructure, he refers to (1) the need for Hong Kong to promote cross-border trade and investment with the support of Beijing, (2) the necessity of Hong Kong to open up the financial and monetary markets further as an experiment, (3) the persistence in improving the financial connecting mechanisms between the mainland and Hong Kong capital, (4) the consolidation of Hong Kong as an offshore Renminbi  exchange platform, (5) the trend of strengthening the city as an international wealth fund and asset management centre, (6) the strategy of building up Hong Kong as a financial technology hub and green financial centre, and (7) the function of elevating Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre.

Secondly, He Lifeng pointed to Hong Kong’s need to expand its international business networks and friendship for the sake of consolidating its financial and monetary status. Furthermore, Hong Kong should actively participate in regional cooperation and interact with the financial and monetary world through its expansion into the ASEAN market and the Middle East market.

Third, He Lifeng remarked that Hong Kong should adapt to the changes in the international and regional markets through its active participation in the construction of the Greater Bay Area, through its deepening integration with the nation, and through its further participation in China’s national development and modernization.

He’s remarks are significant for Hong Kong’s emerging economic repositioning of Hong Kong. Basically, he delineated the two-pronged strategy adopted by China to enhance and reshape Hong Kong’s economic position: relying on the “heartland” of China, to borrow from the geopolitical term of Halford MacKinder, in Hong Kong’s economic integration with the Greater Bay Area, and expanding Hong Kong’s external economic relations under Beijing’s approval and support to the ASEAN and Middle East markets. In short, the two-pronged strategy of relying on and penetrating the mainland Chinese “heartland” and of enhancing Hong Kong’s external economic collaborations under China’s Belt and Road initiative.

On November 10, the Zhuhai city’s party-secretary Chen Yong visited Macau and met Chief Executive Ho Iat-seng. Chen Yong made comments that are, coincidentally speaking, pointing to the emerging economic repositioning of Macau.

Chen Yong said that Zhuhai and Macau had a long history of citizen interactions, and that Zhuhai from now on is going to play a crucial role to “accompany” Macau’s process of developing economic diversification “suitably” through the In-depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin. He also added that Zhuhai is providing convenience to the life and work of the people of Macau. With the acceleration of the construction of the Macau-Zhuhai cooperation items, Chen said, the region’s development will have radiative impacts on the western regions of Guangdong. According to Chen, Zhuhai hopes that it will strengthen the cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries through Macau as a centre, a platform and as a base, and that both Zhuhai and Macau will develop together.

Although He Lifeng is a central-level high-ranking official and although Chen Yong is a local-level party-secretary, their remarks can be taken together as a reflection of how the mainland’s central government and local government perceive the necessity of both Hong Kong and Macau to reposition themselves economically and strategically.

From MacKinder’s geopolitical perspective, Hong Kong’s deeper economic integration and interaction with the Greater Bay Area can be seen as a central government’s plan of utilizing the traditional strength of Hong Kong as a window to absorb more foreign investment and trade into the “heartland.” It is a new push from the central government for Hong Kong to enhance its role as a financial and monetary centre, while attracting more investment and trade from other countries, like those in ASEAN and the Middle East, to the mainland. The recent visits by Chief Executive John Lee and his business delegation to the Middle East and Southeast Asia could be seen as moves strongly supported by Beijing.

Most importantly, Beijing’s recent White Paper on the Belt and Road Initiative has already named Hong Kong’s role as an arbitration centre. In other words, geopolitically speaking, the central government has tried to make use of Hong Kong’s common law system to establish the city as an arbitration hub for international businesses.

In fact, the Hong Kong authorities have expressed their interest in joining RCEP, a move that has already acquired the support of the central government in Beijing. While Hong Kong’s participation in RCEP will take time, its intention and Beijing’s support again demonstrate the geopolitical and geoeconomic calculations: Hong Kong has to strengthen its role as a super-connector for its motherland – a super-connector whose idea stemmed from the C. Y. Leung administration but whose content has not yet been fully concretized until the current John Lee government.

The remarks made by Chen Yong illustrates how the mainland authorities view the emerging economic role of Macau. The White Paper on the Belt and Road Initiative in October 2023 has pointed to the explicit role of Macau as a platform to strengthen China’s relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries. Macau since October 2003 has been playing this significant role through the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries.

Recent media reports have pointed to the economic benefits reaped by Portugal in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, unlike Italy which has withdrawn from the Belt and Road scheme due to the Italian perception of lacking concrete economic benefits. Given the long-standing harmonious diplomatic and economic relations between Portugal and China, it can be anticipated that Macau’s role as a platform for Beijing to enhance its economic relations with Portuguese-speaking countries will continue to expand.

Chen Yong’s comment on how the Zhuhai-Macau cooperation can and will benefit western Guangdong also illustrates China’s national development strategy of utilizing the well-developed regions to stimulate the development of less well-off regions, domestically.

Interestingly, Chen’s remarks came after the Macau government’s publication of its economic diversification plan – a document published in August 2023 after 13 rounds of consultation with the public from June to July.

The economic diversification plan published by the Macau government covers five principal areas: comprehensive tourism and leisure industry, the industry of Chinese medicine and public health products, the modern financial and monetary industry, the high-tech industry and the elevation of traditional industries, and the convention and exhibition industry together with the development of cultural and sports industry.

The plan does implement what the central government has asked Macau to do, namely “suitable” economic diversification. However, from a critical perspective, the diversification plan lacks concrete key performance indicators. Out of twenty-seven indicators of the five areas of industrial diversification, thirteen have concrete statistical figures by the year 2028, mostly in the areas of high-tech development and convention/exhibition/sports/cultural industries. If half of the indicators lack performance targets, it would be easy for the Macau administration to claim achievements by 2028 – perhaps ironically a reflection of the word “suitably” as the central authorities might have assumed that some degree of economic diversification would serve the objective eventually.

The most ambiguous area of the diversification plan is how higher education institutions in Macau help the city’s economic repositioning and deepening integration with Hengqin. The plan mentions 44,052 students in Macau’s higher education institutions in 2022, but it says by 2028 “the number of students will be suitably increased.” From a critical perspective, workforce planning and local training will be necessary to gear up Macau’s new economic repositioning, apart from its reliance on the import of talents, including obviously mainland talents.

From an appreciative perspective, the diversification plan did mention the necessity of expanding higher education programs related to high-tech industries from 24 in 2022 to 40 in 2028.

Overall, it remains to be seen how the Macau authorities readjust their targets, if such targets exist, from time to time in response to the market demands and industrial needs.

Recently, Fujian has already enhanced its communication and interactions with not only Kinmen in Taiwan but also Macau – a trend pointing to the increasing role of Fujian province in the mainland’s attempt at enhancing economic integration with Taiwan. In view of this geoeconomic shift, Macau has a role to play in the process of Fujian’s economic interactions with Taiwan. Specifically, given that a sizeable percentage of Macau residents have Fujianese ancestry, Macau can and should enhance its economic relations with Fujian. Horizontally and geographically, Macau can forge closer economic relations with Fujian in the east while utilizing the physical space in Zhuhai’s Hengqin to achieve the objective of “suitable” economic diversification.

In conclusion, Halford MacKinder’s heartland theory can be applied to our deeper understanding of the emerging new economic repositioning of Hong Kong and Macau. Hong Kong has to fully utilize the mainland heartland by deepening its economic integration with the Greater Bay Area, while enhancing its role as a super-connector through the consolidation of external economic relations under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, especially ASEAN and the Middle East. Hong Kong’s role as an economic super-connector is geopolitically important. Amid continuous Sino-US power politics, Hong Kong’s economic space can be fully expanded through its deeper integration with the mainland while utilizing its motherland’s Belt and Road initiative to enhance external economic relations and reap concrete economic benefits through various China-led forums and through the city’s participation in more international organizations. Macau, on the other hand, has already gained its motherland’s dedicated support to use Hengqin, a very small part of the gigantic heartland, to achieve the objective of “suitable” economic diversification. At the same time, Macau will continue to play the role of a connector between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries, but it can and will have the potential to expand its economic relations with Fujian which is increasingly playing a crucial role in the mainland’s economic integration with Taiwan in the coming years. If the economic repositioning of both Hong Kong and Macau is now clear, the next challenge is how both cities will achieve the national plans and objectives.

原刊於澳門新聞通訊社(MNA)網站,本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址:https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-a-geopolitical-analysis-of-the-emerging-economic-repositioning-of-hong-kong-and-macau/

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