毫無疑問，美國眾議院議長佩洛西早前訪問台灣，已導致台海兩岸緊張局面升級，由現在起至2023年底更會不斷加劇。然而，這次政治風波帶來的最重要後果，是堅定了中國大陸在必要時對台動武的決心，以應對2024年台灣總統選後的台灣未來政局。
佩洛西不顧中方反對堅持訪台，體現了她的自由主義思想，以及政治上的錯判，誤以為中國不會做出嚴重損害台灣利益的事情。儘管美國政府強調佩洛西訪台不會影響其「一個中國」政策，但她公開稱讚及肯定民進黨管治台灣的成績，難免讓人感到美國已改變其「一中政策」。
實彈演習常態化 擦槍走火機會增
中國即時作出回應，在環繞台灣的6個海域進行實彈軍事演習，展示北京有能力以軍事局部封鎖台灣一段短時間，並對台灣經濟帶來負面影響。事實上，在軍演的3天期內，一些台灣的航班及漁船被迫要改變航道。
倘若中國對台灣進行全面的軍事封鎮，台灣的經濟將會癱瘓，社會上將會人心惶惶。
更值得注意的是，中國在台灣附近進行軍事演習將會成為常態，令雙方擦槍走火，出現軍事衝突的可能性大為提高。
中國已禁制數種台灣水果進口大陸，並點名批評民進黨一些領導人是「出賣民族利益、搞『台獨』分裂的人」，當中包括蔡英文及台灣駐美代表蕭美琴。
中國公開批評民進黨領導人具有重要的政治含意── 一旦中國和平或武力統一台灣的日子到臨，民進黨現時的核心領導層很有可能會受到政治上的「懲罰」。
2019年香港反對修改《逃犯條例》風波中，反對派活躍分子的下場是一個好例子。這些核心領導人物全部受到懲處，以產生「殺一儆百」的震懾效果。相信台灣也不會例外，特別是中國非常重視擁有台灣的主權，一再強調台灣是中國領土的一部分。
中國圍繞台灣進行軍演，突顯一些美國政客及戰略家的錯判，展現了中國並非是他們口中的「紙老虎」。解放軍在靠近台灣海域進行軍演及導彈測試，展示解放軍有能力及實力「攻佔」台灣，倘若中國領導人決定以武力統一為最後手段，他們是有能力做到的。
佩洛西現已被中國政府制裁，她的反中取態，令她及顧問團隊作出錯誤估算，為此次訪問帶來他們不想發生的後果，其中最嚴重的後果，是加強了中國領導層在一旦無法採用和平手段下，以武力統一台灣的決心，尤其是中國政府的強硬派，更加堅定他們的主張，計算如何在有需要時以武力攻台實現統一。
2024年台灣總統大選是轉捩點
由現在起至2024年初台灣總統大選，兩岸關係無論在政治及軍事上都會維持不穩局面，北京將會持續向台灣施加壓力，尤其是在2022年底台灣舉行縣市選舉之前，中國將會向台灣民眾展示他們並非「紙老虎」。在此形勢下，民進黨必須改變策略，而以國民黨為首的藍營將會提出台灣有必要採取與中國大陸和諧共處、而不是對抗的策略。
2024台灣總統選舉將會是極為關鍵的轉捩點，如果民進黨人再次連任，兩岸關係將維持緊張，更壞的情況是，如果民進黨以反對中國為選舉綱領，並贏得總統大選，中國大陸有可能考慮採取快速軍事行動攻台，捉拿「出賣民族利益的分裂分子」並以武力實現統一。如果中國的「攻撃」能夠快速有效，在短時間內壓制台灣的反抗，美國將難以採取軍事行動介入。考慮到中國大陸與台灣的軍力差距愈來愈大，中國以快速軍事行動「攻佔」台灣，實際是會有可能的。
如果中國大陸採取快速軍事行動，收復他們聲稱擁有的主權，美國及日本看來將難以作出干預。
此外，若然台灣內部支持統一的親中人士發起政治運動，台灣社會分裂成支持中國和反對中國兩個陣營，更會有利中國大陸統一台灣的行動。
其中一個和平化解兩岸緊張關係的希望，是及早探討出和平統一的模式。中國大陸提出「一國兩制」，讓台灣可以保持擁有軍隊，以及一定程度的對外自治權，即是台灣可以繼續維持與世界其他地方的現存外交關係。如果台灣的政治領袖真的願意為改善現狀而作出改變，並實行「九二共識」，中國大陸很可能會作出讓步，為兩岸關係帶來突破。相反，如果民進黨繼續對中國大陸採取強硬對抗，就有可能引致災難性後果。
缺乏溝通渠道 不利兩岸關係
民進黨反對「九二共識」，也沒有應對中國的明智策略，只能倚靠中間人斡旋與大陸的關係。這些中間人包括台灣的商人、一些獲北京信任的國民黨領袖，以及一些在兩岸均有良好關係的重量級學者。
從選舉的角度看，民進黨不斷攻撃國民黨乃是理所當然，可以理解的。然而，從改善兩岸關係的角度考量，民進黨及美國應該善用國民黨及新黨等藍營中人，作為有用及具建設性的中間人。
令人惋惜的是，民進黨至今仍堅守公開反對中國的立場，此舉實無助改善兩岸關係。更甚的是，民進黨親美和親日的政治取態，只會令兩岸關係更加惡劣。再者，令台灣看似是美國的代理人，只會使台灣更有可能陷入類似烏克蘭的困境，即是在俄羅斯的威脅下，沒有一個緩衝區可以緩解俄方的進襲，同時也無可避免地成為親美陣營的馬前卒。
對於美國而言，制訂中國大陸和台灣政策的決策者並沒有聽取資深外交家基辛格的忠告。這麼多年來，基辛格一直建議美國領導人把對華的外交政策，與美國的本土政治分開。
可惜的是，拜登政府上台後，仍繼續前任特朗普的公開反華立場，並沒有更精明地引導台灣的激進勢力，也沒有採納具建設性的與中國交往政策來處理台灣問題。
總括而言，今天台海兩岸的緊張關係，是佩洛西訪台的直接後果，並且已無可扭轉地讓人感到美國改變及放棄了一個中國政策。更讓人擔心的是，由現在起至2024年台灣總統大選期間，解放軍環繞台灣進行軍事演習將成為常態，令兩岸發生軍事衝突、擦槍走火的風險加劇。最關鍵的轉捩點將是2024年初的台灣總統選舉，如果國民黨重掌政權，預料兩岸關係將會好轉，但如果民進黨繼續執政，又沒有採納更理智的政策來處理與中國大陸的關係，解放軍以武力「收復」台灣實現統一的可能性只會愈來愈大，也是無可避免的。
A risk assessment of Beijing-Taipei relations after Pelosi’s visit
Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has undoubtedly heightened Beijing-Taipei tensions from now to the end of 2023 but, most importantly, it has consolidated mainland China’s determination to use force, if necessary, to deal with Taiwan’s political future in the period after Taiwan’s presidential election in early 2024.
Pelosi’s visit was characterized by her liberal ideology and politically problematic assumption that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would not do anything detrimental to the interest of Taiwan. Her open praise and recognition of Taiwan under the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) created an irreversible impression that the US government has already changed its one-China policy, even though the US leadership has insisted that the one-China policy has remained intact.
In the short run, China has already conducted military exercises in six zones surrounding the island of Taiwan, implying that Beijing demonstrates how a partial and temporary military blockade can and will easily affect Taiwan’s economy negatively. Some Taiwan air flights and fishing boats had to divert their routes immediately in these three days.
If a full-scale military blockade were conducted, Taiwan’s economy would be paralyzed and society’s confidence be undermined seriously.
Most importantly, the Chinese military exercises near Taiwan are becoming a normal phenomenon, raising the specter of a possible military conflict or accident between the two sides.
China has banned the imports of some Taiwan fruits into the mainland while criticizing the core leaders of the DPP as “traitors,” including Tsai Ing-wen and Hsiao Bi-khim.
The open criticisms of some DPP core leaders have tremendous political implications. In the event of a peaceful or forceful reunification of Taiwan, it would be very likely that the DPP’s current core leaders would be politically “punished.”
The case of Hong Kong’s radicals who stirred up the anti-extradition movement in Hong Kong during the latter half of 2019 was a good example. All those core leaders had to be punished as a demonstration effect on other localists in Hong Kong. Taiwan is and will be no exception to this rule, especially as the PRC attaches immense importance to its sovereignty over Taiwan.
The military exercises around the island of Taiwan means that the PRC is by no means a “paper tiger,” as some US politicians and strategists might misperceive. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted military exercises and missile tests outside the Taiwan waters, meaning that it has the strong capacity and capability to “capture” back Taiwan if the PRC leaders opt for such a solution as the last resort to deal with Taiwan’s future.
Pelosi is now being sanctioned by the PRC. Given her anti-China sentiment, Pelosi and her advisers miscalculated the unintended consequences of her visit. The most important unintended consequence is to enhance China’s determination, especially from the hardline faction, to use military force to reunify Taiwan if the peaceful means are encountering increasing difficulties. The conservative hardline faction in the mainland has been reinforced by her irresponsible visit, calculating the scenarios in which China would resort to military force to reunify Taiwan if necessary.
From now to the Taiwan presidential election in early 2024, the relations between Beijing and Taipei remain politically and militarily unstable. Beijing is likely applying constant pressure on Taiwan, especially before the county and mayoral elections by the end of 2022, to show to the people of Taiwan that it is by no means a “paper tiger,” that the DPP must change its strategy, and that the blue camp like the Kuomintang would argue for the need for Taiwan to adopt an appeasement rather than a confrontational strategy toward mainland China.
The 2024 presidential election in Taiwan will be a very critical turning point. In case of a continuous DPP victory, Beijing-Taipei relations would remain tense. Even worse, if the DPP puts up an anti-China election platform and wins the presidential election, mainland China would likely consider a swift attack on Taiwan militarily, capturing the main “traitors” and leading to a forceful process of reunification. The US would be unlikely to intervene militarily if the mainland Chinese “attack” would be swift, effective and paralyzing the Taiwan opposition within a very short period of time. Given the increasing military disparity between mainland China and Taiwan, a quick military “occupation” of Taiwan by the mainland would become a realistic possibility.
The US and Japan would be unlikely to intervene quickly to help Taiwan resist any swift mainland military recovery of China’s sovereignty over the island republic.
Adding to the mainland Chinese swift recovery of its sovereignty over Taiwan would be the possibility of pro-reunification activists launching a political movement dividing the Taiwan society into two parts, one pro-China and the other one anti-China.
One hope for a peaceful resolution of Beijing-Taipei relations is to explore a peaceful reunification model quickly. The mainland authorities insist on the “one country, two systems” in which Taiwan would be able to maintain its military and have some degree of external autonomy. That is, Taiwan would continue to enjoy its existing diplomatic relations with other parts of the world. If Taiwan’s political leaders really take a turn for the better by adopting the 1992 consensus between the mainland and Taiwan, a breakthrough in making concessions on the part of the mainland would likely be made. Reversely if the DPP continues to adopt a hardline policy toward the PRC, the result would likely be catastrophic.
A wise DPP policy toward China – which is now non-existent as it opposes the 1992 consensus – is to rely on go-betweens to mediate its relations with the mainland. Such intermediaries may include Taiwan businesspeople, some core leaders of the KMT trusted by the mainland side, and perhaps heavyweight academics who have good relations with both the mainland and the Taiwan side.
The DPP’s constant attack on the KMT is natural and understandable from the electoral market perspective. But from the perspective of ameliorating Beijing-Taipei relations, the KMT and other blue forces, like the New Party, can and should be utilized by the DPP and the US as useful and constructive intermediaries.
Sadly, so far, the DPP adopts an openly anti-China stance, which is by no means conducive to Beijing-Taipei relations. Even worse, the DPP’s explicitly pro-US and pro-Japan policy does not bode well for its relations with the mainland. Making Taiwan look like a proxy of the US would likely make the island republic increasingly encounter a Ukrainian scenario in which a buffer state was failed to emerge in the first place to fend off Russian threats on the one hand and to avoid Ukraine from becoming an agent of the pro-US alliance on the other.
For the US, its policy makers on mainland China and Taiwan have not heeded the good advice of veteran diplomat Henry Kissinger who has constantly advised the US leadership to separate its foreign policy toward China from domestic American politics.
It is unfortunate that the Biden administration sticks to an openly anti-China position of the Donald Trump government without becoming far more sophisticated by reining in the radical forces in Taiwan on the one hand and without adopting a constructive engagement policy toward the mainland authorities dealing with Taiwan on the other hand.
In short, the tense relations between the two Straits today are a direct result of Pelosi’s visit, which has already generated an irreversible image that the US government has changed and abandoned its one-China policy. Even worse, from now to the Taiwan presidential election in early 2024, military exercises conducted by the PLA surrounding Taiwan will become a regular and normal phenomenon, thereby increasing the likelihood of military accidents and conflicts. The most critical juncture would be the presidential election in Taiwan in early 2024. If the KMT would return to the presidential position, Beijing-Taipei relations would take a turn for the better. If the DPP continues to dominate the political scene of Taiwan without adopting a far more sophisticated policy toward mainland China, the PLA’s military “recovery” of the PRC’s “sovereignty” over Taiwan would become increasingly possible and inevitable.
