從美國國務卿布林肯與中國前外交部長楊潔篪的通話，以及美國總統拜登與中國國家主席習近平最近的兩次通話來看，現在美國對華政策有戰略競爭和戰略耐性的特點。 然而，某些戰略模糊和不確定性因素仍然存在，導致未來幾年中美關係可能繼續緊張和不穩定。
拜登政府將以「戰略耐性」處理美中關係
1月25日，白宮新聞秘書普薩基（Jen Psaki）向記者透露，總統拜登希望以「耐心」對待與中國的關係。 她補充說，習近平主席呼籲世界各國領導人加強宏觀經濟政策協調，而20國集團在全球經濟治理中的作用，不會改變美國對華政策。 她的講話揭示了拜登政府採取「戰略耐性」的重要性。
2月5日，美國國務院發言人普萊斯（Ned Price）表示，國務卿布林肯與中共中央外事工作委員會辦公室主任楊潔篪通電話。布林肯強調，「美國將繼續捍衛包括新疆、西藏和香港在內的人權和民主價值，並敦促中國與國際社會一起，譴責緬甸的軍事政變」。 此外，布林肯重申，美國「將與盟友和夥伴捍衛共同價值和利益，為威脅包括台海在內的印太地區穩定，並損害基於規則的國際體系行為負責」。
不過，楊潔篪回應：「中國敦促美國在一段時期以來的錯誤，同中方一道，秉持不衝突不對抗、相互尊重、合作共赢的精神，聚焦合作，管控分歧，推動中美關係健康穩定向前發展。」
回應兩國在意識形態和價值觀分歧時，楊潔篪強調，中美雙方應該相互尊重彼此核心利益和各自選擇的政治制度與發展道路，各自辦好自己國家的事，楊潔篪說，台灣問題是「中美關係中最重要最敏感的核心問題，事關中國主權和領土完整」。美方應當嚴格恪守一個中國原則和中美三個聯合公報。此外，「涉港、涉疆、涉藏等事務均為中國內政，不容任何外部勢力干涉」。
中美兩國對「國際秩序」看法不同
而布林肯則認為，美國將捍衛其在印太地區的「核心價值和利益」，要求中國遵循「基於規則的國際秩序」。楊潔篪則指出，「世界各國應當維護的是以聯合國為核心的國際體系，以國際法為基礎的國際秩序，以聯合國憲章宗旨和原則為核心的國際關係基本準則，這是國際社會的共識，而不是少數國家所謂的以規則為基礎的國際秩序」。顯然，布林肯和楊潔篪對中國是否應該遵循「基於規則的國際秩序」有不同意見。
布林肯又呼籲中國「譴責緬甸軍事政變」時，楊潔篪的回應重申了中國的立場，強調國際社會應當為緬甸問題妥善解決營造良好外部環境。
從美國國務院的簡短聲明和中華人民共和國外交部的詳細敍述來看，布林肯和楊潔篪對美中關係的取態不同。布林肯似乎採取了一種更加「低調」和「耐心」的方式，而楊潔篪則採取了堅定而公開的立場。
2月10日，美國總統拜登與習近平主席通電話時，美方再次採取「低調和耐心」的態度。白宮表示：「拜登總統重申了他的首要任務，即保護美國人民的安全、繁榮、健康和生活方式，並維護自由開放的印太地區」。巧合的是，中國外交部詳細報道了習近平與拜登的電話談話，稱習近平向拜登表示，中美合則兩利、鬥則俱傷，「中美對抗對兩國和世界肯定是一場災難」，合作是唯一的正確選擇。
習近平在回應拜登提到香港、新疆和台灣時強調，台灣與香港、新疆等有關的問題「是中國的內政，關係到中國的主權和領土完整，美方應尊重中國的核心利益，慎重行事」。
美國須正視「中國崛起」的現實
隨後，拜登在1月12日表示，鑑於中國在交通和鐵路系統等基建設施方面的快速發展，美國必須改善基建設施。他還成立了一個15人特別工作組，配合美國對華政策。 顯然，中國的崛起已經在軍事和經濟上對美國構成真正威脅。
不過，美國在對台灣政策卻傾向於採取某種含糊的態度。1979年的《台灣關係法》仍然是美國對台灣政策的支柱。美國對台政策中存在戰略模糊的成分，因為美國可以控制台灣的任何極端舉動，同時讓武器靈活售台，以適應不斷變化的情況。
毫無疑問，戰略模糊之中含有不確定性，有關各方的忍耐和約束，將是影響台灣海峽和平穩定的最關鍵因素。
總之，美國對華政策的特點是戰略競爭和戰略耐性，以及合作和遏制的混合。在台灣問題上，戰略模糊的特徵依然存在，但中美表面的和平共處之下，卻是軍事的不確定性和潛在的不穩定性，希望雙方能夠並以相對和平的外交方式來處理不確定性。
US Policy Toward China: Implications of strategic competition, patience and ambiguity
Judging from the two recent phone conversations between the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and China’s former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and between US President Joe Biden and the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the US policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now characterized by strategic competition and patience. Nevertheless, some elements of strategic ambiguities and uncertainties persist, leading to the likelihood of tense and oscillating US-China relations in the coming years.
On January 25th, White House press secretary Jen Psaki spoke to reporters and she revealed that President Joe Biden would like to approach the relations with the PRC with “patience.” She added that PRC President Xi Jinping’s call for world leaders to consolidate macroeconomic policy coordination and the G20 role in global economic governance would not alter the US policy toward China. Her remarks unveiled the importance of strategic patience adopted by the Biden administration.
On February 5, US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with the PRC Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi. Blinken stressed that the US “will continue to stand up for human rights and democratic values, including Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and pressed China to join the international community in condemning the military coup in Burma (State Department’s readout on February 5, 2021).” Moreover, Blinken reaffirmed that the US “will work together with its allies and partners in defence of our shared values and interests to hold the PRC accountable for its efforts to threaten stability in the Indo-Pacific, including across the Taiwan Strait and its undermining of the rules-based international system.”
On February 6th, the PRC Foreign Ministry announced in its official website that Yang had a phone conversation with Blinken “at the latter request.” Furthermore, Yang said that the Sino-US relations “now stand at a key moment” although they “brought great benefits to the people of the two countries and promoted world peace and prosperity.” China, according to Yang, “urges the US to rectify its mistakes over a period of time and work with China to uphold the spirit of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, focus on cooperation and manage differences, so as to push forward the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations.”
In response to the ideological and value differences between the two countries, Yang “stressed that the two sides should respect each other’s core interests and choices of political system and development path and manage their domestic affairs well.” Yang added that “the Taiwan question” is “the most important and sensitive core issue in China-US relations” and that it “bears on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” According to Yang, the US “should strictly abide by the one-China principle and the three Sino-US joint communiques.” Furthermore, “Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet-related affairs are all China’s internal affairs and allow no interference by any external forces.”
On Blinken’s point that the US would defend its “core values and interests” in the Indo-Pacific and hold the PRC accountable through the “rules-based international system,” Yang pointed out that countries in the world “should safeguard the international system with the United Nations at its core, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms of international relations in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.” This is, according to Yang, “the consensus of the international community, not the so-called rules-based international order championed by a few countries.” Clearly, Blinken and Yang had different perception on whether China should follow the “rules-based international order.”
In response to Blinken’s call for China to “condemn the military coup in Burma,” Yang reiterated the PRC’s position and stressed that “the international community should create an enabling external environment for the proper settlement of the Myanmar issue.”
Judging from the terse statement made by the US State Department and the detailed description from the PRC Foreign Ministry, both Blinken and Yang approached the US-China relations differently. Blinken appeared to adopt a more “low-key” and “patient” approach, while Yang took a firm and open stance.
The more low-key and patient approach adopted by the US side was repeated in how the White House revealed President Biden’s phone call with President Xi Jinping on February 10th. The White House readout said: “President Biden affirmed his priorities of protecting the American people’s security, prosperity, health and way of life, and preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific. President Biden underscored his fundamental concerns about Beijing’s coercive and unfair economic practices, crackdown in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and increasingly assertive actions in the region, including toward Taiwan. The two leaders also exchanged views on countering the Covid-19 pandemic, and the shared challenges of global health security, climate change, and preventing weapons proliferation. President Biden committed to pursuing practical, results-oriented engagements when it advances the interests of the American people and those of our allies.”
Coincidentally, the PRC Foreign Ministry issued a detailed description of President Xi’s phone conversation with President Biden, saying President Xi “stressed that China and the US both gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation; [and that] cooperation is the only right choice for both sides.” Furthermore, President Xi added that “confrontation between the two countries, however, will definitely be disastrous for both countries and the world.” The Chinese President also reiterated Yang Jiechi’s point, namely both China and the US should “follow the spirit of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation” – perhaps a key phrase in the PRC emphasis on the “new” Sino-US relations.
In response to Biden’s mentioning of Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan, President Xi said: “The Taiwan question and issues relating to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, etc. are China’s internal affairs and concern China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the US side should respect China’s core interests and act prudently.” Moreover, China and the US should “act to conform to the trend of the world, jointly safeguard peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and make historic contributions to promoting world peace and development.”
On February 12, President Biden said that the US must improve its infrastructure in view of the PRC’s rapid infrastructure development, including transport and railway system. He also set up a 15-member special task force in the US Defence Department to deal with the US policy toward China. Clearly, the rise of the PRC has already constituted a real threat to the US, militarily and economically. If China’s hard power has been emerging prominently, the US as a superpower naturally sees the PRC as a “strategic competitor.”
The implications of the new US policy toward China are politically significant.
First and foremost, the Biden administration has not abandoned the policies adopted by the Donald Trump government toward the PRC. The Biden administration retains the tariffs on the Chinese products, although it backs off from Trump’s ban on the popular video app TikTok. As the Democratic Party is traditionally supportive of human rights and sees it as a universal value, it is natural that Biden and Blinken stand tough on the “human rights conditions” in the PRC, which the Chinese leaders believe that the US should and must not interfere with China’s internal matters. Unlike the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who adopted an open approach to criticizing the PRC, Blinken has been taking a slightly low-key and far more patient approach. The Biden administration has also appeared to focus on the PRC in general rather than the ruling party, which was often the target of the critical remarks of former Secretary of State Pompeo. At least from the perspective of diplomatic interactions, US-China relations have seemingly taken a slight turn for the better.
Second, like the Trump administration, the US under Biden is combining engagement with containment, while the tone of engagement is stronger in the Biden government. The rise of China has become a real political and military threat to the US leaders and policymakers, who see the PRC’s assertively nationalistic moves in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific region as “destabilizing.” As such, the Biden administration is inheriting the Trump policy of consolidating the US relations with its allies, including Australia, UK, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and increasingly India to counter the perceived China threat. The implication here is that both the US and must manage their relations very sensitively and carefully to avoid any military accident or skirmishes. Similarly, China’s relations with its neighbours, including India and Japan, will be increasingly sensitive. In East Asia, as Japan has been improving its defensive capability, it is likely dragged increasingly into any potential military tensions with not only China but also North Korea, where its nuclear weapons program has constituted a military threat to the US and its allies.
Third, there are elements of strategic ambiguity and uncertainty in US policy toward the Taiwan issue. Although the PRC Foreign Ministry’s statement said that Blinken reiterated the US attachment to the one-China principle and to the three Sino-US joint communiques (in 1972, 1979 and 1982), interestingly the US State Department’s brief readout did not mention this.
From another perspective, the US prefers to adopt some degree of ambiguities in its policy toward Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, signed by President Jimmy Carter of the Democratic Party, remains the pillar of US policy toward Taiwan. As political scientist Dennis Hickey has long pointed out in an academic article in Asian Surveyin 1988, the US has been adopting a “two-point” policy toward Taiwan, namely the resolution of the Taiwan issue is for the Chinese to decide, but the US has an interest to see that such resolution would be peaceful. At a time when the rise of China is seen by the US as a real military threat, the American provision of military weapons to Taiwan is an act of deterrence to any other military threat. The ingredient of strategic ambiguity exists in this US policy toward Taiwan, for the US can rein in any extreme move by Taiwan and make the provision of military weapons flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances.
In recent months, some US observers, notably Richard Haass and David Sacks, have advocated in an article in Foreign Affairs (September 2, 2020) that the US strategic “ambiguity” toward Taiwan should be turned into “clarity” to make its bottom line clear to the PRC side. Nevertheless, judging from the official US remarks and stance, it prefers to maintain strategic ambiguity over the Taiwan issue.
Indeed, uncertainties are embedded in strategic ambiguity. Hopefully, both China and US can manage their differences calmly, diplomatically, flexibly and peacefully. Hopefully, such uncertainties can and will be managed without military accident or skirmishes between the PRC side and the US on the one hand, and between the PRC and Taiwan on the other hand. Tolerance and restraints on all sides concerned will be the most critical factor shaping peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
In conclusion, the US policy toward China is now marked by strategic competition and patience, together with a mixture of engagement and containment. On the Taiwan issue, the characteristic of strategic ambiguities persists, but military uncertainties and potential instability are underlying the surface of peaceful coexistence between the PRC and the US. It is hoped that both sides can and will manage their uncertain, oscillating, competitive and rocky relations in a relatively calm and diplomatic manner.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
