4月2日，在中美經濟、政治和軍事事務持續緊張的情況下，中國國家主席習近平與美國總統拜登進行了兩個小時的電話交談，其特色是與對方重新接觸並重新定位立場的總統外交。自2023年11月舊金山會晤以來，這種重新接觸和重新定位仍然是中美關係的持久特色。
與特朗普政府與中國進行激烈的意識形態和貿易戰不同，拜登政府自2021年1月以來，一直試圖尋找與中華人民共和國重新接觸的機會。拜登總統和習近平主席最近一次通電話，是在具有重要政治意義的時期進行的，7個月後美國總統大選即將舉行。此外，台灣新總統賴清德的就職典禮將於5月20日舉行。雖然預計大陸政府將對賴清德就職演說中的言論作出反應，但拜登政府卻作出了自己的決定。與習近平通電話時就一系列問題表達了其立場。
拜登「七不一肯定」 習近平重申三立場
據報道，拜登表示美方奉行「一個中國」政策，不支持台獨，不尋求新冷戰，不尋求改變中國體制，不尋求通過強化同盟關係反對中國，無意與中國發生衝突，不尋求遏制中國發展，不尋求與中國脫鈎，這實際是「七不一肯定」的姿態。
習近平主席重申了中方三個立場，即中美關係要以和為重、以穩為重、以信為本。在和平方面，中方秉持不衝突、不對抗的底線原則，堅持提升中美關係水準；在穩定方面，中方採取不干擾、不挑釁、不逾越對方邊界的立場，維持了中美關係整體穩定；以信為本，中國強調用行動兌現承諾，將「舊金山願景」變成實景。
戰略認知：中美關係「第一粒鈕扣」
習近平又強調，戰略認知問題始終是中美關係必須扣好的「第一粒鈕扣」，這意味着中美雙方必須避免對抗、相互尊重；必須堅持穩定健康發展，走可持續發展的道路，而不是走回老路。
明顯地，中美雙方以更清晰和更有力的方式重申了先前的立場，以舊金山會晤時兩國達成的共識為基礎，解決氣候變遷、禁毒和人文交流等「低階政治」問題。
習拜電話會談雖然暫時放下了雙方的意識形態分歧，但確實沒有任何突破。中國一如既往強調台灣問題的紅線不容逾越、美方打壓中國經濟、科技、貿易發展增加了中美關係的風險。
美方堅持「航行自由」與「國家安全」
與此同時，美方強調台海穩定與和平的重要性，強調南海「航行自由」的重要性，對中方支持俄羅斯軍事和國防工業表示擔憂，批評中國的「不公平貿易政策和非市場經濟行為」，並表示華盛頓將避免美國先進技術被用來「削弱美國國家安全」。拜登政府重申了在朝鮮半島無核化問題上的立場，暗示期望中國在遏制北韓窮兵黷武行為方面發揮積極作用。
南海主權不讓步 中方寧可談「人權」
針對美方關切，中方在電話會議和事後的外交部例行記者會上重申，中國對南海有關島嶼及附近海域擁有「無可爭辯的主權」，美方不應干預北京和馬尼拉之間的事務。外交部發言人汪文斌4月3日表示，中方願與美方就人權問題進行交流，但不應以此為藉口干涉中國內政，此舉反映了美方對中國內地和香港「人權」狀況的關切。
從某種意義上說，上述討論的所有問題，更多的是中美互相擺出姿態，而不是尋求建設性的解決方案，但拜登政府的立場顯然旨在為接下來舉行的兩場會談鋪路──一是關於貿易問題，另一是恢復軍事對話，建立互信。
「產能過剩」恐傾銷 耶倫訪華討價還價
習拜4月2日通電話後，中美雙方立即在兩個領域重新接觸──美國財長耶倫訪華並與中國國務院副總理何立峰就貿易問題會談，以及中國軍方代表與美軍印太司令部、太平洋艦隊和太平洋空軍軍官為代表的海上軍事安全磋商機制工作組，在夏威夷舉行的中美海上軍事安全磋商機制工作小組會議。就改進中美海上軍事安全問題的措施進行討論。
不出所料，耶倫用中國出口影響美國工人和產業利益的方式表達了美國對中國所謂「產能過剩」的擔憂。耶倫抱怨中國「不公平的貿易行為」，並告訴何立峰，中國對可再生能源、電動車和電池的「巨額」補貼，導致相關中國產品在美國和世界市場「泛濫」，許多行業的競爭力被「削弱」。
同時，美國商務官員副部長拉戈（Marisa Lago）與中國商務部副部長王受文舉行副部長級會議，討論關稅和市場准入問題。美國擬利用關稅來保護其產業免受中國產品「傾銷」美國市場的影響，但雙方都試圖在談判桌上討價還價並與對方達成令人滿意的協議。
美國貿易代表戴琪在比利時出席會議期間同時提出了美國對中國「產能過剩」的擔憂，她在4月4日對歐盟代表表示，美國和歐盟應合作抵制中國的「產能過剩」和鋼鐵、鋁、太陽能板和電動車的「大量出口」。
防擦槍走火 中美兩軍恢復交流
除了中美之間的貿易關係緊張外，雙方也在夏威夷檀香山就軍事問題進行面對面對話。4月3至4日在夏威夷舉行的軍事對話具有重要的政治意義。美國印太司令部的弗朗西斯上校（Colonel Ian Francis）表示：「美國將繼續在國際法允許的任何地方在印太地區安全、專業地開展行動，我們認真對待這項責任。」他又說；「與中國人民解放軍和該地區所有其他軍事力量進行公開、直接和清晰的溝通對於避免事故和誤解至關重要。」近期，美方指責中方採取「具脅迫性和危險的行為」，因為美國軍機看到中國戰機在高速接近時「發射箔條和紅外干擾彈」。
客觀地說，中美雙方軍事對話可以最大限度地減少分歧，增進相互了解，有望減少發生不必要的空域事故的可能性。2022年8月美國眾議院前議長佩洛西對台灣進行挑釁性訪問後不久，中國暫停了與美國的軍事交流。在夏威夷恢復正式軍事對話可以被視為建立互信和加強溝通的重要一步。
美拉攏「島嶼防禦」 台海軍司令赴華盛頓
然而，從軍事上來說，中美軍事關係建立互信絕非易事；未來必將面臨諸多挑戰。中國外交部4月4日呼籲美軍「終止」與台灣方面的軍事交往、聯繫和「勾連」。據悉，台灣海軍司令唐華將於4月8至10日訪問美國，出席在華盛頓舉行的「海空暨太空研討會」，並可能會見美國海軍作戰部長弗朗切蒂上將（Admiral Lisa Franchetti）。
唐華在台灣4月和7月舉行「漢光演習」之前對美國進行訪問。一些台灣觀察家表示，台灣不會正式參與美國在太平洋的軍演，但可能會以觀察員身份參加。不過，此舉很可能會被中國大陸視為「挑釁」。
過去，一些台灣高級軍官曾造訪美國參加防務相關會議，例如2015年海軍司令李喜明和2023年國防部副部長徐衍璞訪美。
根據路透社報道，唐華的訪問是美國「聯合島嶼防禦概念」計劃的一部分，旨在與台灣、日本和其他地區協調，如何在所謂「第一島鏈」（一條連結日本、台灣、菲律賓和婆羅洲的戰略島鏈）內對抗解放軍。這個概念反映了美國針對中國在太平洋的軍事擴張和威脅採取軍事威懾的方式。
「新冷戰」悄然成型 印度邊境也增兵
或許大眾傳媒不應該誇大唐華的訪美，尤其是金門取消了原定4月2日的實施對海實彈射擊，以示善意姿態，避免在拜登與習近平通電話當天對中國大陸進行任何挑釁。
從軍事上來說，美國、日本和菲律賓正計劃加強在太平洋的聯合軍演，同時建設互聯網基建設施，以應對來自中國、俄羅斯和北韓的網絡攻擊──此舉似乎反映「新冷戰」在暗中蘊釀。儘管拜登方面在4月2日與習近平通電話表示，美國不尋求任何「新冷戰」。
此外，美國副國務卿坎貝爾（Kurt Campbell）4月3日在華盛頓表示，澳英美聯盟（AUKUS）已經制定了一項潛艇計劃，將能協助台灣「抵禦」中國大陸對台的任何行動。鑑於AUKUS作為三邊安全組織的本質，其目的是促進和平、安全及防禦國際秩序和體系所面臨的威脅，坎貝爾的言論具有政治和軍事意味。
最近，美國反對中國重新命名中印之間3000公里有爭議的喜馬拉雅邊境一帶的30個地點，即所謂的「實際控制線」。中國將印度所謂的「阿魯納恰爾邦」的一些地方（北京稱之為藏南地區和西藏自治區的一部分）視為中國領土──這一立場遭到印度方面的爭議。中國和印度邊防因此發生小規模軍事衝突──據報道導致20名印度軍人和4名中國軍人死亡──之後，印度和中國軍隊舉行了21輪會談。不過，最近印方似乎在中印邊境加強軍事力量和軍事基建，引起了未來突發軍事衝突的憂慮。如果美國突然在印度與中國的邊界爭議的問題上站在印度一邊，美中關係的改善和重新接觸將受到嚴重制約。
中美關係及美國盟友的一系列舉動或許表明，自1991年前蘇聯解體後，超級大國美國領導的單極世界日益遭到「中國威脅」的看法，對於許多國家及其領袖來說似乎是真實的。因此，中國的崛起，特別是經濟發展、貿易擴張和軍事現代化，確實對美國領導和主導的單極世界構成了挑戰。特朗普前政府發動的中美貿易戰「證明」了中國的經濟威脅。儘管拜登政府堅定地重新與中國接觸，但貿易戰仍在持續。從軍事上來說，中國被美國視為威脅，但重新接觸進程已經在夏威夷開始，雙方軍官已坐下來加強溝通和理解。
總體而言，習拜電話會談的內容主要是重申雙方眾所周知的立場，但為隨後其他官員就貿易和軍事事務的討論鋪平了道路。從某種意義上說，習拜電話外交不僅是雙方重新接觸的嘗試，也是雙方就貿易爭端和軍事相關問題進行深入討論的預熱。因此，即使建立信任需要兩國總統持續、定期的電話外交，相互對話和溝通也有望減少誤解。儘管如此，鑑於中美之間持續的軍事競爭和對抗，習拜會談的大環境仍充滿挑戰。美國如何處理與中國鄰居的關係，不僅包括有爭議的台灣問題及其未來，還包括美國與日本、北韓、菲律賓和印度的關係，增加了大環境的挑戰。限制中美關係進一步改善的條件仍然存在。不過，2023年11月的舊金山會議，確實在美中兩國漫長、艱難和不確定的友誼之路上建立不可或缺的信任方面，發揮了至關重要的作用。
Xi-Biden diplomacy of reengagement and repositioning amid Sino-US Tensions
The presidential diplomacy of reengaging the other side and repositioning their stance was a hallmark of Xi Jinping’s 2-hour phone discussions with Joe Biden on April 2 amid ongoing Sino-US tensions over economic, political, and military affairs. Such reengagement and repositioning remain the enduring characteristics of Sino-US relations since the San Francisco meeting in last November 2023.
Unlike the Donald Trump administration which engaged in a fierce ideological and trade war with China, the Joe Biden government has since January 2021 attempted to look for opportunities of reengaging the People’ Republic of China (PRC). The most recent telephone dialogue between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping took place at a politically significant period during which the upcoming US presidential election will be held seven months later. Furthermore, the “presidential” inauguration of the new Taiwan leader, William Lai Ching-te, will be held on May 20. While the PRC government will be expected to react to what Lai will say in his inaugural speech, the Biden administration made its position clear on the telephone dialogue with the Xi Jinping side on a whole range of issues.
According to news report, the US maintains its “one-China policy,” does not support “Taiwan independence,” does not seek “the new Cold War,” does not intend to change the Chinese system, does not seek to oppose China through the consolidation of its alliances, does not intend to have conflicts with China, does not seek to curb China’s development, and does not seek to decouple or delink with China – a posture with one certainty and seven “NOs.”
President Xi Jinping reiterated three positions from the Chinese side, namely seeing a peaceful stance as valuable, seeing stability as of utmost importance, and seeing trust as the foundation of Sino-US relations. In terms of peace, the Chinese side maintains the principle of no conflict, no confrontation as the bottom line, and persistence in elevating the Sino-US relations. Regarding stability, China adopts the position of not disrupting, not provoking, not stepping over the boundary of the other side, thereby maintaining the overall stable relations with the US. In terms of trust-building as the basis, China utilizes actions to realize its promises, turning the visions of the San Francisco into realities.
President Xi Jinping emphasized that the strategic understanding of China and the US is “the first button” that should be fixed by both sides – meaning that Beijing and Washington must avoid confrontation, must have mutual respect, must persist in the stable, healthy, and sustainable path rather than returning to the old road.
Clearly, both sides reiterated their previous stance in a more refreshing and emphatical manner, utilizing the San Francisco consensus as the basis to tackle issues of “low politics,” such as climate change, narcotics control and people-to-people exchange.
The Xi-Biden telephone talks went through the ideological differences of both sides, but indeed without any breakthrough. The Chinese side, as before, emphasized that the red line over Taiwan must not be crossed and that the US has heightened the risks of Sino-US relations by suppressing China’s economic, technological and trade development.
At the same time, the US side stressed the importance of stability and peace across the Taiwan Strait, emphasized the importance of the “freedom of navigation” in South China Sea, expressed its concern about the Chinese support of the Russian military-industrial complex, the “unfair trade policy and non-market economic practices” of China, and indicated that Washington would avoid a scenario in which the US technology would be utilized to “weaken the American national security.” The Biden administration reiterated its stance over the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, implying perhaps China would be expected to play an active role in reining in the militaristic behaviour of North Korea.
In response to the US concerns, the Chinese side reiterated in the telephone meeting and at the Foreign Ministry’s press briefing afterwards that China has its “indisputable sovereignty” over the related islands and nearby waters in the South China Sea, and that Washington should not intervene in the affairs between Beijing and Manila. China, according to Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin on April 3, is willing to exchange with the US over human rights issues, which however should not be used as an excuse to interfere with the Chinese internal affairs – a position referring to the US side’s concern about “human rights” condition in China and Hong Kong.
In a sense, all the issues discussed above were more about mutual posturing rather than a search for constructive solutions, but clearly the Biden government’s positioning aimed at paving the way for two talks to be followed soon – one on trade and the other on trust-building and dialogue over military issues.
Immediately after their dialogue on April 2, both sides have reengaged each other in two fronts – US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit to China and she met Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng on trade issues, and the meetings in Hawaii of the Sino-US Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group with the US side represented by officers from the Indo-Pacific Command, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Air Forces over issues like airspace and maritime operations.
As expected, Yellen has articulated the US concerns about China’s so-called “industrial overcapacity” with Chinese exports that affect the interests of the American workers and industries. Yellen complained about “unfair industrial practices” in China, telling He Lifeng that China’s state subsidies to its green energy, electric vehicles, and electric batteries were “excessive,” leading to a “flood” of the related Chinese products in the US and world markets where the competitiveness of many industries were “weakened.”
At the same time, the US commerce official Marisa Lago initiated a ministerial-level meeting with the Chinese commerce’s vice-minister Wang Shouwen to discuss tariffs and market access issues. The US is going to use tariffs to protect its industries over the “flood” of Chinese products in its market, but both sides attempt to bargain and extract a satisfactory deal with the other on the negotiating table.
The US concern about China’s “industrial overcapacity” was simultaneously raised by its trade representative Katherine Tai during her trip to Belgium where she told the EU representatives on April 4 that the US and EU should collaborate in resisting the Chinese “overproduction” and “exports” of steel, aluminium, solar panels, and electric vehicles.
Apart from the trade tensions between the US and China, both sides have been engaging each other through face-to-face dialogue over military issues in Honolulu, Hawaii. The military dialogue in Hawaii on April 3 and 4 was politically significant, as Colonel Ian Francis of the Indo-Pacific Command said the US “will continue to operate safely and professionally in the Indo-Pacific whatever international law allows, and we take this responsibility seriously.” He added that “open, direct, and clear communications” with the officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “is of utmost importance to avoid accidents and miscommunication.” Recently, the US has criticized the Chinese side for “coercive and risky operational behaviour” because the Chinese fighter jets were seen as “discharging chaff and shooting flares” when they approached the American fighter aircraft at high speed.
Objectively speaking, the military dialogue between both sides can minimize differences, enhance mutual understandings, and hopefully will reduce the possibility of unnecessary airspace accidents. China suspended military communications with the US shortly after the provocative visit by former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022. The resumption of formal military dialogue in Hawaii can be seen as an important step in mutual trust-building and their enhanced communications.
Still, militarily speaking, trust-building in Sino-US military relations is by no means an easy task, given the necessity of encountering numerous challenges ahead. The Chinese Foreign Ministry on April 4 appealed to the US military to “terminate” the military exchange, links, and “collusion” with the Taiwan side. It is reported that Taiwan’s naval chief Tang Hua will visit the US from April 8 to April 10 to attend a Sea-Air-Space conference at Washington, and that he will likely meet the US chief of naval operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti.
Tang’s visit to the US will take place before the Taiwan’s military exercise in April and July. Some Taiwan observers have indicated that Taiwan would not participate formally in the US military exercise in the Pacific, but it will likely join as an observer. Still, such a move would very likely be seen as “provocative” by the mainland Chinese side.
In the past, some senior Taiwanese military officers visited the US to attend defence-related conferences, such as the visit of navy chief Lee Hsi-ming in 2015 and deputy defence minister Hsu Yen-pu in 2023.
This time, according to Reuters, Tang Hua’s visit is expected to fall under the US Joint Island Defence Concept, which refers to the coordination between Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei to counter or resist the PLA within the so-called “first island chain” – a strategic chain of islands connecting Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo. The concept reflects the way in which the US has been adopting military deterrence against the perceived Chinese military expansion and threat in the Pacific Ocean.
Perhaps the Tang visit to the US should not be overstated by the mass media, especially as Kinmen on April 2 suspended a naval military exercise as a goodwill gesture of avoiding any provocation to the mainland Chinese side on the day when Biden engaged his telephone diplomacy with the Chinese president.
Militarily speaking, the US, Japan and the Philippines are planning to enhance their joint military exercises in the Pacific Ocean, while simultaneously building up their internet infrastructure to present any internet attack from China, Russia and North Korea – moves that appear to reflect a hidden new “Cold War” even though the Biden side said in the telephone dialogue with the Chinese side on April 2 that the US does not seek any “new Cold War.”
Furthermore, Kurt Campbell, the US Deputy Secretary of State, said on April 3 in Washington that the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) has a submarine blueprint that can and will help “curb” any moves by mainland China on Taiwan (Oriental Daily, April 5, 2024, p. A14). Given the nature of AUKUS as a trilateral security organization with the aim of promoting peace, security, and defence against perceived threats to the international order and system, Campbell’s remarks were politically and militarily significant.
Recently, the US opposed the moves by China to rename 30 places along the 3,000 km disputed Himalayan border between India and China, or the so-called “Line of Actual Control.” China sees some places in the Indian-administered Arunachal Pradesh state, which Beijing refers to as the Zangnan and part of the Tibet autonomous region, as Chinese territory – a position disputed by the Indian side. After a military skirmish between street-level soldiers from the Indian and Chinese side – an event leading to the deaths of reportedly 20 Indian and four Chinese military officers – the Indian and Chinese militaries held 21 rounds of talks. But recently, the Indian side has appeared to build up its military forces and infrastructure along the border with China, raising the anxieties and prospects of a sudden military conflict. If the US suddenly sides with India over the latter’s border dispute with China, there will be severe limitations in the improvement and reengagement of US-China relations.
All the ongoing moves made by China and the US, and the American allies, have perhaps demonstrated that, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the unipolar world led by the superpower US has increasingly encountered the perception of “the China threat,” which to many countries and their leaders appear to be a real one. As such, the rise of China, especially its economic development, trade expansion and military modernization, has really challenged the unipolar world led and dominated by the US. The trade war between China and the US under the former Donald Trump administration was a testimony to the perceived Chinese economic threat. Although the Joe Biden administration has reengaged China assertively, the trade war persists. Militarily speaking, China is seen as a perceived threat by the US, but the reengagement process has begun in Hawaii when military officers from both sides sat down to enhance their communication and understanding.
In conclusion, the content of the Xi-Biden telephone talks was mostly a reiteration of the well-known positions from both sides, but they paved the way for the ensuing discussions among other officials over trade and military affairs. In a sense, the Xi-Biden telephone diplomacy was not only an attempt at reengagement from both sides, but also a warm-up session leading to in-depth discussions over trade disputes and military-related issues. Hence, even if trust-building needs a persistent and regular telephone diplomacy involving the presidents of both countries, mutual dialogue and communication can and will hopefully minimize misunderstandings. Still, the context of the Xi-Biden talks is challenging, given the ongoing US-China military competition and rivalries. The contextual difficulties have been compounded by how the US deals with China’s neighbours, including not only the contentious issue and future of Taiwan but also their relations with Japan, North Korea, the Philippines, and India. Limitations to a more cordial Sino-US relationship persist, but the San Francisco meeting in November 2023 did play a crucial role in building up an indispensable element of trust between the US and China in their very long, difficult and uncertain path of friendship ahead.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
