2023年6月17日，全國政協主席王滬寧在廈門第15屆海峽論壇上就即將設立「兩岸融合發展示範區」的講話指出， 中國大陸提出新計劃，計劃在未來幾年以福建省為平台，加速與台灣在社會、文化和經濟方面更緊密的融合。
雖然該計劃的細節將在稍後公布，但從近年來福建與台灣一體化嘗試的快速發展中，可以看出一體化計劃的範圍，這意味着，如果大陸加速統一台灣的計劃，或者大陸向台灣推廣一國兩制的台灣模式，社會文化和經濟一體化很可能是雙方分階段進行談判的第一步。
中共欲加速融合 促統一台灣計劃
6月17日，王滬寧提到了一些值得我們關注的重點。他首先表示，大陸秉持「兩岸一家親」理念，始終尊重、關愛、造福台灣同胞。
其次，他表示將建設兩岸融合發展示範區，讓台灣民眾和企業在大陸開展業務時享受同等優惠待遇。
第三，王滬寧指出，福建作為「台胞台企登陸的第一家園效應，將更加顯現」。
第四，王滬寧強調習近平總書記高度重視海峽論壇，並向與會者發來賀信。他說，習近平強調「國家好，民族好，兩岸同胞才會好」。為此，習近平希望繼續深化兩岸經濟文化交流合作，造福兩岸同胞。
第五，王滬寧闡述了兩岸關係發展根基在民間、動力在人民，交流合作成果惠及兩岸同胞。大陸方面願為增進相互了解作出更多努力，增進兩岸同胞的福祉。
第六，王滬寧表示，兩岸關係和平發展是維護台海和平穩定、促進共同發展、造福兩岸同胞、通向民族復興的正確道路。台獨理念同台海和平水火不容。堅持「九二共識」、反對台獨，兩岸關係才能回到「和平發展的正確軌道」。
陸委會勸拿善意 勿對台軍事威嚇
台灣陸委會立即回應王滬寧的言論，表示大陸「與其每年都耗費大量地方人力經費舉辦徒具形式、台灣民眾也並不感興趣的統戰活動，不如拿出真正的善意，停止日復一日對台的軍事威嚇，並盡早解除對兩岸交流之政治障礙與限制，全面開放陸生來台就學、陸客來台觀光，讓中國大陸民眾能夠體會台灣社會民主自由多元的生活方式」。
雖然陸委會的迅速反應是可以理解的，但王滬寧的言論，標誌着中國大陸在經濟、社會和文化上與台灣融合的階段性新政策。
事實上，2023年1月11日，福建省省長趙龍在作《政府工作報告》時表示，福建將加快推進兩岸融合發展示範區建設進程。趙龍補充說，2022年福建對台出口增長20%，台資企業和資本投資福建大幅增長，其中包括石化合作項目。
此外，福建還將推動閩台電子信息、石油化工、精密機械、生物科技、現代服務業、現代農業、台灣農民創業園等合作，推進閩台優勢企業產業鏈供應鏈價值鏈融合；支持在閩優質台企在大陸上市，加快區域性股權市場「台資板」建設。此外，福建加快打造兩岸能源資源中轉平台和對台功能性經貿平台，特別是在福州、平潭等地建設跨境電商集散樞紐和兩岸「共同市場」。
此外，福建與金門、馬祖之間的「小三通」將加快推進，包括加快恢復海路、供電、供水、供氣，以及建設橋樑，打造廈門至金門、福州至馬祖之間的「共同市場」。
福建的這些政策可以追溯到2020年12月，當時福建省委批准了與台灣更緊密融合的建議。 時任福建省委台港澳工作辦公室主任王玲表示，福建在「十四五」（2021年至2025年）期間將加快與台灣的融合。具體來說，鼓勵台灣企業參與5G通訊、數字經濟、人工智能、生物科技、醫療保健和綠色能源等相關建設項目。此外，還將建設集成電路產業合作試驗區、石化產業合作區和精密機械製造產業園。
然而，新冠病毒及其變種的持續存在，將合作項目從2020年推遲到2023年上半年。現在，隨着新冠疫情結束，福建原定與台灣融合發展的計劃預料將加速。
利用基建設施 作為融合工具
新的兩岸融合發展示範區的設立，對大陸與台灣的關係具有重要的經濟和政治影響。
首先，福建將採用加速基礎設施發展的模式，通過擬在未來數年建設跨海大橋，甚至是大陸工程師所提到的地下隧道，連接台灣特別是金門和馬祖。
如果說香港、澳門加速與廣東省的社會經濟深度融合，是通過港澳珠海大橋等快速基礎設施項目來實現的，那麼，未來幾年福建與台灣的融合也可以如此。
利用基礎設施項目作為融合工具的具體好處是它是非政治性的；能夠使兩岸關係去政治化，並向台灣民眾表明，在加速融合的過程中，實用主義和經濟利益佔主導地位。
其次，如果大陸要與台灣方面討論融合問題，特別是在2024年1月台灣選出新總統之後，我們可以預見一個更務實的場景，即兩岸或許坐下來談判更困難的政治統一問題前，社會文化和經濟融合將先行。
大陸要實現與台灣的和平「統一」，兩岸分階段談判將是最務實的出路。無論誰將成為台灣總統，這種分階段的過程很可能在未來幾年內出現。
第三，如果大陸領導人一直強調「一國兩制」台灣模式的重要性，我們可以預見，台灣現有的生活方式、經濟繁榮以及政治制度將保持不變。台灣甚至可保留自己的軍隊，正如一些大陸領導人所強調的那樣，例如已故葉劍英元帥在1981年9月提出的9點建議。但這個「台灣模式」將包含非常強大的基建設施項目和建設元素，一方面以福建廈門和台灣金門之間的基礎設施項目和建設為重點，另一方面以福建福州和台灣馬祖為重點試點。
第四，閩台融合模式將與港深（特別是前海）、澳珠（特別是橫琴）融合呈現出相似之處。 通過北部都會區的發展及新界與前海之間的聯繫（可能通過橋樑或地下隧道）加速連接，香港與深圳的融合將加也快──這一發展將在未來幾年內顯現。同樣，未來幾年，隨着更多澳門居民、資本和企業進入新區，澳門─橫琴合作區也將加速建設。閩台基礎設施合作和人員交流將齊頭並進。
第五，2024年1月後的台灣新總統將愈來愈面臨與大陸在社會文化和經濟領域務實融合的壓力。如何解決融合這一突出問題，對兩岸和平發展至關重要。從2024年1月起，台灣新總統將面臨更多的政治壓力，無論這種壓力來自大陸，還是來自台灣島內及其多元但碎片化的政治勢力。
「一國兩制」台灣模式正明顯形成
如上所述，宣布設立兩岸融合發展示範區，是大陸與台灣關係，特別是福建與金馬兩島關係的重要分水嶺。「一國兩制」的台灣模式正在明顯形成，最重要的相似之處是利用基礎設施項目和建設作為更緊密的經濟和社會文化融合的先導，隨後可能就「統一」進行另一階段的政治對話。即使政治上「統一」的談判可能遭遇各種障礙，但在台灣，無論是內部還是外部，經濟和社會文化的實用主義不僅會佔上風，而且會更快地推動閩台融合。因此，兩岸融合發展示範區標誌着大陸當局制定了一項具有政治意義的新計劃，旨在以明智、巧妙且可能富有成效的方式，在未來幾年處理與台灣的社會文化和經濟融合問題。
Fujian’s socio-cultural and economic integration plan with Taiwan and its political significance
The remarks by Wang Huning, the chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, on the forthcoming establishment of a “Cross-Strait Integration and Demonstration Zone” during the 15th Cross-Strait Forum in Xiamen on June 17, 2023, were pointing to a new plan from mainland China on the usage of Fujian province as a platform to accelerate closer social, cultural and economic integration with Taiwan in the coming years.
Although the details of this plan will be published later, the parameters of the integration plan can be seen in the rapid development of Fujian’s attempt at integration with Taiwan in the recent years, implying that, if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is going to accelerate its plan of “reunifying” Taiwan, or if mainland China is promoting the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” to Taiwan, socio-cultural and economic integration will very likely be the first step of a stage-by-stage negotiation between the two sides.
On June 17, Wang Huning mentioned some points that deserve our attention. First, he said that people of the two Straits should treat themselves as members of a single family with the ideal of improving the developmental opportunities of the Taiwan people and Taiwan enterprises.
Second, he commented that the Cross-Strait Integration and Demonstration Zone would be established so that the people and enterprises of Taiwan would enjoy the same preferential treatment to conduct their businesses in the mainland.
Third, Wang added that Fujian would be the first garden for the Taiwan comrades and enterprises for the sake of “achieving mutual prosperity, fighting against Taiwan independence, and resisting the deviated path of confrontations.”
Fourth, he stressed that President Xi Jinping attached high importance to the Cross-Strait Forum and that the President wrote a congratulatory letter to the participants. President Xi, according to Wang, was emphasizing that “if the country is good, the nationalities are good, and the comrades of the two Straits are also good.” As such, President Xi hopes that the two Straits should deepen economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation with a view to promoting the well-being of the mainlanders and Taiwan people.
Fifth, Wang elaborated on the necessity of more cooperation at the civilian level, which builds up the foundation of cross-strait relations. To enhance mutual understanding, the PRC would make more efforts and promote the welfare of people from the two sides.
Sixth, Wang said that the peaceful development of the two Straits is the “correct path” of maintaining the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, promoting mutual well-being, and going through the process of “the renaissance of the Chinese nation.” The idea of “Taiwan independence” is “incompatible with peace across the two Straits.” Maintaining the 1992 consensus is also necessary so that the two sides would return to the “correct path of peaceful development.”
The Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) reacted immediately to Wang’s remarks by saying that the PRC side spends a lot of money to organize such forum annually, but the mainland side should “show its sincerity to stop military threats, to relax the political hindrance and limits to cross-strait exchanges, to allow completely the mainland students to study in Taiwan, to permit mainlanders to visit Taiwan as tourists, and to let the mainland people to experience democracy, freedom and pluralistic life-style for the sake of promoting mutual understanding and positive interactions.”
While the immediate responses from the MAC were understandable, the remarks made by Wang Huning signaled a new phase of mainland China’s policy of integrating with Taiwan economically, socially and culturally.
In fact, on January 11, 2023, the Fujian provincial governor Zhao Long delivered a work report of his government, saying that Fujian would accelerate the process of building up the Cross-Strait Integration and Developmental Demonstration Zone. Zhao added that in 2022 Fujian’s exports to Taiwan increased by 20 percent, while the number of Taiwan enterprises and capital investment in Fujian grew tremendously, including the petrochemical project of cooperation.
Furthermore, Fujian is going to promote Fujian-Taiwan electronic information, petrochemical industry, mechanical industry, biochemical technology, service industry, agricultural cooperation, and a special innovative garden for Taiwan farmers and businesspeople. Fujian will welcome and embrace Taiwan enterprises to participate in the mainland’s logistic and supply chain management and integrative process. Taiwan’s enterprises are welcome to be listed in the mainland’s securities and stock markets. Moreover, the energy sectors from both sides will have their resource transfer platform in Fujian, especially in the areas of Fuzhou and Pingtan where e-commerce and a common market will be fostered.
Moreover, the three little links between Fujian and Taiwan’s Kinmen and Mazu will be accelerated, including the acceleration of resumption of naval routes, and the supply of electricity, water and gas, as well as the possibility of bridge construction to create “a common market” between Xiamen and Kinmen and between Fuzhou and Mazu.
These Fujian policies could be traced back to December 2020, when the Fujian provincial committee approved proposals for integrating with Taiwan more closely. According to Wang Ling, the director of Fujian Province’s Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office at that time, Fujian during its 14th five-year plan from 2021 to 2025 would accelerate its integration with Taiwan. Specifically, Taiwan’s companies would be encouraged to participate in construction projects, including those related to 5G, the digital economy, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, health care and green energy. Furthermore, a circuit industry cooperative pilot zone would be established, while petrochemical industry’s cooperation and a precision machinery manufacturing industrial park would be built.
However, the persistence of Covid-19 and its variants delayed the projects of cooperation from 2020 to the early half of 2023. Now, with the end of Covid-19, Fujian’s original plan of integrating closely with Taiwan can and will be accelerated.
The revelation of the new Cross-Strait Integration and Demonstration Zone has important economic and political implications for the mainland’s relations with Taiwan.
First, Fujian is going to adopt the model of accelerated infrastructure development to integrate with Taiwan, especially Kinmen and Mazu, through the proposed construction of a bridge, or even an underground tunnel as planned and mentioned by mainland engineers, in the coming years.
If Hong Kong and Macau’s deeper socio-economic integration with Guangdong province has been conducted and accelerated by rapid infrastructural projects, such as the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai Bridge, the same can be said of Fujian’s closer integration with Taiwan in the years to come.
The concrete benefit of utilizing infrastructure projects as integration tool is that it is non-political. Moreover, it can and will depoliticize cross-strait relations and demonstrate to the people of Taiwan that pragmatism and economic benefits prevail in the process of accelerated integration.
Second, if the mainland is going to discuss with the Taiwan side on integration, especially after a new president will be elected in Taiwan in January 2024, we can anticipate a more pragmatic scenario that socio-cultural and economic integration will proceed first before both sides will perhaps sit down to talk about the more difficult issue of political reunification.
A stage-by-stage process of negotiations between the two sides will be the most pragmatic way forward if the mainland is to achieve a peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan. This stage-by-stage process will very likely be seen in the coming years, regardless of who will be the leader of Taiwan.
Third, if the mainland leaders have been emphasizing the importance of the “Taiwan model” of “one country, two systems,” we can anticipate that the existing lifestyle and economic prosperity as well as the political system of Taiwan will remain unchanged. Taiwan will even have its own military, as some PRC leaders, like the late Marshall Ye Jianying’s nine-point proposal in September 1981, have emphasized. But this “Taiwan model” will entail an extraordinarily strong element of infrastructure projects and construction between Fujian’s Xiamen and Taiwan’s Kinmen on the one hand and Fujian’s Fuzhou and Taiwan’s Mazu as key pilot points.
Fourth, the integration model between Fujian and Taiwan is going to show similarities with the Hong Kong-Shenzhen (especially Qianhai) and Macau-Zhuhai (especially Hengqin) integration. The Hong Kong-Shenzhen integration is going to be accelerated through the development of the Northern Metropolis and the accelerated linkages between the New Territories and Qianhai perhaps through a bridge or an underground tunnel – a development that will be revealed in the coming years. Similarly, the Macau-Hengqin Cooperation Zone is going to be accelerated with the movement of more Macau people, capital and businesses into the new zone in the coming years. A parallel process of accelerated infrastructure cooperation and human interactions between Fujian and Taiwan is going to be seen.
Fifth, the new political leaders of Taiwan after January 2024 will be increasingly under this new pressure of pragmatic integration in socio-cultural and economic spheres with the mainland. It will be critical to the peaceful development of the two Straits on how they will tackle this prominent issue of integration. More political pressure will be exerted on the new political leaders in Taiwan from January 2024 onwards, no matter whether such pressure will be from the mainland or from the island of Taiwan and its diversified but fragmented political forces.
In conclusion, the announcement of the forthcoming establishment of the Cross-Strait Integration and Demonstration Zone is an important watershed in the relations between mainland China and Taiwan, especially between Fujian and the two islands of Kinmen and Mazu. The Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” is clearly taking shape, with the most important similarity of utilizing infrastructure projects and construction as the precursors of closer economic and socio-cultural integration, followed by another stage of a political dialogue over possible “reunification.” Even if the talks on political “reunification” will likely encounter various obstacles, in Taiwan both internally and perhaps externally, economic and socio-cultural pragmatism will not only prevail but will also propel Fujian-Taiwan integration in a much faster manner. As such, the Cross-Strait Integration and Demonstration Zone is signaling a politically significant new plan formulated by the mainland authorities to deal with the socio-cultural and economic integration with Taiwan in an intelligent, skillful and potentially fruitful way in the coming years.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-fujians-socio-cultural-and-economic-integration-plan-with-taiwan-and-its-political-significance/
