由於內幕政治的性質，政治觀察家預測中國繼任的領導層往往是一項令人頭痛的任務。然而，即將召開的中共二十大很可能會見到年輕一代的中國領導人，他們有機會成為中國共產黨政治局常委的7名成員。
「七上八下」年齡劃線非絕對
經常被人們引用的「七上八下」（67歲可以續任，68歲便要離任）的年齡劃線規範，絕不是中共十九大嚴格遵守的原則，2013年3月，時任中央政治局委員、67歲的李源潮沒有出現在中央委員的名單上，獲選為國家副主席；另一個很好的例子是王岐山，他在2012年11月成為政治局常委，時年64歲，唯於2017年10月卸任政治局常委、中央紀委書記。 2018年3月接替李源潮，當選國家副主席。
最重要的是，新華社在2017年10月的十九大閉幕時報道稱：「符合年齡的也不一定當然繼續提名，主要根據人選政治表現、廉潔情況和事業需要，能留能轉、能上能下。」如果年齡劃線可以隨時間而改變，那麼中國的領導層接班也不會例外。
一些外部觀察人士並未注意到新華社2017年的說法，他們對即將召開的中共二十大的領導層繼任作出許多且經常互相矛盾的揣測。
習近平仍是核心領導人
上述新的年齡劃線的實踐解釋了為什麼很多新聞報道已經暗示，習近平主席肯定會繼續擔任國家主席、中共總書記和中央軍委主席3個關鍵職務。這種黨、政、軍「三位一體」的領導地位，對於中國大陸的政治穩定和維持強力的領導，無疑是至關重要的。
外界廣泛報道，李克強總理已經連任兩屆，他很可能會辭去國務院總理職務。事實上，李克強在2022年3月曾公開表示，這將是他的最後一屆任期。
另一位極有可能退下的領導人是現年73歲的王岐山。李克強能否接替王岐山出任國家副主席，還有待觀察。如果李克強當上副主席，就意味着習近平主席和他的支持者對李克強總理所做的工作評價很高。
高齡政治局常委去留費思量
目前，政治局7名常委平均年齡為68歲──雖然他們都非常有經驗，但年齡稍大一些。他們是69歲的習近平、67歲的李克強、67歲的汪洋（全國政協主席）、68歲的韓正（國務院副總理）、72歲栗戰書（全國人大常委會委員長）、67歲王滬寧（中共書記處書記）、65歲趙樂際（中紀委書記）。考慮到政治局常委高齡的現實，會出現兩種情況：（1）一個漸進的過程，保留較年輕的趙樂際和經驗較豐富的汪洋和王滬寧，而讓李克強、韓正和栗戰書退下。（政治局出現3個空缺）；（2）更激烈的改革，也許只保留王滬寧或趙樂際，但政治局至少加入5名新成員，以便習近平主席領導下的中國順利進行領導層接班。
如果出現第一種情況，那麼在國務院工作經驗豐富、在重慶和廣東都擔任過黨委書記的汪洋，可能會接替李克強出任下一任國務院總理。不過，鑑於汪洋已經67歲，他的國務院總理職位或許是短暫的，可能只有5年的時間──如果他被選中接替李克強擔任國務院總理，政策延續性將是一個問題。而且，將全國政協主席調任國務院總理職務，未免有些不合常規。
王滬寧作為中國的意識形態建築師，如果繼續在留在政治局，很可能會被提升為國務院副副總理或全國人大委員長。在中國反腐倡廉中發揮關鍵作用的趙樂際，也有可能被提名為全國人大委員長或國務院副總理，這取決於最高層領導人如何安排自已在新的政治格局中的分工。
胡春華丁薛祥加入政治局呼聲高
然而，出於兩個原因，第二種情況更有可能發生。更大刀闊斧的改革將培養新的和更年輕的領導人接替習近平和李克強等一代領導人。習近平像江澤民等前任國家主席一樣，至少在未來5年內，無疑將成為黨的核心領導者，領導黨和監督年輕領導人。
因此，第二種情況可能會看到更多的年輕新血加入政治局。他們是59歲的胡春華（國務院副總理）、60歲的丁薛祥（中共中央辦公廳主任）、62歲的陳敏爾（重慶市委書記）、63歲的李強（上海市委書記）、65歲的黃坤明（中宣部部長）。
胡春華接替李克強成為國務院總理的可能性很大，一方面是因為他年紀較輕，另一方面是因為他在河北、內蒙古和廣東的豐富資歷。此外，胡春華從共青團中脫穎而出，這是一種分享李克強經驗的事業模式。如果李克強辭去國務院總理職務，他可能會推薦胡春華來接替他的高位。
多年來，丁薛祥一直擔任習近平主席的重要政治助手。2007年，45歲的丁薛祥是上海市委書記習近平的政治秘書。2017年10月，丁薛祥成為中央政治局委員、中央書記處書記，擔任國家主席、中共總書記習近平的重要幕僚。最近幾個月，丁薛祥的名字經常出現在內地傳媒。現在，種種跡象表明，他將成為政治局的重要成員，有可能接替趙樂際擔任中紀委書記。丁薛祥的政治前途一片光明。
另外3位冉冉升起的新星是陳敏爾、李強和黃坤明。中共十九大前，陳敏爾和李強經常為媒體報道，但最終都沒有進入政治局。但是，如果中共領導層熱衷於在未來5年內培養年輕的領導人，那麼兩人都有望成為具有光明前景的新成員。
另外，黃坤明作為中共的主要宣傳官員，也將有很好的機會被選拔晉升為中共中央政治局常委，尤其是思想建築師王滬寧今年已經67歲了。
還有其他候選人，目前是政治局委員，有機會被提拔為政治局常委。他們是廣東省委書記李希和天津市委書記李鴻忠。然而，兩人都已66歲，似乎都不是角逐政治局常委的熱門競爭者。
李克強政治影響力或持續存在
無論李克強被安排擔任國家副主席還是全國人大委員長，他的政治影響力都可能持續存在。
綜上所述，雖然從近期高層政治實踐來看，中國的領導層接班存在不確定性，但我們仍然可以預測政治局常委人事變動的兩種情景。第一種情況將是最小的變化，而第二種情況需要向高層注入更多的新血。第二種情況似乎更有可能，主要是因為正如內地傳媒體廣泛報道的那樣，習近平主席無疑將繼續成為核心領導人，引導中國進入下一階段的社會、經濟和政治發展。如果這個分析是準確的，那麼胡春華和丁薛祥很可能是未來幾年中國下一代較年輕且具有重要政治意義的領導人。
Predicting Leadership Succession in China
It is often a perplexing task for political observers to predict leadership succession in China because of the nature of inside politics; nevertheless, the forthcoming 20th Party Congress would likely witness a younger generation of Chinese leaders who would go up to be the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
The often-quoted political practice, namely “seven up and eight down” (those who reach 67 may continue, and those who reach 68 may step down), was by no means a principle strictly observed in the 19th Party Congress during which 67-year-old Li Yuanchao, who was a Politburo member and became China’s Vice President in March 2013, stepped down from the Central Committee. Another good example was Wang Qishan, who joined PSC as a member in November 2012 at the age of sixty-four, but who stepped down from the PSC and secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee in October 2017. Wang was highly respected and was then elected in March 2018 to succeed Li Yuanchao as the Vice President.
Most importantly, Xinhua news agency reported at the end of the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 that “those who conform to the age requirement are not necessarily nominated continuously – a situation mainly depending on the candidates’ political performance, clean governance and the needs of the career positions on whether they should stay or step down.” If political practice can change over time, this is no exception in China’s leadership succession.
The Xinhua assertion in 2017 has not been noted by some outside observers, who have made many and often conflicting predictions on the leadership succession in the forthcoming Party Congress.
The new political practice mentioned above explains why many news reports have already suggested that President Xi Jinping would certinly continue to hold three key positions – the President, the CPC General Secretary, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. This “trinity” of the leading position in the state, Party and military is undoubtedly crucial to the political stability and strong leadership of mainland China.
It has been widely reported that Premier Li Keqiang would highly likely step down from the Premier position because he has already served two terms. In fact, Li in March 2022 openly said that this would be the last term of his office.
Another Chinese leader who would highly likely step down is Wang Qishan who is now seventy-three. It remains to be seen whether Li Keqiang may take over from Wang as the new Vice President. If Li would become the Vice President, it would mean that President Xi and his protégé highly respect the work done by Premier Li.
Currently, the seven members of the PSC have an average age of 68 – a bit older although they are all very experienced. They are 69-year-old Xi Jinping, 67-year-old Li Keqiang, 67-year-old Wang Yang (Chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee, or CPPCC), 68-year-old Han Zheng (State Council’s Vice Premier in general affairs), 72-year-old Li Zhanshu (Chair of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, or SCNPC), 67-year-old Wang Huning (Secretary of the CPC Secretariat), and 65-year-old Zhao Leji (Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee, or CDIC). Given the elderly nature of the PSC composition, two scenarios would occur: (1) a gradually arranged process of retaining the younger Zhao Leji and the more experienced Wang Yang and Wang Huning, but letting Li Keqiang, Han Zheng and Li Zhanshu to step down (three new positions in PSC); and (2) a more drastic revamp retaining perhaps only Wang Huning or Zhao Leji but injecting at least five new members into the PSC so that a smooth leadership succession would take place in China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping.
If the first scenario would take place, then Wang Yang, who had rich experiences in the State Council, and who had governing experiences as a party secretary in both Chongqing and Guangdong, may take over from Li Keqiang as the next Premier. However, given that Wang is already 67 years old, his possible premiership would likely be a short-term one lasting for only five years – continuity would be an issue if he were selected to take over from Li Keqiang as the premier. Moreover, it would be a bit unconventional for a chairperson of the CPPCC to be transferred to the position of premier.
Wang Huning as an ideological architect in China would likely be promoted to Vice Premier or perhaps the Chair of the SCNPC if he continues in the PSC. Zhao Leji, who has been playing a key role in China’s anti-corruption drive eliminating the unclean leading cadres and officials, would also likely be nominated for the position of the Chair of the SCNPC or the State Council’s Vice Premier, depending on how the top leaders arrange their own division of labor in a new political set-up.
The second scenario, however, is more likely for two reasons. A more drastic revamp would groom the new and younger leaders to succeed the generation of such leaders as Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. President Xi, as with the previous presidents such as Jiang Zemin, will undoubtedly be the core leader of the CPC guiding the Party and overseeing its younger leaders at least in the next five years.
As such, the second scenario may witness more young blood participating in the PSC. They are 59-year-old Hu Chunhua (State Council’s Vice Premier), 60-year-old Ding Xuexiang (Director of the CPC General Office), 62-year-old Chen Min’er (party secretary of Chongqing), 63-year-old Li Qiang (party secretary of Shanghai city), and 65-year-old Huang Kunming (head of the publicity department of the CPC).
Hu would have a strong possibility of becoming the premier succeeding Li Keqiang, partly because of his younger age and mainly because of his rich governing experiences in Hebei, Inner Mongolia and Guangdong. Moreover, Hu rose up from the Communist Youth League (CYL) – a career pattern sharing the experiences of Li Keqiang. If Li Keqiang steps down from the premier position, it is possible that he might have recommended Hu to succeed his eminent position.
Ding Xuexiang has been serving as a significant political aide to President Xi Jinping for a number of years. In 2007, the 45-year-old Ding was a political secretary of Shanghai city’s party secretary Xi Jinping. In October 2017, Ding became a Politburo member and the secretary of the Central Secretariat, a prominent position assisting the President and CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping. In the recent months, Ding’s name has often appeared in the mainland media. All signs are now pointing to his rise to the PSC as an important member, with the possibility of taking over from Zhao Leji as the secretary of the CDIC. Ding’s political future is bright.
Another three rising stars are Chen Min’er, Li Qiang and Huang Kuming. Chen Min’er and Li Qiang were often reported in the media before the 19th Party Congress, but they were eventually not coopted into the PSC. However, if the CPC leadership is keen to groom younger leaders in the coming five years, both are tipped to join the PSC as new members with bright prospects.
Finally, Huang Kunming as the leading publicity official of the CPC would also have a good chance to be coopted and promoted to be a member of the PSC, especially as the ideological architect Wang Huning is now 67 years old.
There are other candidates, who are currently Politburo members, having the chance to be “promoted” to the PSC. They are Li Xi, party secretary of Guangdong, and Li Hongzhong, party secretary of Tianjin. Yet, both are 66 years old and do not appear to be the hot contenders going into PSC.
No matter whether Li Keqiang would be arranged to be the Vice President or the Chair of the SCNPC, it is likely that his political influence would persist.
In conclusion, although China’s leadership succession is marked by uncertainties from the perspective of recent political practices at the top, we can still predict two scenarios for the personnel changes in the membership of the Politburo Standing Committee. The first scenario would be minimal changes, while the second one would entail the injection of more young blood into the top echelon. The second scenario appears to be more likely, mainly because President Xi Jinping would undoubtedly be the core leader, as reported widely in the mainland media, guiding China into the next phase of social, economic and political development. If this analysis is accurate, then Hu Chunhua and Ding Xuexiang would very likely be the next generation of young and politically important Chinese leaders in the years to come.
