在台灣，趙少康2月突然宣布重返國民黨，這不僅對國民黨內部的派系政治和重組產生重大影響，而且對當前至2024年中華民國總統選舉這段過渡時期，北京與台北的互動和方向也有重大影響。
趙少康在1980年代是國民黨的著名政治人物，屬於國民黨的「非主流派」，這一派相對已故總統李登輝領導的「主流派」。 趙少康後來退出國民黨，1993年8月成為「新黨」的創始人之一。1994年，趙少康挑戰台北市長職位，輸給了民進黨的陳水扁。自從1996年從政壇「退休」以來，趙少康通過廣播電視節目，例如TVBS和中國廣播公司，成為了非常成功的媒體評論員。
韓國瑜勸進參選國黨主席
趙少康透露，前高雄市長、曾經參選總統但敗選的韓國瑜遊說他應該重新加入國民黨。 韓國瑜在2018年以53.8％的選票當選高雄市長時，非常受歡迎，但他在2020年總統選舉中被民進黨的蔡英文擊敗（韓38.6％，蔡57％）。 不幸的是，韓的當選機會因2019年在香港舉行的反修例示威受到破壞，這場政治風波為民進黨激進派抹黑他，從而擊敗國民黨提供了千載難逢的機會。更糟糕的是，韓本人後來在2020年4月的罷免公投中被罷免高雄市長的職位。
據報道，韓國瑜擔心，如果他稍後競選國民黨黨主席會使黨分裂。 結果，他說服了趙少康重返國民黨，並考慮競選黨主席一職。
不過，國民黨黨章規定，參選黨主席的人必須擔任過中央委員或中央評議委員，並且必須有一年的黨齡。 即使趙少康重新加入了國民黨，國民黨中常會如何解釋這一年黨齡仍有待觀察。
2月5日，趙少康和國民黨主席江啟臣一同出席記者會，在國民黨支持的2月6日罷免民進黨高雄市議員黃捷的公投中表明了他們的政治團結。台灣掀起一波報復政治浪潮，首先是國民黨在1月中旬成功罷免桃園市議員王浩宇，其次是企圖罷免黃捷。
趙重新入黨，可否達到黨內和諧？
然而，必須指出的是，趙少康的「深藍」色彩在國民黨內存在代溝，他主張承認大陸與台灣在1992年達成的「九二共識」。「淺藍」則以江啟臣為代表，江啟臣的支持者更傾向支持台灣的本土利益。 江啟臣今年48歲，而趙少康則已70歲，這一代人之間的差距說明了國民黨內潛在的矛盾。雖然國民黨始終堅持「九二共識」，但黨內不斷崛起的少壯派則主張採取與大陸打交道時更強調台灣的立場。因此，趙少康重返國民黨，將對台灣政治有多方面的重要影響。
首先，趙少康作為「深藍」陣營的資深成員，或許不至於導致國民黨內的派系鬥爭，而是通過「深藍」和「淺藍」之間更緊密的合作，成為國民黨復興的黃金機會。最近，民意調查顯示國民黨已重新獲得認同，例如台中市長盧秀燕和桃園市長侯友宜。盧秀燕和侯友宜最近均被台灣傳媒形容為國民黨參加2024年總統大選的大熱門。
目前，判斷國民黨參與2024年總統大選的人選為時尚早，但趙少康重返國民黨，不僅對國民黨的派系政治，而且對北京與台北的關係都具有重大意義。從黨派政治而言，趙少康的回巢，可能帶來一個絕佳的機會，可以加強國民黨各派的團結，改善2022年縣市選舉的表現，並為2024年的總統選舉鋪平道路。但是，趙少康的重返國民黨，也會引來很大的疑問，即北京應如何為台灣未來的政治度身訂造「一國兩制」的台灣模式？如果國民黨處於領導層危機中，那麼趙少康的回歸可以將這種危機變成機會。但是，如果真的要讓「一國兩制」的台灣模式對台灣人具有吸引力，無論大陸是否願意，這種機會都必須伴隨着大陸方面的適應和戰略調整，不管國民黨在具有里程碑意義的2024年總統大選是否重奪總統寶座。
The return of Jaw Shaw-kong to KMT: Implications for Beijing-Taipei relations
The sudden return of Jaw Shaw-kong, to the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan in February 2021 has significant implications for not only the factional politics and realignment within the KMT but also Beijing-Taipei interactions and directions in current transition leading to the presidential elections in the Republic of China (ROC) in 2024.
Jaw Shaw-kong was a famous KMT politician in the 1980s, directly elected to the Legislative Yuan and becoming an environmental protection official. He belonged to a “non-mainstream” faction of the KMT, opposing the “mainstream” faction led by the late President Lee Teng-hui. Jaw withdrew from the KMT and was one of the founders of the pro-reunification New Party in August 1993. In 1994, Jaw contested the Taipei mayoral position and lost to Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Since his “retirement” from politics in 1996, Jaw has become a very successful media commentator through radio and television programs, such as TVBS and the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC).
Jaw revealed that Han Kuo-yu, the former mayor of Kaohsiung and former presidential candidate, lobbied him that he should re-join the KMT. Han was a highly popular major of Kaohsiung directly elected in 2018 with 53.8 percent of the vote, but he was defeated in the 2020 presidential election by DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen (Han 38.6 percent and Tsai 57 percent). Han’s chance of being elected was unfortunately undermined by the 2019 anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong, where political developments provided a golden opportunity for the DPP radicals to discredit him and defeat the KMT. Even worse, Han himself was later ousted from the position of Kaohsiung mayor in April 2020 during a recall vote.
Han was reportedly expressing his concern that if he runs for the party chairman position later in the KMT, such a move would split the party. As a result, he persuaded Jaw, a member of the pro-reunification faction, to return to the KMT and consider running for the position of party chairman.
However, the KMT party regulations state that, in order for a member to run for the position of the party chair, he or she needs to be a member of either the Central Committee or the Central Assessment Committee, and that one-year party membership is a precondition for participation in the election of party chair. Even though Jaw re-joins the KMT, it remains to be seen how the KMT Standing Committee would interpret the one-year membership strictly or loosely.
Amid all the political rumours and speculations, Jaw said graciously that while he fully respects KMT party chairman, Johnny Chiang Chi-chen, he himself has not yet decided whether he would run for the party chair election, and that he would follow all the rules and procedures. Clearly, Jaw wants to keep the media and his critics, especially those from the DPP’s radical faction, guessing his intentions, while simultaneously creating an image of unity within the KMT. On February 5, Jaw and Chiang took part in a press conference together, demonstrating their political solidarity in a KMT-backed move to oust a DPP city councillor Huang Chieh on February 6. The success in the recall vote against Han Kuo-yu has sparked a wave of retaliatory politics in Taiwan, firstly followed by the KMT success in winning a recall vote against Taoyuan city councillor Wang Hao-yu in mid-January 2021, and secondly another attempt to oust Huang.
It must be noted that there is a generational gap between Jaw’s “dark blue” faction, which advocates the need to admit the 1992 consensus reached by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC side on the acceptance of one China but with the interpretation of its meaning left to both sides, and the “light blue” faction, which is epitomized by Johnny Chiang whose supporters tend to drift toward a more localist direction supportive of Taiwan’s interests. Chiang is 48 years old, while Jaw 70 years of age – a generational gap that illustrates the underlying tensions within the KMT. While the old party line sticks to the 1992 consensus, the rising Young Turks within the KMT advocates a more localist approach to dealing with the PRC.
In June 2020, the Young Turks under the leadership of Johnny Chiang came up with a slightly pro-Taiwan platform, advocating new positions without openly stressing the need to talk about the 1992 consensus. These positions include the necessity of attaching great importance to the ROC before any cross-Strait consensus, and of recovering the ROC’s “reasonable status” in international organizations. These two positions, according to a critic named Zhu Suiyi in a commentary on Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao on February 4 (page A15), constituted a move to create “two Chinas” and were “no different from the DPP’s line of ‘one China one Taiwan.’” Zhu further criticized the KMT’s factional direction of advocating the “diplomatic return between Taiwan and the US.” Clearly, the faction led by Johnny Chiang is now perceived by the pro-Beijing Hong Kong media as tantamount to not just “light blue” but also having shadows of “light green.” As such, the return of Jaw has been seen by Zhu as the return of “dark blue” to KMT politics with the implication of witnessing a “fierce struggle” in the KMT’s party chair election in late 2021.
Jaw’s return to KMT has important implications for Taiwan politics in several aspects.
First and foremost, the return of Jaw as a member of the “dark blue” camp may not lead to factional rivalries within the KMT, but a golden opportunity for the KMT revival through a closer collaboration between the “dark blue” and “light blue” factions. Recently, public opinion surveys have pointed to a popular resurgence of the KMT; many of its localists and “light blue” activists, such as Taichung mayor Lu Shiow-yen and Taoyuan mayor Hou You-yi. Lu and Hou have recently tipped by the Taiwan media as potential candidates of the KMT in the 2024 presidential elections.
At this moment, it is too early to judge which candidate from which faction of the KMT will run for the 2024 presidential elections. Interestingly, some commentators and reporters of the pro-PRC media in Hong Kong and the mainland have appeared to stick their neck out too early to point to the importance of Jaw Shaw-kong to “revive” the KMT – a position that has already been ridiculed by some Taiwan media commentators, especially those from the pro-DPP side. As such, the mainland reporters and commentators may have to exercise their caution to appreciate the return of Jaw to the KMT prematurely, because Taiwan’s political landscape is so hyper-politicized that any mainland media’s open praise of a Taiwan politician can and will likely portray him as a “pro-Beijing” candidate and yet undermine his chance in any election in the future.
Second, Jaw’s faction belongs to Han Kuo-yu’s emphasis on the acknowledgement of 1992 consensus, but this line of thinking is, according to Han himself, belongs to one of the three line of struggles within the KMT in its policy toward the PRC. Han Kuo-yu revealed to his KMT friends that the party has three main directions in the future: (1) the insistence on the 1992 consensus; (2) the position advocated by retired military officer and KMT member Yu Bei-chen that the party should retain its “anti-communist, resistance to reunification, and opposition to independence” stance; and KMT legislator Lin Wei-chou’s position that the KMT should be “de-mainlandized.” Undoubtedly, the de-mainlandization position can be easily criticized as having shadow of “light green,” approaching the DPP stance. The most important position neglected by many mainland commentators and reporters is Yu Bei-chun’s status quo position, which is arguably an ambiguous position acceptable to the increasingly young voters who favour a localist approach to dealing with mainland China in electoral politics.
Thirdly, the KMT’s factional directions will have an important bearing on Beijing-Taipei relations. Beijing’s think tank members on Taipei should ideally hammer out the details of a Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” that incorporate the need to maintain the 1992 consensus on the one hand and integrate a political line increasingly acceptable to the Taiwan voters in the coming years. This line is perhaps Lin’s position of maintaining the status quo for some years to come.
To put it more starkly, Beijing’s think tank members, if they wish to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwan voters, may need to ponder a stage-by-stage model of reunion and reunification with the ROC in the coming decades. This stage-by-stage model necessities an acceleration of increased socio-economic interactions between the mainlanders and Taiwan people immediately after the fading away of Covid-19, followed by a stage of socio-economic union of South China embracing Taiwan, and then finally by a stage of political dialogue and negotiations over how the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” would be made attractive to the people of Taiwan.
At the present, one has to admit that the Hong Kong model of “one country, two systems” fails to attract the people of Taiwan. The crux of the problem is for the mainland authorities to hammer out the attractiveness of the “Taiwan model.” Otherwise, the usage of the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” to appeal to the ROC side will remain a difficult task in the coming years.
Fourthly, Jaw’s popularity remains high within the KMT supporters and he will stand a good chance of reunifying the party ahead of the county elections in 2022. According to Liberty Times on February 5, an internal opinion survey conducted by the DPP showed interestingly that, among the KMT supporters, 42 percent support Jaw, 35 percent support Eric Chu, and only 7 percent support Johnny Chiang. However, when asked who the preferred candidate would be representing the KMT in presidential elections, the respondents tended to support Eric Chu slightly more than Han Kuo-yu. If so, while Jaw is seemingly a favoured candidate within the KMT supporters for the position of party chair, the prospects of who should represent the KMT in the 2024 presidential election remains uncertain. If so, Jaw’s return to the KMT and revival of the party is one thing; the factional struggle for the presidential candidacy will be another matter that needs to be observed carefully.
Fifthly, mainland commentators and observes may have neglected the inevitable impacts of generational change in the KMT leadership. The more local the KMT leadership, the more distant they are toward the Beijing-Taipei relations. As such, the return of Jaw may signal the “last” battle of the dark blue faction in KMT’s factional politics. On the other hand, Jaw and other members of the dark blue camp, such as Han Kuo-yu and former President Ma Ying-jeou, can and will still play a role of intermediaries between Beijing and Taipei, if time will be politically ripe. In brief, time may not be on the side of the PRC authorities to seek to reunify Taiwan easily through the dream of hoping for an easy KMT dark blue victory in the 2024 presidential election.
In conclusion, the return of Jaw Shaw-kong to the KMT has very significant implications for not only the KMT’s factional politics but also Beijing-Taipei relations. Factionally speaking, Jam’s return may signal a golden opportunity to strengthen the solidarity of various factions in the KMT, improving the electoral performance of the 2022 county elections and paving the way for the significant 2024 presidential elections. However, Jaw’s return to the KMT triggers serious questions on how Beijing should map out the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” for Taiwan’s political future. If the KMT is in a leadership crisis, the return of Jaw can turn such crisis into an opportunity. Nevertheless, such opportunity will have to be accompanied by contextual adaptation and strategic adjustment from the PRC side, if the “Taiwan model” of “one country, two systems” will really be made attractive to the people of Taiwan, and regardless of whether the KMT would return to the presidency in the landmark 2024 presidential election.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
