從5月20日宣誓就職的台灣地區領導人賴清德的言論來看，他觸及了大陸的政治紅線，因此不僅遭到了北京當局的嚴厲批評，也招來了解放軍進行為期兩天的軍事演習。持續的兩岸緊張局勢仍需密切觀察，一方面是因為解放軍軍演發出了重要的警告信號，另一方面是因為台灣立法院的擴權爭議正指向政治更動盪的方向──這些跡象使人懷疑大陸的《反分裂國家法》最終會否在兩岸政治中被引用。
賴清德宣誓就任台灣第16任「總統」所發表的就職演說有幾個特點，危險地觸碰了大陸的政治紅線。
吹噓西式民主 無視九二共識
他的演說首先強調，2024年，台灣在完成3次政黨輪替之後，第一次同一政黨連續執政。第一次政黨輪替是在1996年，當時台灣有第一位直選總統（李登輝）。不過，賴清德誇口說，民進黨打破了8年政黨輪替的魔咒。他的意思是，蔡英文領導民進黨執政8年後，民進黨成功地繼續統治台灣。從某種意義上說，賴清德是對大陸的挑釁，大陸一直認為民進黨政權不僅無視九二共識，而且遠比國民黨親美，無視一國兩制的台灣模式。
賴清德隨後強調台灣不僅是「民主」，而且是「世界民主鏈的亮點」，並補充說，台灣是亞洲第一個同性婚姻合法化的「國家」，並成功地「示範」了「民主防疫」可以優於「專制防疫」。
他吹噓西式民主，而不是大陸強調的「中國式民主」，以及他誇大台灣如何「民主防疫」，可說是對大陸的又一次挑釁。
賴清德談到台灣在第一島鏈的戰略定位，明確表示台灣屬於美國軍事保護傘下的戰略地區，這是對大陸當局再次嚴重挑釁。更糟的是，賴清德強調國際間的「高度共識」是台海的和平穩定，是全球安全與繁榮「不可或缺的要素」──這番言論將台灣置於「國際化」的標題之下，而不是大陸強調台灣問題不應「國際化」。
賴清德迅速將話題轉向美國立法支援台灣軍事的「印太安全補充撥款法案」，這是又一次對大陸方面的明顯挑釁。他「呼籲中國，停止文攻武嚇」，「一起和台灣承擔全球的責任」──這把雙刃劍，一方面批評大陸，另一方面提升台灣在全球的地位與大陸平起平坐。這項觸及甚至超越大陸政治紅線的舉動意味着，在賴清德發表演說後不久，解放軍舉行為期兩天的軍演也就不足為奇了。
賴清德接下來的演說就是大陸方面應該如何「尊重台灣人民的選擇」，大陸應該如何「以對話取代對抗」（而大陸方面一直表示台灣應該放棄對抗，接受九二共識），以及大陸和台灣如何可以先從重啟「雙邊對等的觀光旅遊」，以及「學位生來台就學」開始，一起「追求和平共榮」。然而，大陸長期以來堅持台灣接受九二共識是放寬人員交流和互動的先決條件。
更糟的是，賴清德還談到台灣已申請加入CPTPP（《跨太平洋夥伴全面進步協定》），並以台灣與大陸之間「互不隸屬」的關係，「團結一致」來「護主權」，明顯地再次挑釁了大陸的政治底線。
有觀察家指出，賴清德79次提及「台灣」，9次提及「中華民國」，3次提到「中華民國台灣」，7次使用「中國」一詞來指大陸。
大陸國台辦立即批評賴清德為「台獨分子」，外交部長王毅則重申一個中國原則仍然是穩定兩岸關係未來方向的關鍵。
美國支持舉動 不為中國接受
美國國務卿布林肯祝賀賴清德就任台灣「總統」，甚至呼籲國會「邀請」賴清德和副「總統」蕭美琴訪問華盛頓，此舉激怒了中國外交部立即予以駁斥，指美方嚴重違背一個中國原則和中美3個聯合公報。外交部發言人指，布林肯的言論向台獨分裂勢力「發出嚴重錯誤信號」。
美方與中國的口頭對話清楚地表明，華盛頓對台灣「國際化」的努力表示支持，而中國大陸當局則認為，從麥克風外交的角度來看，美台的此類唱和的動作在政治上是不可接受的。
賴清德發表演說3天後，解放軍環繞台灣島舉行了「聯合利劍─2024A」演習，出動了海軍、空軍和火箭軍。東部戰區主導的台灣海峽演習，範圍包括台灣北部、南部、東部、以及馬祖島、烏坵嶼、東引島周邊。
大陸軍演首次將台灣離島納入其中。這次的地點與2022年8月美國眾議院前議長佩洛西訪問台灣後，解放軍進行實彈演習的地點不同。解放軍這次演習的地點對台灣形成一條環島的大範圍地緣軍事鏈，意味着大陸軍隊有能力輕鬆對台灣實施經濟封鎖，也有能力從戰略上「收復」台灣。正如北京國防大學國家安全學院副教授張弛所言，解放軍可以「阻斷台灣島生存3條線」；解放軍對台灣東部的打擊「再也不存在所谓的防打擊的死角」。言下之意是，台灣東部的後勤補給線很容易被大陸軍隊封鎖。
針對大陸軍演，台灣總統府表示遺憾，美國印太司令部副司令斯克倫卡（Stephen Sklenka）則認為，對於解放軍演習「毫不意外」。他呼籲台灣的「區域友邦」公開「譴責」大陸的演習。
一些大陸軍事戰略家觀察到，解放軍演習有3個特點：（一）大陸海警船進入台灣海域，大陸軍艦、戰機靠近台灣，「擠壓」台灣軍事防禦空間；（二）解放軍可以在西部包圍台灣離島，並在台灣東部展示打擊能力；（三）解放軍可以破壞台灣北部的軍事目標，封鎖高雄的海軍出口，切斷台灣花蓮的外部（空氣和水）補給線。
東部戰區發布了此次軍演中部署的殲─20、殲─16戰鬥機、052D型驅逐艦、071型兩棲船塢運輸艦、東風系列彈道導彈、PHL─16多管火箭炮發射系統（MRLS）。一段新聞影片顯示，導彈護衛艦南通艦參加了演習。
有趣的是，東部戰區發表了3D虛擬動畫，顯示解放軍導彈可以打擊台灣的台北、高雄、花蓮3個地方，這顯示大陸的導彈有能力打擊台灣的這些目標。
在花蓮，10架F─16戰機處於高度戒備狀態，武器裝備就緒，以應對任何可能發生的緊急情況。同時，解放軍進行為期兩天的環台演習時，美國列根號航空母艦（CVN-76）正在菲律賓海執行任務。美國海軍也在南海與荷蘭皇家海軍進行了雙邊軍事演習──這一姿態或許是對中國軍演的回應。美國和荷蘭的行動涉及瀕海戰鬥艦莫比爾號（LCS-26）、物資補給艦沃利·施艾拉號（T-AKE-8）和荷蘭皇家海軍護衛艦卓普號（F803）。
陷入立法爭議 內部政治動盪
在兩岸關係緊張的形勢下，台灣立法政治爭議日益激烈。國民黨和民眾黨試圖修改一項立法，允許立法委員傳喚政府官員接受立法委員質詢，並以「藐視國會罪」可處新台幣2萬至20萬元罰款。民進黨和批評者認為此舉違反憲制安排，使立法院成為「不民主」之地。5月21日，數千名示威者聚集在立法院外，這種情況讓人想起2014年所謂的「太陽花運動」，當時國民黨與大陸之間的《海峽兩岸服務貿易協議》引發了政治對手和民進黨支持者長達一個月的佔領立法院。
這意味着台灣內部的政治動盪現在因黨派政治和立法院內鬥而加劇──這種情況可被視為對兩岸關係的潛在危險。根據2005年3月通過的大陸《反分裂國家法》，有兩項重要條款可以為大陸干預台灣政治動盪和混亂提供理由。第8條規定，台獨分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式造成台灣從中國分裂出去的事實，或者發生將會導致台灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變，或者和平統一的可能性完全喪失，國家得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，捍衛國家主權和領土完整；第9條規定，國家必須盡最大可能保護台灣平民和在台灣的外國人的生命財產安全和其他正當權益，減少損失。如果台灣內部政治鬥爭、騷亂和動盪日益惡化，第八條和第九條中模稜兩可的措辭，可以說允許解放軍對台灣進行軍事干預。
總而言之，當前兩岸緊張局勢說明，賴清德的高度政治性、言辭浮誇和挑釁性的言論，不僅疏遠了大陸當局，還引發了解放軍軍演，史無前例地出動海警進入台海附近海域，也顯示了解放軍封鎖台灣、打擊重點目標、切斷台灣外部補給線的能力。也許美方同時進行的麥克風外交引發了中國大陸方面的相應反應。然而，台灣立法院內外持續不斷的內部政治鬥爭在未來幾年顯示出一些惡化的跡象，導致大陸最終可能適用2005年通過的《反分裂國家法》。果真如此，政治言論、麥克風外交、軍事炫耀、內部政治鬥爭，就成為新的政治發展鏈，加劇了兩岸關係的高度不可預測性、搖擺性和不穩定性。
Touching the Red Lines: Cross-Strait Tensions and Taiwan’s Internal Turbulence
Judging from the remarks made by the newly sworn-in Taiwan leader William Lai Ching-te on May 20, he touched on the political red lines of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), thereby leading to not only the severe criticisms from mainland authorities but also a two-day military exercise conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The ongoing cross-strait tensions remain to be observed carefully, partly because the PLA military exercise sent important warning signals and partly because Taiwan’s legislative politics are pointing in the direction of more political turbulence – signs that will question whether the mainland’s anti-secession law would eventually be invoked in cross-strait relations and politics.
The inaugural speech made by William Lai, who was sworn in as the 16th “president” of Taiwan carried several characteristics that dangerously touched on the political red lines of the mainland.
His speech first emphasised Taiwan’s third rotation of political parties in power in 2024, with the first rotation taking place in 1996, when Taiwan had the first directly elected president. Yet Lai boasted that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) broke the so-called “illusionary spell” of changing the party in power after eight years of its governance. What he meant was that the DPP succeeded in continuing to govern Taiwan even after eight years of Tsai Ing-wen’s DPP leadership. In a sense, Lai was provocative to the mainland, which has been seeing the DPP regime as not only ignoring the 1992 consensus but also being far more pro-US than the Kuomintang and ignoring the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.”
Lai then stressed Taiwan as not just “democratic” but also “a bright spot in the world of democracies,” adding that the island is the first Asian “state” allowing for same-sex marriage and that it succeeded in using “democracy” against the onslaught of COVID-19 and its variants.
His boast of Western-style democracy, as opposed to “Chinese democracy” that has been emphasised in the mainland, and his exaggeration of how Taiwan succeeded in repelling the attacks from COVID-19 became another provocative thorn to the mainland.
Lai turned to Taiwan’s strategic positioning in the “first chain of islands,” explicitly saying that Taiwan belongs to a strategic area under the US military protective umbrella—again, a huge provocation to the mainland authorities. Even worse, Lai stressed that the international “consensus” is that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an “indispensable factor” in global security—a remark putting Taiwan under the rubric of “internationalisation” as opposed to the mainland’s emphasis that the Taiwan issue should not be “internationalised.”
Lai swiftly turned to the US legislation on the provision of military support for Taiwan—again, a clear provocation to the mainland side. He appealed to the PRC for “stopping literary attacks and military intimidation” and “shouldering the global responsibility together with Taiwan” – a double-edged sword that criticised the mainland on the one hand and elevated Taiwan’s status on par with the mainland globally on the other. This move of touching on, and perhaps exceeding, the mainland’s political red lines means that it is not surprising to witness the two-day military exercise of the PLA shortly after Lai delivered his speech.
The rest of Lai’s speech was about how the mainland side should “respect the choice of the Taiwan people,” how the mainland should “replace dialogue with confrontation” (while the mainland has been saying Taiwan should abandon confrontation by accepting the 1992 consensus), and how the mainland and Taiwan can and will become co-prosperous through allowing mainland students to study in Taiwan and through the allowance of “bilateral tourism.” Yet, the PRC has long maintained that the acceptance of the 1992 consensus as a precondition for the relaxation of mutual human exchange and interactions.
Even worse, Lai talked about Taiwan’s attempt at entering the CPTPP and its “united” efforts of protecting “sovereignty” with “non-subservient” relations between the island and the mainland – again a clear provocation to the mainland’s political bottom line.
Some observers have pointed to the fact that William Lam used the term Taiwan 79 times, the Republic of China (ROC) 9 times, and the ROC on Taiwan 3 times, while utilising the name, China, to refer to the mainland 7 times.
The mainland’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office immediately criticised Lai as “a worker of Taiwan independence,” while Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that the one-China principle remains the key one stabilizing the future directions of cross-strait relations.
The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken congratulated William Lai for becoming the Taiwan leader, and he even appealed to the Congress to extend its “invitation” to Lai and deputy Hsiao Bi-khim to visit Washington – a remark provoking the Chinese Foreign Ministry to issue a rebuttal at once, saying that the US side “seriously violating the one-China principle” and the three Sino-US communiques on Taiwan. The Chinese Foreign Ministry added that the Blinken remarks “sent seriously wrong signals” to the Taiwan separatists.
The verbal exchanges between the US side and China clearly demonstrated that Washington has backed up Taiwan’s efforts at “internationalisation” and that the mainland Chinese authorities have regarded such joint US-Taiwan moves as politically unacceptable from the perspective of megaphone diplomacy.
Three days after Lai delivered his speech, the PLA conducted a military exercise, namely Joint Sword-2024A, surrounding the island of Taiwan, mobilising the navy, the air force, and the rocket force. The Eastern Theatre Command led the military exercise in the Taiwan Strait, including Taiwan’s northern, southern, and eastern parts, the Mazu island, Wuqiu, and Dongyin.
For the first time in the mainland’s military exercises, Taiwan’s outlying islands were included. The locations this time were different from the locations of the PLA’s live-fire drills in August 2022, following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Altogether, these locations of the mainland military exercises constitute a broad geo-military chain encircling Taiwan, meaning that the mainland military has the capability to impose an economic blockade easily on Taiwan and that it will have the ability to “take back” Taiwan strategically. As Zhang Chi, a professor at the National Defence University in Beijing, said that the PLA could “occupy main passages” and that “there is no longer a so-called blind spot” for PLA strikes from the eastern part of Taiwan. The implication is that Taiwan’s eastern logistical supply routes can be easily blocked by the mainland military.
In response to the mainland military exercise, the Taiwan presidential office expressed its regret, and the US Indo-Pacific Command deputy commander Stephen Sklenka regarded such exercise as “expected.” He appealed to the neighbours of Taiwan to “condemn” the mainland exercise.
Some mainland military strategists observed that the PLA military exercise had three characteristics: (1) the mainland marine police vessels went into the Taiwan waters while the mainland warships and fighter airplanes went near Taiwan to “squeeze” the Taiwan military defence space; (2) the PLA could encircle Taiwan’s outlying islands in the west and demonstrate its striking capability in the eastern part of Taiwan; and (3) the PLA could damage the northern Taiwanese military targets, blockade the naval outlet of Kaohsiung, and cut the external (air and water) supply lines of Taiwan’s Hualien.
The Eastern Theatre Command released a map and posters of six PLA weapons that were deployed in the military exercise, namely J-20 and J-16 fighter aircraft, Type 052D destroyer, Type 071 amphibious transport dock, a Dongfeng series ballistic missile, and PHL-16 Multiple Rocket Launch System (MRLS). A video was released, showing that frigate CNS Nantong was participating in the military drills.
Interestingly, the Eastern Theatre Command issued 3D virtual animations, showing that the PLA missiles could hit three places in Taiwan, namely Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Hualien – a gesture pointing to the ability of the mainland missiles to strike at these Taiwan targets.
In Hualien, ten F16 fighter aircrafts were on high alert with their weapons ready to deal with any possible emergency. At the same time, the US aircraft carrier USS Ronald Regan (CVN-76) was operating in the Philippine Sea when China launched the two-day military exercise encircling Taiwan. The US Navy also conducted bilateral military operations with the Royal Netherlands Navy in the South China Sea – a gesture perhaps coincidentally in response to the Chinese military exercise. The US and Dutch operations involved combat ship USS Mobile (LCS-26), dry cargo ship USNS Wally Schirra (T-AKE-8) and Royal Netherlands Navy frigate HNLMS Tromp (F803).
Amid cross-strait tensions, Taiwan’s legislative politics have gone increasingly contentious. The Kuomintang and the People Party attempted to amend a legislation to allow legislators to summon private individuals and government officials to face legislators’ questions and to penalise them for any “contempt of the legislature” for up to three years in prison. The DPP and critics have argued that the move “violates” the constitutional arrangements, making the legislature a place of “authoritarianism.” Thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Assembly on May 21, a situation recalling the so-called Sunflower Movement in 2014, when a free trade agreement between the KMT and the mainland triggered a month-long occupation of the legislature by political opponents and DPP supporters.
The implication here is that Taiwan’s domestic political turbulence is now exacerbated by partisan politics and struggles within the Legislative Assembly – a situation that can be seen as potentially dangerous in cross-strait relations. According to the mainland’s anti-secession law, which was ratified in March 2005, two important provisions could provide the justifications for the PRC intervention in Taiwan’s political turbulence and chaos. Article 8 says that the mainland Chinese state shall use non-peaceful and other necessary means to deal with Taiwan under the condition of Taiwan’s separatist forces “accomplishing the fact” of such “separation,” or of a main event occurring in Taiwan that leads to its “separation” from mainland China, or of a scenario in which all the possibilities of peaceful reunification are lost. Article 9 says that the mainland Chinese state must act to protect the persons and properties of Taiwan’s civilians and foreigners for the sake of minimising their losses. The ambiguous wordings in Articles 8 and 9 can arguably provide for the PLA military intervention in Taiwan if the island has worsening internal political struggles, disturbances, and turbulences.
In conclusion, the ongoing cross-strait tensions illustrate that the highly political, rhetorical and provocative speech made by William Lai not only alienated the mainland authorities but also triggered the PLA military exercise, which unprecedentedly mobilized the marine police to go into the waters near the Taiwan outlying islands, and which demonstrated the PLA capabilities of blockading Taiwan, striking the essential targets and cutting off Taiwan’s external supply lines. Perhaps the megaphone diplomacy conducted simultaneously by the US side triggered the corresponding response from the mainland Chinese side. However, Taiwan’s ongoing internal political struggles inside and outside the Legislative Assembly are showing some signs of deterioration in the coming years, leading to a possible scenario that the 2005 Anti-Secession Law may eventually be applied by the mainland. If so, political rhetoric, megaphone diplomacy, military muscle-flexing actions, and domestic political struggles have become a new chain of political development that heightened the highly unpredictable, oscillating, and unstable cross-strait relations.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：https://tinyurl.com/2s9frfep
