解讀複雜的中俄美日四國關係

中國國家主席習近平與俄羅斯總統普京12月15日再度舉行今年第二次視像會晤,就六大主要合作領域達成共識,包括:共同對抗新冠疫情、能源供應、區域合作、強化金磚國家合作及國際和平安全等領域的合作。

12月15日,在中美關係不斷惡化的政治氣氛中,中國國家主席習近平與俄羅斯總統普京舉行視像會晤,就六大主要合作領域達成共識。與此同時,俄羅斯和美國之間出現了小規模冷戰的陰影,主要是因為兩國對烏克蘭的軍事和戰略計算而起。

習近平普京視像再晤  六大領域深化合作

習近平與普京的視像會晤具有重要的政治意義。首先,習近平強調,一些國家打着「民主」、「人權」的幌子,干涉中俄內政,中俄應採取聯合行動,維護雙方的安全利益。 普京則表示,當前俄中關係正處於「前所未有的歷史最好時期」,體現出高度的戰略互信,在互不干涉內政、相互尊重彼此利益基礎上,實現了互利共贏。

顯然,雙方都不同意一些西方民主國家以其民主價值觀批評中國和俄羅斯的方式。在意識形態上,《中俄睦鄰友好合作條約》已經簽署了20年,並且正式宣布延期。正如普京所說,兩國都渴望克服新冠病毒的影響、維持經貿關係、加強技術合作並尋求維護國際和平。

在中美關係和俄美關係同時緊張的情況下,中俄兩國的意識形態愈發顯得接近。美國針對中國實行貿易保護主義,以及華府以其意識形態,批評包括新疆和香港的中國內政,引起了北京領導人的關注。

其次,習主席界定了與俄羅斯深化合作的6個領域:
一、共同抗擊新冠病毒的傳播,包括在針對變種新冠病毒疫苗測試方面的合作和針對跨境病毒傳播抗疫措施方面的合作;
二、能源供應、技術開發和可再生能源生產領域的產業合作;
三、促進從現在到2030年的全球可持續發展,包括開發新市場和向發展中國家提供的援助;
四、加強區域合作,特別是鞏固上海合作組織及「上海精神」,特別是要加強集體安全,不允許外國勢力干涉上合組織成員國的內政;
五、加強金磚國家(巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國、南非)及多邊主義和開放經濟及公共衛生合作;
六、深化聯合國安理會在抗疫和維護國際和平安全方面的合作。

這6個領域的合作對中俄關係具有重要意義。雙方都將抗擊新冠病毒視為合作議程的重要內容。第二個問題是能源供應問題,再者就是強調可持續發展,以贏得其他發展中國家的接受和認同。最重要的是,鞏固上合組織集體安全的想法,具有抵禦任何外國干涉的含義,而金磚國家和安理會國家的更密切合作,意味着中俄合作在政治上比以往任何時候都更加強大。

對於習近平提出的六大合作領域,普京反應正面而積極,他肯定了六大領域合作的重要性,並表示俄羅斯堅決支持中華人民共和國在台灣問題上的立場。

俄羅斯統總普京12月15日與中國國家主席習近平視像會晤,這是今年內的第二度。(亞新社)
俄羅斯統總普京12月15日與中國國家主席習近平視像會晤,這是今年內的第二度。(亞新社)

俄羅斯憂北約東擴  阻烏克蘭投向西方

俄羅斯與中國關係更加密切,正值俄美關係因烏克蘭問題迅速惡化之際。12月初,有報道指,美國情報部門發現俄羅斯在俄烏邊境集結了17.5萬軍隊,俄羅斯可能會「入侵」在政治上向西方盟友傾斜的烏克蘭。

12 月 18 日,俄羅斯表示希望達成一項具有法律約束力的協議,即北大西洋公約組織 (NATO)將停止接收包括烏克蘭在內的東歐國家為成員國。俄羅斯的要求包括莫斯科對烏克蘭未來加入北約具有否決權──西方國家已經拒絕了這一要求。 甚至烏克蘭政府也補充說,烏克蘭有自主權決定與的北約關係。

在這種情況下,烏克蘭在俄羅斯眼中應該是一個更加「中立」的緩衝國,但是美國認為,如果北約不「東擴」,烏克蘭便會成為軍事援助的目標。 俄美在烏克蘭問題上相對緊張的關係有待進一步攤牌和解決。

另一方面,在日本戰略家看來,俄羅斯和中國對日本構成了軍事威脅。 2021 年 7 月,俄羅斯總理米舒斯京登上南千島群島(日本稱北方四島),引起了日本政府的注意。俄羅斯和日本對南千島群島的主權仍有爭議。10 月 19 日,10 艘俄羅斯和中國軍艦駛過津輕海峽,這是一條分隔北海道和本州的狹窄海上通道。

近年來,中國解放軍的實力不斷增強,也被東京視為一種軍事威脅。對軍事威脅的看法使俄羅斯、中國和日本之間的三角關係,比以往任何時候都更加複雜。

大陸攻台臆測無據  美國政客攻心戰略

日本前首相安倍晉三最近表示,「台灣有事」,等同「美日同盟有事」,中國外交部立即作出回應,召見日本駐華大使垂秀夫,指安倍的言論極其錯誤。據報道,中國外交部部長助理華春瑩提醒垂秀夫日本侵略中國的歷史,日本「沒有任何資格和權利就台灣問題說三道四」。

顯然,由於中日關係歷史遺留的問題,政治上的不信任加劇了對軍事威脅的看法。另一方面,日美日益密切的軍事關係也被中俄視為真正的軍事威脅。

中日就釣魚台群島(日本稱「尖閣諸島」)的領土爭議仍是雙方棘手的問題。幸運的是,中日雙方在處理釣島問題上,都更加嫻熟和低調,比如派遣海警船在釣島附近海域巡邏,而不是在離爭議島嶼太近的地方部署軍艦。

儘管如此,在北京和台北之間日益緊張的關係中,日本最近在台灣問題上的強硬立場,無論是從政府的立場還是從議員的言論來看,都讓中國當局感到非常不安。

客觀地講,台灣的未來問題被包括軍事分析家在內的不少美國觀察家誇大了,他們都在喋喋不休地談論解放軍「攻台」很快就要變成現實的話題。然而,這種評估通常都基於高度主觀和純屬推測,卻沒有具體的證據。解放軍軍力不斷增強是一回事,但「即將進攻」台灣則是另一回事。或許一些美國分析人士故意誇大解放軍的威脅,認為這是可以令北京感到「投鼠忌器」的心理策略。

對解放軍「進攻」台灣「迫在眉睫」的評估,是一直忽視了北京在台北問題上的立場沒有改變的事實。一方面,習近平主席曾說過中國人不打中國人,但另一方面,如果台獨「分裂」勢力失控,中國也不會放棄對台灣使用武力。

中印邊境軍事緊張  雙方克制未至失控

中俄關係回暖或許有助於緩和中印兩國在漫長邊境線上的緊張軍事關係。中印兩國士兵在邊境偶爾發生的小規模衝突,一直在考驗兩國的外交和軍事關係。或許幸運的是,即使發生衝突甚至傷亡事件,兩國軍方似乎都在克制自己的軍隊。

鑑於俄羅斯與印度和中國都保持着友好關係,如果中印之間出現嚴重的緊張局勢,莫斯科可以而且將會發揮至關重要的調解作用。然而,另一方面,印度一直依靠俄羅斯的武器來威懾中國的軍事「威脅」。

綜上所述,中俄關係持續回暖,一方面是由於在西方國家「霸權」意識形態威脅下,兩國意識形態的親近感,另一方面是因為俄美關係不斷惡化,涉及中美關係的複雜性。鑑於美日穩固的軍事同盟、俄日領土爭端、俄美在烏克蘭問題上的緊張關係,以及在東京政界眼中,中國對日本和台灣構成「威脅」的看法,中俄美日之間的四國關係,自然被拖入美日同盟與中俄聯盟的小型冷戰陰影之中。此刻,兩個聯盟之間的力量對比仍然是相對穩定與和平的。時間會告訴我們,複雜的中俄美日四國關係將如何在亞太地區展開。

Complex Quadruple Relations between China, Russia, United States and Japan

The video meeting between the Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Russian Vladimir Putin on December 12 reached a consensus on six main areas of cooperation amid a political climate of deteriorating relations with the United States. At the same time, a shadow of mini-Cold War between Russia and the United States has emerged mainly because of their strategic and military calculations over Ukraine.

The video meeting between President Xi and President Putin was politically significant. First and foremost, President Xi emphasized that some countries waved the flag of “democracy” and “human rights” to intervene in the internal affairs of both China and Russia and that both China and Russia should take joint action to protect their safety. President Putin’s position was that the Sino-Russian relations have reached “an unprecedentedly best period” in which both sides establish mutual trust strategically based on maintaining the principles of mutual respect and non-interference in other’s internal matters.

Obviously, both sides disagree with the way in which some Western democratic states use their democratic values to criticize China and Russia. Ideologically, the Sino-Russian neighborly friendship and cooperation treaty has been signed for 20 years and is extended further. Both countries, as Putin said, are eager to tackle the spread of Covid-19, maintain trade relations, strengthen technological cooperation and seek to retain international peace.

The ideological affinity of China and Russia is consolidated at a time when Sino-US relations and Russo-US relations are simultaneously strained. The US trade protectionism against China and its ideological criticisms of China’s domestic developments, including Xinjiang and Hong Kong, have raised the eyebrows of the Beijing leadership.

Second, President Xi delineated six areas of deeper cooperation with Russia: (1) the joint combat against the spread of Covid-19, including mutual cooperation in the testing of vaccines against the variants of Covid-19 and cross-border measures against the spread of the disease; (2) industrial cooperation in the areas of energy supply, technological development and the production of renewable energy; (3) the promotion of global sustainable development from now to 2030, including the development of new markets and the assistance provided to the developing states; (3) the strengthening of regional cooperation, notably the consolidation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its spirit, especially the need to strengthen collective security without allowing foreign forces from interfering with the internal affairs of SCO states; (4) the enhancement of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and its multilateralism and open economy as well as public health cooperation; and (5) the strengthening of the UN Security Council to fight Covid-19 and maintain world peace.

These six areas of cooperation have important implications for Sino-Russian relations. Both sides regard the combat against Covid-19 as high in their cooperative agenda. The question of energy supplies comes the second one, followed by sustainable development in winning the hearts and minds of other developing states. Most importantly, the idea of consolidating the collective security of SCO has the implication of fending of any foreign intervention, while the closer cooperation of countries in BRICS and Security Council means that the Sino-Russian coalition is increasingly politically an ideologically stronger than ever before.

In response to Xi’s proposed six areas of cooperation, Putin’s reaction was warm and positive, affirming the importance of collaboration in these areas while adding that Russia resolutely supports the position of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the question of Taiwan.

The closer Russian relations with China comes at a time when the Russo-US relations are deteriorating rapidly over the question of Ukraine. In early December, it was reported that the US intelligence found Russia gathering 175,000 troop along the border of Ukraine, and that Russia would perhaps “invade” Ukraine which was drifting politically toward the Western allies.

On December 18, Russia said it wanted to have a legally binding agreement that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would give up military build-up in Eastern European states, including Ukraine. The Russian demands embrace Moscow’s veto over any future NATO membership for Ukraine – a demand that the Western states have already rejected. Even the Ukrainian government has added that Ukraine has an “exclusive sovereign right” to determine its relations with NATO.

Under these circumstances, Ukraine has to be a more “neutral” buffer state in the eyes of Russia, but it has become a target of military assistance, if not “expansion,” in the mind of the United States. The relatively tense relations between Russia and the United States over the question of Ukraine remain to be unfolded and solved.

On the other hand, Russia and China have constituted a military threat to Japan, from the perspective of the Japanese strategic thinkers. In July 2021, a visit by the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to the Kurile Islands, whose sovereignty remains contested between Russia and Japan, raised the eyebrows of the Japanese government. On October 19, ten Russian and Chinese warships sailed through the Tsugaru Strait, which is a narrow sea passage separating Hokkaido and Honshu. The increasing strength of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in recent years has also been seen by Tokyo as a military threat. The perceptions of military threat have made the triangular relations between Russia, China and Japan more complex than ever before.

A recent remark made by the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that any “adventure” made by the PLA on Taiwan would lead to “a crisis for the US-Japan alliance” prompted an immediate response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which summoned the Japanese ambassador Hideo Tarumi by saying that Abe’s comments were “extremely wrong.” It was reported that Assistant Foreign Minister Hua Chunying reminded the Japanese ambassador of the previous Japanese military aggression against China.

Clearly, the perceptions of military threats have been compounded by political distrusts that stemmed from the historical legacies in Sino-Japanese relations. On the other hand, the increasingly closer military relations between Japan and the United States have also been seen by China and Russia as a real military threat.

The territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Diaoyu Island (Senkaku Island in Japanese) remains a tricky issue to be handled by both sides. Fortunately, both China and Japan have been handling the island in a more skillful and low-key manner, like dispatching coast guard vessels to patrol along the waters near the island rather than deploying military warships too close to the disputed island.

Still, Japan’s recent stronger position on Taiwan, either from the government’s stance or from the parliamentarians’ remarks, in the midst of the increasingly tense relations between Beijing and Taipei has made the PRC authorities quite uncomfortable.

Objectively speaking, the question of the future of Taiwan has been exaggerated by quite a lot of American observers, including military analysts, who have harped on the same theme that the PLA “invasion” of the island republic would be soon and imminent. Nevertheless, such assessment is usually based on highly subjective and speculative ideas rather than concrete evidence. The PLA’s increasing military strength is one thing, but it is another matter of its “imminent invasion” into Taiwan. Perhaps some American analysts have deliberately exaggerated the PLA threat as a psychological ploy of having a “deterrence” impact on the PRC action.

The assessment of the “imminent” PLA “invasion” into Taiwan has consistently neglected the fact that Beijing’s position on Taipei has remained unchanged. On the one hand, President Xi has mentioned that Chinese would not fight against the Chinese, but on the other hand, China does not renounce the use of force to deal with Taiwan if the “separatist” elements there run out of control.

The warmer relations between Russia and China can perhaps help defuse the tense military relations between India and China along their long border. Occasional skirmishes between the soldiers from India and China along the border have been testing their diplomatic and military relations. Perhaps fortunately, both sides of the military appear to rein in their own armies in case of conflicts, even including deaths.

Given that Russia has cordial relations with both India and China, it can and will play a crucial mediating role in case of any severe tensions between India and China. However, on the other hand, India has been relying on Russian military weapons to deter the Chinese military “threat.”

In conclusion, the ongoing warmer relations between China and Russia are attributable to not only their ideological affinity vis-à-vis the “hegemonic” ideological threat from the Western states, but also the deteriorating relations between Russia and US on the one hand, and the complex relations between China and the US on the other. Given the solid military alliance between the US and Japan, the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, the strained relations between Russia and the US over Ukraine, and in view of Tokyo’s perception of the “China threat” to Japan and Taiwan, the quadruple relations between China, Russia, United States and Japan are naturally dragged into a shadow of a mini-Cold War in which the US-Japan alliance is encountering the Sino-Russian coalition. At this moment, the balance of power between the two alliances remains to be relatively stable and peaceful. Time will tell us how the complex quadruple relations between China, Russia, United States and Japan will unfold in the Asia-Pacific region.

原刊於澳門新聞通訊社(MNA)網站,本社獲作者授權轉載。

盧兆興