中國國家主席習近平最近分別在印尼和泰國出席二十國集團（G20）和亞太經合組織（APEC）領導人峰會，表明他從地緣政治和地緣經濟的角度，對已故中國領導人毛澤東的三個世界理論進行了重大修正和進一步發展。
1974年2月，毛澤東說美國和前蘇聯屬於第一世界，第二世界包括日本、歐洲諸國和加拿大等國家，第三世界包括亞洲人口大國和非洲國家。毛澤東理論的主要目的是進行統戰，以贏得發展中國家或第三世界國家的人心。同樣，中國必須拉攏第二世界國家，試圖孤立美國和前蘇聯這兩個超級大國。1974年4月，已故中國領導人鄧小平表示，中國屬於第三世界，中國支持所有被壓迫人民和民族、反對帝國主義和超級大國的鬥爭。反對霸權主義是1970年代至1990年代中國領導人一貫的主題。
隨着中國自2000年代初以來的快速崛起，特別是自2012年底習近平上台以來，中國領導層一直在顯示毛澤東的三個世界理論的延續和重大變化。
延續反霸權 強調多邊主義
從延續性來看，第一，反霸權仍然是在習近平外交政策中延續着。中國在經濟、軍事和科技上持續崛起，北京積極參與國際組織，並採取強調多邊主義的「大國外交」。與毛澤東的中國在1970年代上半葉相對孤立和經濟落後、鄧小平的中國在整個1980年代經歷現代化早期階段不同，中國近年的崛起意味着它必須採取比以往更包容的外交政策。
最重要的是，隨着前蘇聯解體、俄羅斯大國地位的下降，尤其是俄烏戰爭持續的情況下，中國正抓住了與美俄並駕齊驅成為第一世界第三個「超級大國」的絕好機會。中國對俄烏衝突也一直採取相對中立的態度。北京在俄羅斯對烏克蘭的戰爭中一直表現出不干涉的態度，而烏克蘭實際已成為美國及其盟友對普京的俄羅斯之戰中的代理人。旨在延續毛澤東三個世界理論的反霸權主義，習近平的中國在俄烏戰爭中增加了多邊主義的新元素、積極參與國際組織，並對俄烏戰爭相對中立。
毛澤東的三個世界理論和習近平外交政策的第二個延續性是廣泛的統戰工作以贏得第二和第三世界國家的人心。中國於2015年3月正式宣布的「一帶一路」倡議，旨在拓展與三個世界的地緣經濟和政治影響力。在地緣經濟方面，中國一直利用國有企業在第三世界國家投資，幫助她們實現現代化，建設基礎設施項目，幫助發展中國家實現可持續發展，而不是強加所謂的「中國發展模式」在他們身上，最終目的是贏得他們的人心，幫助中國實現和平外交政策的目標，展現社會主義大國的形象，幫助所有其他發展中國家實現經濟現代化和可持續發展。
同樣地，習近平領導下的中國也一直在與加拿大、歐洲國家和日本等更先進的第二世界國家接觸，以贏得更多朋友，塑造和平中國的形象，並爭取他們對中國的支持。在處理台灣問題上強調「一個中國」原則。在台灣的軟實力自1990年代以來迅速擴大之際，習近平領導下的中國大陸，渴望實現統一台灣的長期目標，正如最近的中共二十大所揭示的那樣。
採取強硬政策 捍衛國家利益
與毛澤東的三個世界外交實踐相比，習近平外交政策的重要變化在於，他放棄了1950年代和1960年代毛澤東提出的革命外交，當時中國支持世界各地的許多共產主義運動。
儘管如此，正如最近召開的中共二十大所強調的那樣，習近平領導下的中國已經建立了一支強大的、正在崛起的軍隊，隨時準備捍衛其主權、領土完整和國家發展利益。
習近平版本的三個世界理論的另一個顯著變化，是中國一直採取高度強硬的外交政策。中國外交官一直在反駁外國官員、記者和傳媒專業人士的論點。
習主席最近一次出席G20和APEC領導人峰會，是在鞏固其政治權力的中共二十大舉行之後不久，他生動地展示了這種自信的主席外交。11月14日，當習近平會晤美國總統拜登時，他告訴拜登，他們的會面「受到了世界的關注」，標誌着中國正在國際政治的新世界中崛起為一個大國。3個小時的會談對中美關係具有建設性意義，雙方同意繼續對話，討論經貿問題，推動氣候變化政策及公共衛生和良好安全方面的合作，成立工作小組解決問題，同時加強兩國外交互動。
不過，習近平警告拜登，台灣問題是中國的「第一條紅線」，暗示美國對台政策不能偏離「一個中國」原則。儘管拜登強調美國堅持「一個中國」原則，反對任何改變台灣現狀的單方面行動，但中美關係建立互信是有限度的。
問題的癥結在於，2024年美國總統大選後，民主黨能否繼續執政？中美當前脆弱的穩定局面能否長期維持？8月初，美國國會眾議院議長佩洛西訪問台北，中美關係遭到嚴峻考驗。幸運的是，中國大陸、美國和台灣各方都採取了克制態度來應對這場前所未有的危機。
與第二世界打交道 方式各有不同
11月15日，習近平會見法國總統馬克龍，說明了中國如何跟第二世界打交道。習近平對馬克龍說，要相互尊重雙方核心利益，擴大雙邊貿易，希望歐盟在與中國打交道時採取獨立、積極的態度。
習近平對待第二世界國家的方式也取決於個別國家如何對待中國。他批評加拿大總理杜魯多將兩人在談判中討論的內容洩露給傳媒，這表明中國國家主席與杜魯多有着截然不同的政治文化。據報道，杜魯多和習近平的會談中提到了中國在加拿大從事間諜活動的問題，他辯稱加拿大的政治文化強調公開對話和坦誠。儘管如此，習近平回應說，兩國應該在關係向前邁進之前創造必要的條件──這清楚地表明杜魯多的自由主義與習近平謹慎的家長式作風背道而馳。
自從孟晚舟事件及2018年12月至2021年9月拘留加拿大公民康明凱（Michael Kovrig）和邁克爾·斯帕弗（Michael Spavor）之後，中加關係一直處於低潮，但相對而言，中日關係要好得多。11月17日，習近平在亞太經合組織會議期間對日本首相岸田文雄表示，中國不接受任何人干涉中國內政，言下之意是日方需要慎重處理台灣問題。岸田向中方提出「尖閣諸島」（釣魚島）和台海安全問題。儘管習近平和岸田在公開場合親切握手、開心微笑，但中日關係的溫馨也有其局限性：釣魚島領土爭端和台灣問題的敏感度仍是考驗兩國長期關係的暗湧。
致力爭取第三世界國家的人心
11月15日，習近平不失時機地對第二世界進行統戰工作，他表示，各國要以團結代替分裂，共渡難關，共創未來，每個國家都有更好的發展權利，現代化絕不是任何國家的專利，糧食安全和能源供應不應被政治化和武器化，現代化的中國正在為世界各國提供大量機遇。習近平還表示，希望非洲聯盟國家加入G20。這可以理解為統戰，爭取第三世界國家的人心。
習近平11月15日在 G20 峰會上的講話以如下方式呼籲第三世界：發展中國家要比以往任何時候都更加重視發展問題，中國願意幫助他們；各方要繼續深化抗疫國際合作；發展中國家需要在國際貨幣基金組織的幫助下應對金融和貨幣風險；他們需要在處理債務的過程中得到幫助；中國將實施數字化計劃，打造有利於發展中國家的數字經濟； G20國家應在糧食生產、能源供應、經濟生產、資本積累和技術轉讓等方面幫助發展中國家。同時，習近平的話呼應了中國的「一帶一路」倡議，旨在向發展中國家提供貸款，動員國有企業為受援國的基礎設施建設項目做出貢獻，幫助第三世界許多國家擺脫不發達狀態。中國的目標本質上是社會主義的：為人類創造共同的命運，以便所有國家縮小收入和經濟差距，確保世界和平。
在11月18日的亞太經合組織會議上，習近平就構建亞太命運共同體建設提出四點建議，主張建設和平穩定、共同富裕、清潔美麗、守望相助的亞太，構建開放型亞太經濟，推動亞太地區經濟發展走在世界前列。顯然，習近平領導下的中國正在實踐社會主義願景，即建立一個沒有霸權主義、永久和平的共同繁榮的亞洲。
綜上所述，從國家主席習近平出席G20和APEC峰會，以及他在兩個重要國際組織的演說和講話，可見他已經對毛澤東的三個世界觀進行了重要的修正、恢復和更新。在連續性方面，中國反對霸權主義、堅持統一戰線，同時把世界分為三類國家。中國的崛起表明需要通過大國外交應對美俄。毛澤東三個世界觀的變化是非常突出和顯著的。習近平治下的中國現在全面致力於維護多邊主義，實現世界和平，在俄烏衝突中採取相對中立的立場，塑造亞洲乃至世界共同繁榮的社會主義新願景，同時助力第三世界國家克服不發達，發展社會經濟現代化，創造人類命運共同體。如果說社會主義革命是1950年代和1960年代毛澤東外交政策的主旋律，那麼習近平領導下的中國正在採用一種新的社會主義永久和平和堅持社會主義外延的意識形態。至於在世界上構建新的可持續性社會主義和永久和平的雙重目標，如何能夠而且會實現？仍有待觀察。
Xi Jinping’s Revision of Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds Theory and Practice
The recent visits of the Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend the G20 and APEC meetings in Indonesia and Thailand, respectively, have shown that he has significantly revised and redeveloped the late Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s three worlds theory in a geopolitical and geo-economical way.
In February 1974, Mao Zedong said that the US and the former Soviet Union belonged to the first world, that the second world embraced countries such as Japan, European states and Canada, and that the third world included the populous states in Asia and Africa. The main objective of Mao’s theory was to conduct united front work to win the hearts and minds of the developing or Third World states. Similarly, China must win over the countries in the second world, trying to isolate the two superpowers, namely the US and the former Soviet Union. In April 1974, the former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping remarked that China belonged to the third world, and that China supported all the oppressed peoples and nations-states in their struggles against imperialism and superpowers. Anti-hegemonism was a consistent theme adopted by the Chinese leaders from the 1970s to the 1990s.
With the rapid rise of China since the early 2000s, and particularly since Xi Jinping’s ascendancy to political power since late 2012, the Chinese leadership has been displaying significant continuities and changes in Mao Zedong’s three worlds theory.
In terms of continuity, firstly, anti-hegemonism remains a continuity of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy. China has been rising economically, militarily and technologically and adopting a “great power diplomacy” that emphasizes multilateralism and Beijing’s active participation in international organizations. Unlike Mao’s China which was relatively isolated and economically backward in the early half of 1970s, and unlike Deng Xiaoping’s China which underwent the early phase of modernization throughout the 1980s, China’s recent rise has meant that it has to adopt a far more inclusive foreign policy than ever before.
Most importantly, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the decline of Russia’s power status, especially amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, China is grasping the excellent opportunity to become the third “superpower” alongside with the US and Russia in the first world. China has also been adopting a relatively neutral attitude toward the Russo-Ukrainian conflicts. Beijing has been showing the element of non-interventionism amid the war between Russia and Ukraine, which has become a de facto proxy of the US and its allies in the war against Putin’s Russia. Amid the continuity of anti-hegemonism in Mao’s three worlds theory, Xi Jinping’s China has added the new elements of multilateralism, active participation in international organizations, and relative neutrality within the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The second continuity of Mao’s three worlds theory and Xi Jinping’s foreign policy is the ingredient of extensive united front work to win the hearts and minds of countries in both the second and third worlds. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which was officially announced in March 2015, has the objectives of achieving its geoeconomic and geopolitical outreach to the three worlds. Geoeconomically, China has been utilizing its state-owned enterprises to invest in countries in the third world, helping them to modernize, building up infrastructure projects, and helping the developing states to achieve sustainable development without imposing the so-called “China model of development” onto them. The ultimate objective is to win their hearts and minds, helping China to achieve the foreign policy objectives of presenting a peaceful image, and portraying the perception of a socialist power that assists all other developing states in the processes of economic modernization and sustainable development.
Similarly, China under Xi Jinping has been reaching out to the more advanced countries in the second world, such as Canada, European states and Japan, to win more friends, to project the image of a peaceful China, and to secure their support of China’s emphasis on the one-China principle in dealing with Taiwan. At a time when Taiwan’s soft power has been rapidly expanding since the 1990s, China under Xi Jinping is eager to achieve the long-term objective of reunifying the island, as the recent 20th Party Congress has unveiled.
The important change of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy compared with Mao’s three worlds practice is that Xi has abandoned Mao’s revolutionary diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s when China supported many communist movements in various parts of the world.
Nevertheless, Xi Jinping’s China has built up a strong and rising military which is prepared to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national developmental interests, as emphasized in the recent 20th Party Congress.
Another prominent change in Xi Jinping’s version of the three worlds theory is that China has been adopting a highly assertive foreign policy. Chinese diplomats have not been shying away from refuting the arguments of foreign officials, journalists and media professionals.
The most recent visits of President Xi, shortly after the 20th Party Congress that consolidated his political power, to G20 and APEC have vividly demonstrated such assertive presidential diplomacy. On November 14, when Xi met US President Joe Biden, he told the latter that their meeting was “under the world spotlight,” signaling the rise of China as a “great power” in the new world of international politics. The three-hour meeting was constructive in Sino-US relations, for both sides agreed to conduct continuous dialogue, discuss economic and trade issues, promote climate change policy and cooperation in public health and good safety, set up work teams to solve problems, and enhance diplomatic interactions between the two countries.
However, Xi warned Biden that the Taiwan question is “the first red line” for China, implying that the US cannot deviate from the one-China principle in its policy toward Taiwan. Although Biden emphasized that the US does adhere to the one-China principle and that the US opposes any unilateral action of changing the status quo of Taiwan, mutual trust-building has its limits on Sino-US relations.
The crux of the problem is whether the Democratic Party would continue to govern the US after the presidential election in 2024, and whether the currently fragile and precarious stability between the two countries will be maintained in the long run. The Nancy Pelosi visit to Taipei in early August plunged the Sino-US relations into a serious ordeal. Fortunately, all sides – China, the US and Taiwan – adopted a restraint attitude to cope with the unprecedented crisis.
Xi Jinping’s meeting with the French President Emmanuel Macron on November 15 illustrated how China deals with the second world. Xi told Macron to maintain mutual respect of the core interests of both sides, to expand bilateral trade, and he hoped that the EU should adopt an independent and active approach in dealing with China.
Xi’s approach of tackling the countries in the second world also depends on how individual country deals with China. His criticism of Canadian Prime Minister Justine Trudeau of leaking out what they had discussed in negotiations to the press revealed that the Chinese President has a vastly different political culture compared with Trudeau. Trudeau, who reportedly raised the issue of Chinese espionage in Canada during the discussions with Xi, defended by saying that Canada’s political culture emphasized open dialogue and frankness. Nevertheless, Xi responded by saying that both countries should create the necessary conditions before they would move forward – a clear indication that Trudeau’s liberalism was at odds with Xi’s cautious paternalism.
While the Sino-Canadian relations has remained sour since the Sabrina Meng incident and after the controversies over Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor from December 2018 to September 2021, Sino-Japanese relations have been much better, comparatively speaking. Xi Jinping told Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during the APEC meeting on November 17 that China does not accept anyone to intervene in its internal affairs – an implication pointing to the need for Japan to handle the Taiwan question carefully. Kishida raised the issues of Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and the Taiwan Strait’s security to the Chinese side. Although both Xi and Kishida shook their hands warmly and smiled happily in public, the warm Sino-Japanese relations have their underlying limitations: the territorial dispute over Diaoyu (Senkaku) Island and the sensitivity to the Taiwan question remain the hidden tides that would test their long-term relations.
Xi Jinping did not lose the chance of conducting united front work on the second world on November 15, when he remarked that countries should replace divisions with unity, that they should seek to make progress and achieve well-being for the world, that each country has its right to be better, that modernization is by no means a monopoly possessed by any country, that food security and energy supplies should not be politicized and weaponized, and that the modernizing China is providing lots of opportunities for countries in the world. Xi also stated that he hoped for the countries in the African Union to join G20 – a remark that can be interpreted as a united front effort at winning the hearts and minds of countries in the third world.
Xi’s speech at G20 on November 15 appealed to the third world in the following way: these developing states should recover their economies and China is keen to assist them; they would also need to upgrade their anti-Covid tools, medication and diagnosis; they need to deal with financial and monetary risks with the help from the International Monetary Fund; they need to be helped in the process of tackling their debt; China would implement a digitalized plan to create a digital economy beneficial to the developing states; and countries in G20 should help developing states in the aspects of food production, energy supplies, economic production, capital accumulation and technology transfer. Here, what Xi said echoed China’s Belt and Road Initiative which aimed at providing loans to developing states, mobilizing state-owned enterprises to contribute to the infrastructure developmental projects of aid recipients, and helping many countries in the third world to overcome underdevelopment. The objective of China is inherently socialist: the creation of a common destiny for the humankind so that all countries would be narrowing their income and economic gap and that world peace would be ensured.
During the APEC meeting on November 18, President Xi suggested four points in the construction of the Asia-Pacific common destiny: the maintenance of fairness, justice and a peaceful Asia-Pacific region; the insistence in the construction of Asia-Pacific common prosperity; the insistence in green development and a clean and beautiful Asia-Pacific region; and the determination of building up the Asia-Pacific region with neighborliness and mutual help. Clearly, China under Xi is adopting a socialist vision of creating a commonly prosperous Asia without hegemonism and with permanent peace.
In conclusion, from the visits of Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend the G20 and APEC meetings, and from his speeches and remarks delivered in the two important international organizations, he has already significantly revised, revived, and updated Mao Zedong’s three worlds theory. In terms of continuities, China remains opposed to hegemonism and persists in the adoption of united front work, while seeing the entire world in three categories. China’s rise has pointed to its need to adopt great power diplomacy to deal with the US and Russia. The changes from Mao’s three worlds theory are very prominent and significant. China under Xi Jinping is now fully committed to maintaining multilateralism, achieving world peace, adopting relative neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian conflicts, shaping a new socialist vision of achieving common prosperity not only in Asia but also the world, and assisting countries in the third world to overcome underdevelopment and to develop socio-economic modernization so that the common destiny for the humankind would be created. If socialist revolution was a main theme in Mao’s foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s, China under Xi Jinping is adopting a new ideology of permanent socialist peace and persistent socialist outreach. It remains to be seen how the twin objectives of creating new socialist sustainability and permanent peace in the world can and will be achieved.
