9月12日，國務院新聞辦發表《中共中央 國務院關於支持福建探索海峽兩岸融合發展新路建設兩岸融合發展示範區的意見》（下稱《意見》）。《意見》規劃了促進大陸與台灣特別是金門、馬祖地區社會經濟、文化交流融合的詳細藍圖。《意見》可被視為大陸在後新冠時期和台灣2024年初總統選舉之前採取的一項關鍵措施，藉此呼籲台灣民眾與大陸，特別是福建省進一步融合，對兩岸關係具有巨大的政治影響。
構建對台通道 促進台胞融入內地
《意見》主要內容如下：
一是適度超前開展交通物流基礎設施的建設，加大資金等要素保障力度，推動閩台基礎設施「應通盡通」，構建立體式、綜合性的對台通道樞紐，暢通閩台與大陸其他地區的連接通道，完善區域物流集散體系。
如果是這樣，那麼大陸傳媒最近報道，建議在福建至少4個地方修建橋樑，以連接大陸與金門的想法就很明顯了。
二是進一步優化、加密福建沿海與台灣本島及金門、馬祖客貨運航線，為兩岸居民往來閩台和台灣居民在閩停居留創造更便利的條件，以及更寬鬆的環境。
具體做法是「以惠促融」、「以情促融」。包括支持台灣居民到福建求學、就業及生活。歡迎更多台灣學生、教師、醫師及專業人士到福建實現職業發展和人生理想。另外，持續優化台商營商環境，支持更多的台企參與閩台產業合作和科技創新合作，特別是歡迎台灣農漁業和中小企業到福建發展。
言外之意，是歡迎和鼓勵台商參與大陸職業學校建設，帶動更多台灣學生到福建留學。
三是擴大直接採認台灣的職業資格、逐步擴大取得國家法律職業資格的台灣居民在閩從事律師職業的執業範圍、發展壯大對台灣居民在閩人力資源服務等方式，鼓勵台灣同胞到福建台資企業就業。
從長遠來說，這些措施將是邁出兩岸職業資格互認的第一步，短期則可促進台灣律師融入福建法律界。
四是擴大福建台灣居民在閩的社會參與，支持台胞參與福建省社區建設和基層管理，支持台胞加入職業、學術、專業團體。
換言之，就是鼓勵台灣民眾參與福建的居民、鄰里、團體活動，促進台胞更深層次地融入大陸社會。
五是便利和促進在閩台胞的社會生活，取消台胞在閩暫住登記，享受與持有大陸身份證的大陸居民同等的待遇和福利，鼓勵台胞在福建購買住宅單位和房屋。
這些措施旨在通過放寬台灣人在閩生活的便利、居民身份和福利，以及開放台灣人投資福建房地產市場，加速更多台灣人融入福建。
以廈門為橋頭堡 深化社經互動融合
六是深化產業合作，建立兩岸標準共通服務平台，利用專業和產業研究的共同標準，探索建立兩岸產學研企行業共通標準的評估和認可體系。
具體來說，福建兩岸融合發展示範區將嘗試設立產業融合基金，支持兩岸證券交易所建設，鼓勵更多台商企業參與大陸貨幣金融市場。鼓勵台灣漁業和更多中小企業到福建興業發展。 同樣地，鼓勵福建和台灣的研究機構開發技能和知識交流平台，促進產業數碼轉型。
福建股市的發展能否吸引台灣投資者，還有待觀察。另外，技術和知識轉移涉及的敏感性可能會成為「兩岸產業融合」理念的障礙，而「兩岸產業融合」或許可視為一個長期目標。
七是廈門和金門將打造為「同城生活圈」，意味着廈門將被賦予與金門交往的更大自主權，金門居民將享受與大陸居民相同的居民福利，雙方將加快推進廈門新機場通電、通氣、通橋和共用。
此外，馬祖居民享受與福州居民同等的居民福利，福州對馬祖通電、通水、通氣、通橋的速度將加快。
換句話說，就是以廈門為橋頭堡，深化與金馬兩地的經濟社會互動和融合，台灣居民與福建居民將享有同等待遇。
八是福建平潭將開放對台投資、跨境服務、貿易便利化金融體系，探索兩岸共同市場建設試點。福建將考慮向台灣資訊服務業、教育業開放。
其意義在於研究在福建平潭開放金融、貿易和服務市場，作為台灣服務業和教育業融合的試點研究。
九是促進閩台社會人文交流，允許台灣團體在福建設立辦事處，推動廈門大學研究院與台灣智庫互動，鼓勵兩岸青年交流和團體互動，通過向海外遊客展示中華文化，建立閩台合作項目。
換句話說，福建教育文化領域的開放，有利於與台灣社會文化教育的融合。
一國兩制台灣方案重要組成部分
總的來說，福建兩岸融合發展示範區具有巨大的政治意義，特別是結合國務院新聞辦2022年8月發布的《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》白皮書來分析。
首先，《意見》可以說是「一國兩制台灣方案」的重要組成部分，以福建直接作為橋頭堡和平台，與台灣居民、台灣島在社會、文化、經濟等方面進行融合。2022年8月的白皮書強調了「促進兩岸關係和平發展、融合發展」的重要性。因此，2023年9月12日發布的《意見》是對「融合發展」的具體規劃和政策的闡述。白皮書明確提出，大陸「勇於探索海峽兩岸融合發展新路，率先在福建建設海峽兩岸融合發展示範區。持續推進兩岸應通盡通，不斷提升兩岸經貿合作暢通、基礎設施聯通、能源資源互通、行業標準共通。」事實上，《意見》勾劃了大陸對台灣同胞的種種優惠；勾勒出大陸與台灣「融合發展」的輪廓和內容。
其次，《意見》以福建、廈門、平潭為切入點，塑造和改變更多台灣民眾的身份認同。如果更多的台灣居民到大陸來福建省學習、工作、居住和經商，他們的社會和文化認同將有望變得更加中國化，從而認識到「中華民族偉大復興」的重要性和必要性，以及認同「國家統一，民族復興」的長遠目標。事實上，台灣同胞在社會文化上愈融入大陸，就越有可能支持中華民族偉大復興和國家統一；更多台灣人身份的這種無聲轉變將有望影響台灣政府對台灣與大陸（尤其是福建）融合的看法。
第三，以福建為標頭堡，以金門、馬祖為社會文化經濟融合試點的想法是明智的，因為如果白皮書確實提到了「分階段」談判進程的可能性，大陸與台灣就國家統一進行對話，那麼金門、馬祖島顯然就是「一國兩制」台灣方案更深層次融合和試驗的先行者。
第四，福建兩岸融合發展示範區的創建，平行呼應內地藉粵港澳大灣區將香港、澳門更深入地融入內地社會、文化和經濟，類似的模式也表明，使用區域或專門設計的地區作為社會文化、經濟以及後來的政治融合的窗口。香港和澳門在社會文化、經濟和政治與內恃融合的過程，是成功的案例，特別是通過利用港珠澳大橋和高鐵等基礎設施項目。可以預見，福建將有可能通過橋樑和類似的高鐵與金門、馬祖連接起來。台灣與大陸融合的挑戰在於，由於過去4年新冠疫倩的爆發，兩地之間的社會文化和經濟人文融合被中止。當前，加快兩岸社會文化、人文融合的時機已經成熟。
第五，《意見》發表的時間恰逢台灣2024年總統選舉即將展開，意味着大陸的舉措正在考驗台灣總統候選人的反應。國民黨候選人侯友宜9月15日表示，雖然中國統一台灣的意圖沒有改變，但台灣對待大陸有「自己的原則」。 他的言論表明，反應會更加謹慎，避免國民黨過於密切、過快地與大陸的融合計劃掛鈎，同時為國民黨在兩岸關係上提出自己的綱領贏得更多時間。
總之，《意見》將考驗國民黨侯友宜、民眾黨候選人柯文哲和民進黨候選人賴清德的反應。 兩岸關係很可能成為一個關鍵的競選政綱，將影響許多台灣選民在2024年1月總統選舉中的想法、決定和投票意向。
綜上所述，《意見》的出台是對2022年8月台灣問題白皮書中提到的「融合發展」方案的具體闡述。《意見》具有巨大的政治意義，不僅因為它是台灣「一國兩制」方案的重要組成部分，更因為它旨在推動更多台灣民眾的身份轉變，推動「分階段」互動與對話進程，以基建項目作為社會文化與經濟融合的關鍵統戰策略，並測試台灣不同政黨候選人在當前準備階段到2024年1月總統選舉的反應。
Fujian’s Cross-Strait Integration Zone and Its Political Significance
On September 12, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) published an “Opinion of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and State Council on the Exploration of Cross-Strait Integration Developmental Path and the Construction of Cross-Strait Integration Demonstration Zone,” delineating a detailed blueprint of fostering socio-economic and cultural interactions and integration between the mainland and Taiwan, especially the Kinmen and Matsu region. This plan can be seen as a crucial measure taken by the PRC after the Covid-19 era and before the Taiwan presidential election in early 2024 to appeal to the Taiwanese for greater integration with the PRC, particularly the Fujian province. It has tremendous political implications for cross-strait relations.
The main points of the Opinion are as follows:
First, the channels for the Taiwan compatriots to visit the mainland are facilitated and smoothened through the construction and consolidation of logistical infrastructure projects, which will form an entity for the collection and distribution of goods and products.
If so, it is obvious why the mainland media have recently reported on the idea of suggesting at least four places in Fujian where bridges can be built to link up the PRC with Kinmen.
Second, the Taiwan students’ study in Fujian is promoted by supporting Fujian’s higher education and scientific research institutes to accept and enrol them in an enlarged manner, and by supporting Taiwan’s special enterprises and industries to participate in Fujian’s vocational schools in the form of joint stock ownership and joint management.
The implication here is that the businesspeople of Taiwan are welcome and encouraged to participate in vocational school development in mainland China, stimulating more Taiwan students to study in Fujian.
Third, the Taiwan compatriots are encouraged to find jobs and get employed in Fujian through the direct recognition of Taiwan’s occupational qualifications, the provision of allowing Taiwan lawyers to practice law in the mainland, and the development and expansion of human resources services for them through the Taiwan enterprises in Fujian.
The implication is that such a move attempts at initiating the first step of mutual recognition of occupational qualifications in the long run while enhancing the integration of Taiwan lawyers into the Fujian legal profession in the short term.
Fourth, the social participation of Taiwan compatriots will be expanded in Fujian by supporting them to partake community construction and grassroots-level management in the province, and by supporting them to join occupational, academic, and professional groups.
The implication here is that the Taiwan people are encouraged to participate in Fujian’s resident, neighbourhood, and group activities, fostering deeper social integration into the mainland.
Fifth, the social life of the Taiwan compatriots in Fujian is facilitated and promoted by repealing the need for them to register as temporary residents there, by equalizing their treatment and benefits as with the mainland residents who hold mainland identity cards, and by encouraging them to buy apartment units and houses in Fujian.
This measure aims at speeding up the social integration of more Taiwan people into Fujian province through the relaxation of their privileges, citizenship status, and benefits and the liberalization of the Fujian property market to embrace the Taiwanese.
Sixth, industrial cooperation is going to be deepened by setting up cross-strait service platform, utilizing common standards of professions and industrial research, and by exploring how to build up the assessment and recognition system for Taiwan enterprises and businesses.
Specifically, the Fujian integration zone is trying to set up industrial integration funds, to support cross-strait stock exchange centres, to encourage the participation of more Taiwanese enterprises in the mainland’s monetary and financial markets. The Taiwan fishery industry and small and medium enterprises are encouraged to develop and conduct business in Fujian. Similarly, the research institutes of Fujian and Taiwan are encouraged to develop their platform in skills and knowledge exchange, promoting digital and industrial transformation.
It remains to be seen how the Fujian’s stock market development can and will lure the Taiwan investors. Moreover, the sensitivity involved in skills and knowledge transfer will likely be a hindrance to the idea of “industrial integration,” which can perhaps be regarded as a long-term goal.
Seventh, Xiamen and Kinmen are going to be reshaped as “the same city of social life,” meaning that Xiamen is empowered to reform its interactions with Kinmen with more autonomy, that the Kinmen residents will enjoy the same residents’ benefits as with the mainlanders in Xiamen, and that both places will speed up the provision of electricity, gas, bridges and the mutual usage of the Xiamen airport.
Moreover, Matsu residents enjoy the same residents’ benefits as with those people in Fuzhou, while the provision of electricity, water, gas, and bridges by Fuzhou to Matsu is speeded up.
The implication here is that Xiamen is used as a bridgehead to deepen socio-economic interaction and integration with Kinmen and Matsu where the Taiwan residents are treated as having the same benefits of the Fujianese.
Eighth, Fujian’s Pingtan county is going to liberalize the financial system of facilitating Taiwan investment, cross-border services, and trade, and to explore the pilot construction of a cross-strait common market. Fujian will consider opening its door to Taiwan’s information service industry and education sector.
The implications here are the study of liberalizing the financial, trade and services market in Fujian’s Pingtan, serving as a pilot study to integrate Taiwan’s service and education sectors.
Ninth, social and human interactions between Fujian and Taiwan are promoted by allowing Taiwan groups to set up their offices in Fujian, by promoting research institutes of the Xiamen University to interact with Taiwan’s think tanks, by encouraging cross-strait youth exchange and groups interaction, and by establishing Fujian-Taiwan cooperative items through the exhibition of Chinese culture to overseas visitors.
The implication here is that the educational and cultural sectors of Fujian are liberalized to facilitate socio-cultural and educational integration with Taiwan.
Overall, the Fujian integration zone has tremendous political significance, especially if this Opinion is analysed together with the State Council’s August 2022 White Paper on the Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.
First, the Opinion can be regarded as part and parcel of “the Taiwan model of ‘one country, two systems,’” utilizing Fujian as the direct bridgehead and platform to integrate with the people and island of Taiwan socially, culturally, and economically. The August 2022 White Paper emphasized the importance of “promoting peaceful cross-strait relations and integrated development.” As such, the Opinion published on September 12, 2023, is an elaboration of the concrete plans and policy toward “integrated development.” The White Paper mentioned explicitly that China “will explore an innovative approach to integrated development and take the lead in setting up a pilot zone for integrated cross-Strait’s development in Fujian province, advancing integration through better connectivity and more preferential policies, and based on mutual trust and understanding.” In fact, the Opinion delineates all the preferential treatment of the mainland toward the Taiwan compatriots, outlining the contours and content of “integrated development” between the mainland and Taiwan.
Second, by utilizing Fujian and its Xiamen city as well as Pingtan county, the Opinion seeks to shape and change the identity of more Taiwan people. If more Taiwan people visit the mainland to study, work, reside and do business in the Fujian province, their social and cultural identity will hopefully become more Chinese, thereby generating an identity of recognizing the importance and the need for “Chinese renaissance” and Chinese “national reunification and rejuvenation” in the long run. In fact, it is quite possible that the more the Taiwan compatriots are socially and culturally integrated into the mainland, the more likely they will support Chinese national renaissance, reunification, and rejuvenation. Such silent transformations of the identity of more Taiwan people will, hopefully, shape how they would perhaps influence the way of the Taiwan government thinks about Taiwan’s integration with the mainland, especially Fujian.
Third, the idea of utilizing Fujian to target at Kinmen and Matsu as the front yard of socio-cultural and economic integration is a wise one, because if the White Paper did mention the possibility of a stage-by-stage” process of negotiation and dialogue between the mainland and Taiwan on national reunification, then obviously the islands of Kinmen and Matsu constitute the pilot points for such deeper integration and experimentation with the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems.”
Fourth, the creation of the Fujian integration zone is parallel to how the mainland has utilized the Greater Bay Area (GBA) to integrate both Hong Kong and Macau more deeply into the mainland’s social, cultural, and economic orbits – a similar pattern pointing to the usage of zones or specially designed districts as the windows of socio-cultural, economic, and later political integration. The cases of Hong Kong and Macau have been successful ones in this process of socio-cultural, economic, and political integration, especially through the usage of infrastructure projects like the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau bridge and the High-Speed Rail. It can be anticipated that Fujian will likely link up with Kinmen and Matsu through bridges and similar High-Speed Rail. What makes the case of Taiwan’s integration with the mainland challenging is that due to the outbreak of Covid-19 in the past four years, socio-cultural and economic-human integration between the two places were terminated. It is now the ripe time to speed up socio-cultural and human integration between the mainland and Taiwan.
Fifth, the timing of the publication of this Opinion coincides with the forthcoming campaign of the 2024 Taiwan presidential elections, meaning that the initiatives from the mainland are testing how the candidates of the Taiwan presidential elections will react. Hou You-yi of the Kuomintang stated on September 15 that while China’s intention of reunifying Taiwan has not changed, Taiwan has “its own principle” in dealing with the mainland. His remark points to a more cautious reaction that avoids affiliating the KMT too closely and too quickly with the mainland’s integration plan, while buying more time for the KMT to come up with its platform on cross-strait relations.
In short, the Opinion is going to test the responses from the KMT led by candidate Hou, the People’s Party led by Ko Wen-je, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by candidate William Lai. Cross-strait relations will likely be a key party platform that will shape the ideas, decisions, and votes of many Taiwan voters in the January 2024 presidential elections.
In conclusion, the publication of the Opinion represents an elaboration of the plan of “integrated development” mentioned in the August 2022 White Paper on the Taiwan Question. The Opinion has tremendous political significance not only because it is part and parcel of the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems,” but also because it aims at promoting the identity transformation of more Taiwan people, fostering a “stage-by-stage” process of interactions and dialogue, utilizing infrastructure projects as the key united front strategy of socio-cultural and economic integration, and testing the responses of candidates of different political parties in Taiwan in the current run-up to the January 2024 presidential elections.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-fujians-cross-strait-integration-zone-and-its-political-significance/
