經常出行的市民，最高興就是看到第四條過海鐵路本周投入使用，從新界東北到港島金鐘從此有了便捷的途徑。但我們當中可能沒有多少人知道它已經推遲了近30年。
沙中線是在地鐵是名副其實的城市運輸系統和九廣鐵路是郊區鐵路的時候構思的。
荃灣延伸線及機場快線則被視為市區系統向新界的延伸，而九鐵公司則熱衷於將其系統延伸至市中心。
正是這兩家公司之間的激烈競爭，導致沙中環線延遲施工，有些人用中文稱之為「缺失環節」。
政府要求競標 兩鐵最終合併
我記得當時的政府當局，不僅是指定九鐵公司或地鐵公司進行施工，而是有一個奇怪的想法，要求不管是完全擁有還是多數擁有的雙方，都競標這條鐵路線。
當局要求兩間公司各自提出一個效率最高路線的方案，以及融資的建議。
由於九鐵在新界東部已經擁有鐵路網，最終中標。
但傳奇還在繼續。
不幸的是，當時公眾認為九鐵的營運效率較低，最終導致了2007年的兩鐵合併。
該計劃進展緩慢，導致中標的九鐵公司將其業務併入另一家公司，而地鐵公司（現在稱為港鐵）再次重新獲得了建設這條至關重要鐵路線的權利──儘管它應該是一個基於郊區東鐵線的九鐵系統。
四線穿行金鐘 繁忙一時無兩
但與此同時，隨着城市的不斷發展，與中環的交通聯繫變得更為窘迫。
這條鐵路線再也不能繞行穿過跑馬地，再回到中環站。
金鐘站成為唯一可行的轉車站，但由於現有的建築物地基和其他障礙物的限制，可用空間已無法容納全長12節車廂的列車。
東鐵線列車現在要縮短到9節車廂，需要更複雜的信號系統來縮短列車與列車間的距離，以盡量彌補載客量的不足。
那時候，南港島線已經規劃好，金鐘再次被選為市區的終站。沙中線只能在繁忙的月台層中增加一層來連接金鐘站。
金鐘突然成為香港鐵路網中最繁忙的車站，4條不同的鐵路──荃灣線、港島線、南港島線和東鐵經過這裏。
這就是為什麼建造和完成需要這麼長時間，而且成本要高得多的原因。雪上加霜的是，幾年前紅磡站的大堂月台出現了施工問題，兩年後擴建部分又出現了信號問題，導致進一步延誤。
再一次，香港在規劃和建設一條重要的鐵路線方面汲取了慘痛的教訓。
我們延遲實施基建計劃的時間愈長，時間和金錢成本就愈高。
我們寧願看到系統早日完成，投入服務，而不是永遠試圖徒勞地改進設計和程序，以完善流程。
不然，最終這頭「野獸」將更像駱駝而不像獅子。
Lesson in Rail Link about Signalling Quick Starts
Commuters are most delighted to see the fourth railway harbor crossing coming into service this week, providing an express link from northeast New Territories to Admiralty.
But not many of us may know it has been deferred by almost 30 years.
The Shatin to Central Link was conceived at a time when MTR Corp lived up to its name as an urban system and Kowloon-Canton Railway Corp was a suburban railway.
The Tsuen Wan extension and then the Airport Express was regarded as expansions of the urban system to the New Territories, and the KCRC was keen to extend its system into the city center.
It was the severe competition between these two firms that caused the delay in implementing the Shatin to Central Link, which some people dubbed, in Chinese, as the “Missing Link.”
I recall the government authorities at that time, instead of just naming either the KCRC or the MTRC to proceed, had the strange idea of asking both, which it totally or majority owns, to bid for the link.
They were asked to come up with a proposal on what link was the most effective one and the method to finance it.
As the KCRC already has a network in east NT, it eventually won the bid.
But the saga continued.
Unfortunately, at that time the public perceived KCR operations as less efficient, which eventually led to a railway merger in the early 2000s.
The slow progress of the plan caused the railway company that won the bid for the link to have its operation merged into the other company, and once again, the MTRC (as it is now called) regained the right to build this all-important line, despite its being a KCR system, based on the suburban East Rail Line.
But meanwhile, with continued development in the city, the connection into Central has become much tougher.
It was no longer possible to loop the line through Happy Valley and lead it back to Central station.
Admiralty station then become the only feasible connecting station, but with the constraints of existing building foundations and other obstacles, the space available can no longer accommodate the full length of 12-car trains.
East Rail Line trains now need to be shortened to nine-car ones, requiring a much more sophisticated signaling system to facilitate a shorter headway to try and minimize the reduction in passenger carrying capacity.
By this time, the South Island Line has already been planned and again Admiralty was selected as its city terminal. The Shatin to Central Link can only connect to Admiralty by adding a further layer of platform to the busy layout.
Admiralty has suddenly become the busiest station in the railway network, accessing four different lines: Tsuen Wan, Island, South Island and East Rail.
That is why it has taken so long to construct and complete, and at a much higher cost. To add to this misery, there was a construction issue over a concourse platform at Hung Hom station a few years ago, and a signaling issue of the new extension some two years after, causing further delays.
Once again, Hong Kong learned a hard lesson in planning and construction of an essential railway link.
The longer we delay the implementation of an infrastructure plan, the more costly in time and money it will be.
We would rather see the system being completed early for service than forever trying to fruitlessly enhance the design and procedures for perfection of process.
In the end, the “beast” will be more of a camel than a lion.
原刊於《英文虎報》，本社獲作者授權翻譯及轉載。
