9月7日晚至8日凌晨持續16個小時的特大暴雨，不僅讓香港特區各區陷入混亂，也引發了人們對政府應該汲取哪些教訓的嚴重質疑。應對突發危機管理。
9月7日晚上9時25分，天文台發出黃色暴雨警告。 兩分鐘後，警告變為紅色。 晚上11時05分，發布黑色暴雨警告。9月8日上午12時15分，港鐵公司宣布觀塘至黃埔線停止服務。
香港傳媒披露，天文台於9月7日晚分別向消防、警察、渠務等政府部門發出警告，告知暴雨可能造成的損害範圍。
港府宣布極端情況處理
隨後部門官員召開會議制定應急預案，就像以往颱風襲港的處理方式。午夜過後，香港一小時內降雨量達158毫米（6.2 吋），這是自 1884年以來的歷史現象。據報道，政務司司長陳國基與部門官員會面，準備調集人力和資源應對危機。
9月8日凌晨1時19分左右，行政長官李家超透過Facebook呼籲居民留在安全地方，並稱政府正在全力應對暴雨。
凌晨5時34分，政府宣布，因應惡劣天氣，日校和夜校將停課，僱主則按照8號風球情況下的做法處理工作安排。
惡劣天氣一直持續到9月9日中午12點。
暴雨給多區帶來嚴重破壞：黃大仙的黃大仙中心北館被泥水淹沒；筲箕灣遭遇水浸，道路嚴重受損；黃大仙港鐵站嚴重受損；市民被困在汽車內，其中許多汽車擱淺或損壞；至少151棵樹倒塌；發生39宗山泥傾瀉；20所學校報告設施受損；144名居民需要住院治療；向政府求助電話343個；至少有335人在北區的臨時庇護中心避難。
9月9日，政務司司長李家超會見傳媒，同意檢討警報系統是否可以進一步完善。
事後看來，儘管短時間內的暴雨堪稱500年一遇，但政府本可以做得更好。
政府本可以做得更好
首先，政府向居民發出的警告為時已晚，不像超強颱風「蘇拉」時，政府提前懸掛8號颱風，讓市民有足夠的時間購買食物並在家中做好預防措施。事實上，蘇拉的迅速吹襲可能是一件幸運的事情，可以最大限度地減少對香港造成的損害。
不過，有趣的是，在福建省登陸的颱風「海葵」引發的暴雨和山泥傾瀉，本港天文台應更早發出警報。內地新聞9月5日至6日已報道了海葵從福建南下廣東時造成的嚴重損失。根據正確的天氣情報收集和分析，天文台應該更早向政府部門和居民發出警報，而不是在9月7日夜間一個半小時內將黃色暴雨警報提升為黑色暴雨警報。事實上，天文台官員在9月8日下午解釋說，預測暴雨的移動更加困難。不客氣地說，在氣候快速變化的情況下，技術預測可能會遇「困難」，但更早對天氣狀況和海葵移動的情報分析，或許可更早地提高暴雨警報的級別。
第二，儘管政務司司長迅速協調有關部門應對暴雨，香港傳媒卻準確指出了政府與市民溝通的不足。一些傳媒和評論人士指出，政府有必要使用短訊來提醒居民暴雨情況。然而，一名官員告訴傳媒，這種短訊警報可能會在居民睡覺時嚇到他們──這一言論可能令人信服，但也存在爭議。問題是什麼時候應該並且可以通過短訊發送適當的信息來提醒居民暴雨的危險。無論如何，保安局轄下的緊急監察及支援中心，以及政務司司長領導的跨部門督導委員會，或許應該研究日後如何改善早期預警信號，特別是在氣候變化極有可能產生自然災害的情況下，突發暴雨襲擊也會造成的類似災害。
第三，據報道，深圳在決定排洪前16分鐘通知香港特區當局，但香港政府後來澄清稱已提前45分鐘通知。客觀而言，此次危機使深圳當局難以較早向香港當局通報情況，但需要加強跨境政府溝通，以加強相互對話、相互警惕，以防暴雨突然襲擊。此次特大暴雨不僅對福建造成嚴重破壞，還對廣州、深圳、香港等地造成嚴重破壞，足以證明海葵造成的所謂「風尾雨」的危害性。
少數香港居民提出深圳排洪是否會加劇新界水浸的質疑，這種說法確實沒有證據。有趣的是，香港特區一家親北京報章9月9日批評這種「大謠言」不負責任，並採訪了一位氣象專家，該專家堅稱香港水浸與深圳排洪無關。客觀地講，普通民眾並不是氣象專家，但如何破除這種不實謠言，還需要政府部門更好、更及時地與民眾溝通。
第四，一些立法會議員指出，政府有必要檢討9月8日上午關於僱主應自行安排工作的公告。 儘管政府表示，不能「一刀切」要求所有員工停止工作，但工會成員認為，要求員工停止工作存在「法律真空」。工聯會立法會議員鄧家彪表示應立法終止工作，勞資雙方實在不知道如何回應政府的號召在「惡劣天氣」下安排工作。其他批評政府的人表示，在沒有明確指導方針的情況下，政府將處理危機的責任交給了僱主。政府是否應該就「惡劣天氣」情況下的停工立法，還是應該僅僅發布指導方針，存在爭議。目前，政府認為在8號颱風的情況下，應給予僱主酌情權來決定工作安排。
綜上所述，海葵的「風尾雨」帶來的暴雨，暴露了香港特區危機管理的問題。本來可以更早發出天氣警報，還可以與公民進行更好的溝通；香港和深圳政府當局在應對天氣和氣候變化方面也需要加強溝通；有需要檢討僱主在8號風球情況下工作安排的酌情權。如果國家安全涉及政府如何應對突發的氣候變化情況，那麼香港特區當局就必須從短時間內給香港帶來嚴重破壞的突發暴雨中汲取教訓。
Rainstorm Paralyzed Hong Kong: Lessons for Crisis Management
The 16-hour of torrential rainstorm that straddled the night of September 7th and the morning of 8th not only plunged various districts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) into chaos, but also raised serious questions on what lessons the government should learn in dealing with sudden crisis management.
At 9.25 pm on September 7th, the Observatory issued a yellow rainstorm alert. Two minutes later, the alert was changed to a red one. At 11.05 pm, black rainstorm warning was issued.
At 12.15 am on the morning of September 8th, the MTR Corporation announced that the line between Kwun Tong and Whampoa terminated service.
Hong Kong’s media have revealed that the Observatory sent separate warnings to government departments on the night of September 7th, including fire services, police, and the drainage department, on the possible scope of damage incurred by the rainstorm.
Then department officials held meetings to produce their contingency plans, just like the past experiences during which typhoons attacked Hong Kong. After the midnight when 158 mm (6.2 inches) of rainfall poured into the HKSAR within an hour – a historical phenomenon since 1884 – it was reported that Chief Secretary Eric Chan met with departmental officials to prepare the mobilization of manpower and resources to cope with the crisis.
At around 1.19 am on September 8th, the Facebook of Chief Executive John Lee asked the residents to stay in safe places and it said the government was making all the efforts to deal with the torrential rainfall.
At 5.34 am, the government announced that, due to severe weather, day and night schools would terminate their classes, while employers would deal with their work arrangements in accordance with the practices under Typhoon number 8 conditions.
The severe weather condition lasted until 12 am on September 9th.
The rainstorm brought havoc to many districts: Temple Mall North in Wong Tai Sin was flooded with muddy water; Shau Kei Wan witnessed flooding and severe damage on its roads; the MTR station in Wong Tai Sin was badly damaged; citizens were trapped in cars many of which were stranded and damaged; at least 151 trees were fallen; 39 landslides took place; 20 schools reported their facility damage; 144 residents needed hospital treatment; 343 calls were made to the government for assistance; and at least 335 people took refuge in temporary shelters in the North district.
On September 9th, Chief Secretary John Lee met the media, and he agreed that a review should be undertaken to see whether the warning system can be improved further.
With the benefit of hindsight, the government could have done better even though the torrential rainfall in a short period of time was regarded as once in 500 years.
First and foremost, the warning given to residents by the government was too late, unlike the situation during the Super Typhoon Saola during which the government hoisted Typhoon number 8 much earlier for citizens to have sufficient time to buy food and make precautionary measures at their homes. Indeed, the speedy movement of Saola might be a fortunate event that could minimize the damage done to the HKSAR.
However, interestingly, the torrential rainfall caused by Typhoon Haikui, which had made serious landfall in Fujian province, should have alerted the officials of Observatory much earlier. Mainland news on September 5 and 6 had already reported the severe damage incurred by Haikui as it moved south from Fujian to Guangdong. Based on proper weather intelligence-gathering and analyses, the Observatory should have alerted the government departments and residents much earlier instead of raising the yellow rainstorm alert to black one within one and half hours on the night of September 7th. Indeed, the Observatory officials explained on the afternoon of September 8th that it was more difficult to predict the movement of rainstorm. Critically speaking, technological predictions might be “difficult” in situation of rapid climate change, but earlier intelligence analyses of weather conditions and Haikui’s movement could increase the level of the rainstorm alert much earlier.
Second, even though the Chief Secretary coordinated the departments concerned quickly to cope with the rainstorm, the Hong Kong media have accurately pointed to the inadequacies of governmental communication with the public. Some media and critics have pointed to the need for the government to use the SMS system to alert the residents of the rainstorm situation. Yet, one official told the media that such SMS alert could have scared the residents during their sleep – a remark that could be regarded as apparently convincing but controversial. The question was what time a proper message should and could be used through SMS to alert the residents of the dangers of the rainstorm. In any case, the Emergency Monitoring and Support Centre supervised by the Security Bureau and the cross-departmental steering committee led by the Chief Secretary should perhaps study how earlier warning signals would be improved in the future, especially when climate change would very likely produce natural disaster of a similar kind through sudden rainstorm attack.
Third, it was reported that Shenzhen informed the HKSAR authorities sixteen minutes before it decided to discharge its reservoir waters, but the Hong Kong government later clarified that it had been informed 45 minutes earlier. Objectively speaking, the crisis made it difficult for the Shenzhen authorities to inform their Hong Kong counterparts earlier, but more cross-border governmental communications will be necessary to enhance mutual dialogue and mutual alert in case of sudden rainstorm attack. The torrential rainstorm caused havoc in not only Fujian, but also Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong – evidence pointing to the detrimental force of the so-called “residual rain” caused by Haikui.
A minority of Hong Kong residents raised the question on whether the Shenzhen water discharge might have exacerbated the flooding in the New Territories – a claim without evidence indeed. Interestingly, a pro-Beijing daily in the HKSAR on September 9th criticized such a “big rumour” as irresponsible and it interviewed a weather expert who insisted that the flooding in Hong Kong had no relation with the Shenzhen water discharge. Objectively speaking, ordinary citizens were not weather experts, but it was up to the government authorities to communicate with citizens in a better and prompt manner to dispel such an unfounded rumour.
Fourth, some lawmakers have pointed to the need for the government to examine its announcement on the morning of September 8th that employers should make their own work arrangements. While the government said that it could not “cut in one slice” by asking all employees to stop their work, trade unionists have argued that there was a “legal vacuum” by asking employees to do so. Federation of Trade Union legislator Tang Ka-piu said that there should be a legislation on the termination of work, and that employers and employees do not really know how to respond to the government’s call for them to arrange their own work under “severe weather” conditions. Other critics of the government said that it kicked the ball to employers to deal with a crisis without clear guidelines. It is controversial on whether the government should legislate on the termination of work under “severe weather” condition or whether it should just issue guidelines to do so. Currently, the government believes that employers should be given the discretion to decide work arrangements under the circumstances of Typhoon number 8.
In conclusion, the torrential rain caused by the “residual rain” of Haikui exposed the problems of crisis management in the HKSAR. Earlier weather warnings could have been made; better communications with the citizens could also have been made; more communication is also needed between the Hong Kong and Shenzhen government authorities in dealing with weather and climate change; and there is a need for review of the discretion given to employers in work arrangements under Typhoon 8 circumstances. If national security embraces how governments deal with sudden climate change conditions, then the HKSAR authorities must learn a lesson from the legacies of the sudden and heavy rainstorm that brough havoc to Hong Kong within a short period of time.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-rainstorm-paralyzed-hong-kong-lessons-for-crisis-management/
