中日會成為烏克蘭危機的調停人嗎？

2023年3月21日，在國家主席習近平與俄羅斯總統普京簽署中俄兩國關於深化新時代全面戰略協作夥伴關係的聯合聲明之際，日本首相岸田文雄突訪烏克蘭並會見總統澤連斯基。從中日與俄羅斯、烏克蘭的互動來看，中日雙方以調解人的身份介入烏克蘭危機，可以說突然打開了一扇機會之門。

《中俄關於深化全面戰略協作夥伴關係的聯合聲明》具有重要的政治和外交意義。

中俄聯合聲明強調非冷戰同盟

第一，《聯合聲明》明確中俄關係不是類似冷戰時期的軍事政治同盟；相反，它超越該種國家關係模式，具有不結盟、不對抗、不針對第三國的性質──這意味着兩國在深化全面戰略協作夥伴關係時並不真正針對任何其他第三國。《聯合聲明》說，俄羅斯需要繁榮穩定的中國，中國需要強大成功的俄羅斯。

第二，中俄都在相互尊重、平等相待的基礎上，在多極世界中建立合作夥伴關係。

不過，兩國都反對霸權主義、單邊主義和保護主義──這是對他們認為的霸權國家美國的含蓄批評，儘管《聯合聲明》表面上沒有針對任何第三國。

第三，中俄雙方在維護各自核心利益的基礎上，通過維護自身主權、領土完整、國家安全和發展，推動世界多極化、經濟全球化、國際關係民主化，確保中俄關係始終沿着正確方向前行，推動全球治理朝着更加公正合理的方向發展。

第四，雙方指出，各國自身歷史、文化、國情不同，都有自主選擇發展道路的權利。雙方反對任何國家通過所謂「民主對抗權威」的觀念，將自己的價值觀和意識形態強加於人。雙方反對將民主、自由作為向他國施壓的政治工具。俄方高度重視中方提出的全球文明倡議。在俄方支持中方實現「中國式現代化」的同時，中方支持俄方實現2030年前國家發展目標。

第五，俄方重申恪守「一個中國」原則，承認台灣是中國不可分割的一部分，雙方同意在戰略安全磋商和執法安全合作機制框架下展開互信對話，加強在防範「顏色革命」、打擊包括「東伊運」在內的三股勢力、跨國有組織犯罪、經濟犯罪、毒品犯罪等執法領域合作。此外，雙方高度重視維護兩國海外人員和機構安全及權益，將不斷拓展海外公民、項目、機構安全保護合作方式和領域。

加強雙邊貿易推動跨領域合作

第六，雙方加強雙邊貿易、電子商務、經濟合作、產業鏈供應鏈安全、雙邊投資、創新合作、數字經濟、綠色可持續發展、貨幣金融合作、油氣燃料合作、煤炭與能源、核能、可再生能源及氣候變化等方面合作。其他合作領域包括航空、汽車製造、船舶製造、交通設施、港口能力、鐵路和海運、農產品供應，以及推動橫跨亞歐大陸的「一帶一路」建設。

第七，雙方將推動上海合作組織發展，加強人文交流合作，包括大學聯盟和中學聯盟建設、推動合作辦學和職業教育交流，並在人工智慧、物聯網、5G、數字經濟、低碳經濟等技術與産業領域探索合作新模式。

第八，其他合作領域包括科學研究、醫療衛生和保建研究、博物館和圖書館、傳染病防治、體育、海洋和生態研究、海上救援和演習、傳媒和出版、檔案和文藝等。充分利用世界衛生組織、金磚國家、上海合作組織、20國集團、亞太經合組織等現有國際組織，進一步深化協作。

第九，俄方指出中方關於構建人類命運共同體對加強國際社會團結，合力應對共同挑戰具有積極意義；中方積極評價俄方為推動構建公正的多極化國際關係所作建設性不懈努力。

上述信息有一個重要的暗示，即中方正在倡導和平的國際社會主義思想；俄方決心建立一個「公平」的多極新世界。

主張避免核戰阻止戰爭惡化

第十，雙方將加強中俄與印度、中俄與蒙古，以及東亞峰會、東盟地區論壇等地區國際論壇的協作。中俄將就深化同東盟合作加強協調，繼續推動鞏固東盟在地區架構中的中心地位。

鑑於中印之間持續存在的邊界爭端和緊張局勢，提及中國、俄羅斯和印度之間的三角關係非常重要。中俄聯合聲明的含義是，俄羅斯可能在調停中印未來任何嚴重的邊界爭端和可能發生的衝突方面發揮關鍵作用。在意識形態上，印度與美國和日本關係密切，但印度在俄烏衝突問題上似乎保持相對中立。

十一，中俄雙方強調降低核戰爭風險和避免使用核武器的重要性。雙方同意，所有核武器國家都不應在境外部署核武器並應撤出在境外部署的核武器。

避免核戰爭的主張，可說是《聯合聲明》的重要組成部分，但大多數西方觀察家都忽視了。在俄烏戰爭持續升級、動用核武器的前景令人擔憂之際，《中俄聯合聲明》可以說是阻止俄烏戰爭進一步惡化的重大舉措。

十二，中俄雙方對由美英澳組成的三邊安全夥伴關係（AUKUS）表示嚴重關切，同時強調日本今年將福島放射性污染水排放到太平洋的舉動令人嚴重關切。中俄敦促日本以科學、透明、安全的方式妥善處置放射性污染水。

中俄兩國也都致力於建立一個沒有化學武器的世界，但從客觀的角度來看，這一理想可能難以實現。

十三，中俄雙方都反對將外太空演變成軍事對抗疆域的行為，主張快啟動具有法律約束力的多邊文書談判，為防止外太空軍備競賽、外太空武器化及防止對外太空物體使用或威脅使用武力提供根本和可靠的保障──鑑於更多國家競相將外太空用作衛星監視和軍事競賽的舞台，這個共同理想可以說是重要的。

十四，俄方在積極肯定中方在烏克蘭問題上的「客觀公正立場」的同時，也希望重啟和談。俄方積極肯定中方關於烏克蘭危機的立場文件，雙方均表示希望各國避免在烏克蘭問題上「拱火澆油」。

問題的癥結在於，儘管中方試圖在烏克蘭危機中充當調解人，但美國及其西方盟友認為北京偏向俄方，中方的立場文件和這份中俄聯合聲明中都提到「勸和促談」，但俄方佔領了頓巴斯地區，在軍事上明顯處於有利位置。

不過，如果中國和日本等更多中間人參與「勸和促談」，僵局是可以解決的。

Will China and Japan be the mediators in the Russo-Ukrainian Crisis?

On March 21, 2023, while the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Xi Jinping signed a Joint Declaration with the Russian President Vladimir Putin on the deepening of their strategic partnership, the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made a surprise visit to meet the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Judging from how China and Japan interacted with Russia and Ukraine, a new window of opportunity has suddenly and arguably emerged for the Sino-Japanese involvement in the Ukrainian crisis as double mediators.

The Joint Declaration on the Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic partnership is politically and diplomatically significant in its content.

First, the Joint Declaration asserts that the Sino-Russian relations are not a military-political alliance as with the Cold War situation; instead, it transcends the model of state relations by having the three features of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeted at the third country – an implication that both states are not really targeted at any other third country while forging a special relationship. The Joint Declaration says that while Russia needs a prosperous China, China also needs a strong Russia.

Second, both China and Russia establish their cooperative partnership on the basis of mutual respect and equality and in the midst of a multipolar world.

However, they both reject hegemonism, unilateralism and protectionism – an implicit criticism of their perceived hegemonic power the United States although the Joint Declaration apparently does not target at any third country.

Third, on the basis of protecting their core interests, both China and Russia ensure the continuous development of Sino-Russian relations by protecting their own sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security and development and by promoting multipolarity, economic globalization, democratization of international relations, and the need for fair and just global governance.

Fourth, both sides affirm that each country has its history, culture and tradition and thereby each has its right to select the developmental path, while opposing any country to impose its values and ideology onto others through the so-called “democracy versus authority” conceptual description. Both sides oppose the usage of democracy and freedom as a political tool of exerting pressure on other countries. As such, Russia supports China’s global civilization advocacy. While Russia supports China-style modernization, China also supports Russia to realize its national developmental objectives in 2030.

Fifth, while Russia supports the one-China principle and recognizes that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, both sides agree to engage in mutual dialogue based on mutual trust and to engage in security dialogue through the security and interior ministries to prevent “colour revolution” and the third forces that engage in terrorism and cross-border crimes in economic and drugs spheres. Furthermore, both sides attach great importance to the safety of their diplomatic staff and organizations in overseas countries by engaging in protective cooperation and projects.

Sixth, both sides enhance bilateral trade, e-commerce, economic cooperation, logistics supply chain safety, mutual investment, innovative cooperation, digital economy, green and sustainable development, monetary and financial collaboration, gas and fuel cooperation, coal and energy and nuclear supply as well as the development of renewable energy and climate change. Other areas of cooperation include aviation, automobile manufacturing, shipping manufacturing, transport facilities, port capacity, railway and marine transport, agricultural products supply, and the promotion of Belt and Road initiatives which cut across Asian and European continents.

Seventh, both sides promote the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, enhance cultural and education and human exchanges, including alliances between universities, vocational and secondary schools and talent exchanges so that artificial intelligence, Internet, 5G, digital economy and low carbon economic techniques will be promoted and explored with progress in the future.

Eighth, other areas of collaboration embrace scientific research, health facilities and health studies, museum and libraries, the prevention and tackling of infectious diseases, sports, maritime and ecological research, marine rescue and exercises, the mass media and publications, and archival records and arts. The available international organizations such as the World Health Organization, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation will be fully utilized to strengthen mutual cooperation.

Ninth, Russia supports China’s idea of constructing a common destiny for the mankind to enhance international social solidarity, while China supports Russia in the promotion of a fair and multipolar international relations system.

The message above entails an important implication that China is advocating an ideology of peaceful and international socialism and that Russia is determined to establish a new multipolar world with “fairness.”

Tenth, both sides enhance the international forums in the regions involving both countries and India, both countries and Mongolia, East Asia and ASEAN. China and Russia will strengthen coordination in the ASEAN region.

The reference to the triangular relations between China, Russia and India is important in light of the ongoing border disputes and tensions between China and India. The implication of the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration is that Russia may play a crucial role in mediating any serious border dispute and possible conflicts between China and India in the future. Ideologically, India is close to the US and Japan, but India appears to maintain its relative neutrality over the Russo-Ukrainian conflicts.

Eleventh, both China and Russia affirm the importance of reducing the risks of nuclear war and avoiding the usage of nuclear weapons. Both sides agree that states with nuclear weapons should withdraw such weapons from the regions outside their territories.

This reference to the avoidance of nuclear war is arguably an important part of the Joint Declaration neglected by most Western observers. At a time when the Russo-Ukrainian war is proceeding in a prolonged way in which concerns were raised on the prospects of utilizing nuclear weapons, the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration is arguably a significant move that may prevent the further deterioration of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Twelfth, both China and Russia express their deep concern about AUKUS which is composed of the US, UK and Australia, while emphasizing that Japan’s move of releasing radioactive water from Fukushima to the Pacific Ocean this year is a matter of serious concern. Both sides hope that Japan can be more transparent and scientific in the process of releasing radioactive water into the ocean.

Both China and Russia also aim at creating a world without biochemical weapons – an ideal which may be difficult to be realized from an objective standpoint, however.

Thirteen, both China and Russia oppose the moves of changing the outer space into a place where military action and confrontation become a phenomenon. Legal restraint and multilateral dialogue and documents will be necessary to prevent the militarization of the outer space – a common ideal that is arguably important given the rivalries of more countries to use the outer space as an arena of satellite surveillance and military contests.

Fourteen, while Russia actively affirms the “objective and fair position” of China on the Ukrainian issue, Russia also wants to initiate peace talks. Russia affirms positively China’s position paper on the Ukrainian crisis, while both sides express the hope that all countries should avoid “adding any oil onto the flame” of the Ukrainian issue.

Here, the crux of the problem is that while China attempts to act as a mediator in the Ukrainian crisis, it is perceived by the US and its Western allies as being biased in favour of Russia, which appears to occupy the Donbas region in a militarily advantageous position at a time talks and dialogue are mentioned in not only China’s position paper but also this Sino-Russian Joint Declaration.

The impasse, however, can be tackled if more middlemen can perhaps be involved, such as China and Japan.

The Japanese Prime Minister Kishida projected an image of protecting and favouring the Ukrainian side during his meeting with Zelensky.

Perhaps the way forward for China and Japan are to explore how the conditions for ceasefire in the Russo-Ukrainian war can be reached in the first place, like the exchange of prisoners. Then other issues, like whether Ukraine would adopt neutrality without joining NATO in exchange for Russia’s possible withdrawal from at least parts of the eastern territories, may be bargained further.

If so, the recent responses from China and Japan to the Russo-Ukrainian conflicts may open a door of opportunity for both Beijing and Tokyo to explore how the war between Russia and Ukraine can be stopped. The PRC’s position on the Ukrainian crisis was a positive step, but the conditions for ceasefire need to be hammered out by middlemen such as China and Japan in a constructive, collective and concrete manner.

What is significant in the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration is that while Russia agrees to the prospect of dialogue and peace in the Ukrainian crisis, China has already secured Russia’s agreement to avoid the usage of nuclear weapons. As such, some Western observers with bias against China and with their deep perception of the “China threat” and the “Russian threat” should perhaps read the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration in a more neutral and objective way.

In fact, China’s reaction to Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Ukraine was lukewarm. The Chinese Foreign Minister spokesman Wang Wenbin said on March 21 that China hopes Japan can do more things to deescalate tensions in the Ukrainian crisis – an implicit message that both China and Japan may sit down and discuss how both countries can mediate in the Russo-Ukrainian conflicts. Wang also added that the international society should “create the conditions of solving the Ukrainian crisis politically.” If so, the opportunities for both China and Japan to become potential and real mediators persist. Despite the fact that China and Japan have their differences over other matters, such as territorial dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Island and the forthcoming release of radioactive water from Fukushima to the Pacific Ocean, both Asian powers have already made important inroads in the Ukrainian crisis by interacting with the two main parties – Russia and Ukraine.

In conclusion, the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration came at a time when Japanese Prime Minister Kishida also interacted with the Ukrainian President Zelensky. It signalled the development of a special relationship between China and Russia at a time a new Cold War is developing in the world. Observers who superficially view China and Russia as the “threats” to the Western world have perhaps played down the significance of the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration. However, the Joint Declaration is diplomatically very significant in two aspects: Russia is willing to have dialogue over the Ukrainian crisis and it has signed a document that affirms the avoidance of utilizing any nuclear weapons. If two important bottom lines have been met, then the conditions for ceasefire over the Ukrainian crisis can be explored collectively by not only China but also Japan. Given the fact that China and Japan are good neighbours for almost forty-five years after both sides established diplomatic relations in October 1978, it is perhaps the ripe time for both Asian powers to act as real mediators in the Russo-Ukrainian conflicts. It remains to be seen, however, how China and Japan can and will perhaps explore the necessary conditions for ceasefire in the Ukrainian crisis.

原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。網址：
https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-will-china-and-japan-be-the-mediators-in-the-russo-ukrainian-crisis/